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This dissertation examines the immigration policy in Italy at the beginning of 2011.  
This aim has been pursued through the analysis of a European Court of Human 
Rights’ Grand Chamber case, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy tackling issues as illegal 
detention, torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and collective 
expulsion.  
The study has been carried out firstly by analyzing and comparing all the national, 
European and supranational human rights legal texts; secondly by examining the 
process of communicating rights to migrants; and thirdly by considering the legal 
translation of the Court as a tool for communicating and disseminating migrants’ rights.  
From a legal point of view, the research has shed light on the legislation and the 
mechanism of the Italian reception system through an in-depth study of the border and 
migration management, the stakeholders involved and the events characterizing 
Lampedusa in 2011, which shows that an adequate immigration policy is necessary to 
ensure that individuals or groups of individuals do not endure human rights’ violations.  
From a linguistic point of view, it emerges, instead, that human rights legal texts 
stand out for their vagueness, high register and technical terminology and consequently 
they may not be comprehensible to all migrants. Therefore, communication, in the form 
of mediation or translation, may turn out to be a tool to efficiently convey the contents 
and the rights of legal texts.  
The analysis of the case has proved that migrants were not appropriately 
communicated with their rights, showing that when states are overwhelmed by large 
migration flows, authorities may be given more leeway to manage them, at the expense 
of the human rights enshrined in law.  
Additionally, the translation analysis of the Khlaifia case has demonstrated the 
contribution of legal translation to the dissemination of contents in human rights legal 












Immigration has existed since prehistory, when homo sapiens moved from Africa to 
the Middle East and finally to Europe. Over the centuries, technological innovation and 
global connection have constantly changed the structure of migration processes. A 
significant turning point took place in 2011, where people from North Africa began 
seeking shelter in Europe as a consequence of the Arab Spring. This incoming flux put a 
strain on border and migration management in Italy, one of the main protagonists of this 
new scenario. The country was unexpectedly not ripe to face this situation, leading to a 
frequently violation of some of the rights enshrined in the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
The aim of this research is therefore to explain the Italian immigration policy at the 
very beginning of the uprisings of 2011 through the analysis of a specific case: Khlaifia 
and Others v. Italy. The case tackles the holding of irregular migrants in a reception center 
on the island of Lampedusa and their subsequent removal to Tunisia. The case was 
brought by three Tunisian in 2011 against the Italian Republic before the Grand Chamber 
of the European Court of Human Rights for the violation of some of the principles stated 
in the Convention: Article 5§1 “right to liberty and security”, Article 5§2 “right to be 
promptly informed of the reasons for deprivation of liberty”, Article 5§4 “right to a 
speedy decision on the lawfulness of detention”, Article 3 “prohibition of inhuman or 
degrading treatment”, and Article 4 of the Protocol No. 4 “prohibition of collective 
expulsion of aliens”. The case is of worthiness as the issues raised by the complainants 
as well as the principles affirmed by the Grand Chamber are relevant to the migration and 
border management which involves not only Italy, but also the EU Member States and 
institutions. For the purpose of this dissertation, the Khlaifia’s case has been analyzed 
both from a legal and a linguistic point of view.  
Chapter 1 narrates not only the facts, but also the decisions taken by the Grand 
Chamber regarding the Khlaifia and Others v. Italy case, shedding light on the impact 
that the case had on the development in the human rights protection policies. Chapter 2 
analyzes and compares, instead, all the national, European and supranational legal texts 
used by the Court for delivering the final judgment of the case. These texts concern 
issues as illegal detention, torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and 




solution to the shortcomings of Italian immigration policy. Therefore, the process and 
the actors involved in the migration and border management have been examined, as 
well as the events in Lampedusa at the time of Khlaifia case. Lastly, Chapter 4 sheds 
light on the role of translation in disseminating migrants’ rights, with a particular regard 
to the translation activities and programs of the European Court of Human Rights. To 
ensure a better understanding, an analysis and a comparison of the translation from 







The Khlaifia and Others v. Italy case: an analysis of the legal 
narration 
This dissertation sheds light on the Italian immigration policy at the beginning of the 
Arab Spring of 2011 through the analysis of an exemplary case lodged with the 
European Court of Human Rights: Khlaifia and Others v. Italy. Therefore, Chapter 1 
will narrate the facts of the case and the judgments taken by the Second Section of the 
Chamber and by the Grand Chamber and explain its relevance in the migration 
management.    
 
 1.1. The facts 
The Khlaifia and Others v. Italy case concerns the holding of irregular migrants in a 
reception center on the island of Lampedusa and on ships in Palermo and their 
subsequent removal to Tunisia1.  The applicants are three Tunisian nationals, namely 
Mr Saber Ben Mohamed Ben Ali Khlaifia (Mr Khlaifia), Mr Fakhreddine Ben Brahim 
Ben Mustapha Tabal (Mr Tabal) and Mr Mohamed Ben Habib Ben Jaber Sfar (Mr 
Sfar), who left their home country in September 2011 heading for Italian coasts. After 
several hours at sea on board of rudimentary vessels, the applicants were intercepted on 
September 16 and 17 by the Italian coastguard, which escorted them to a port on the 
island of Lampedusa. They were first transferred to an Early Reception and Aid Centre 
(CSPA) in Contrada Imbriacola, where they were given first aid and were subjected to 
identification measures by the authorities. CSPAs, which are run by the European 
Union, are commonly known as migration hotspots and they have to be distinguished 
from Italy’s Centers for Identification and Expulsion (CIE) which are run by Italy and 
authorized by Italian legislation2. On this occasion, individual information sheets were 
filled in for each of the migrants, although the applicants disputed this. The migrants 
 
1Cfr. Khlafia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016). Judgements of the Court cited 
herein are available at its website: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.  
2Goldenziel J.I., “Khlaifia and Others v. Italy”, ed. Wuerth I., in The American Society of International 





complained not only about the living condition and the overcrowd in the CSPA, but also 
about the permanent surveillance by the police. Actually, they claimed that they had not 
been allowed to leave the center and had never got into contact with the outside world. 
The applicants remained in the center until September 20, when a revolt broke out 
among the migrants. As the center was guttered by fire, the migrants were transported to 
a sport complex in Lampedusa for the night. At dawn on September 21, the applicants 
escaped from the police and they reached other migrants in the city center of 
Lampedusa, where they took part to a demonstration through the streets of the island 
with other 1.8000 migrants. After being stopped by the police, they were first taken to 
the reception center and then to Lampedusa airport. On September 22 they were 
transferred to Palermo and after their disembarkation they were moved onto two ships 
moored in the harbor. Mr Khlaifia was placed with other 190 migrants on the Vincent, 
while Mr Tabal and Mr Sfar were boarded on the Audace with other 150 migrants and 
they all remained there for a few days. Here too, the applicants denounced the bad 
conditions in which they were forced to live and the fact that they were allegedly 
insulted and ill-treated by police officers, who kept them under permanent surveillance 
and did not give them any information about the reasons of their detention. On 
September 27, Mr Tabal and Mr Safal were taken to Palermo airport and so was Mr 
Khlaifia on September 29, where they were all pending for their removal. Before 
boarding the planes for Tunisia, all the applicants were received by the Tunisian Consul 
who merely recorded their identities in accordance with the agreement between Italy 
and Tunisia of April 2011. This text, however, was secret to migrants and to the public. 
The migrants complained in their applications that they had not been issued with any 
documents regarding their status and the reasons of their detention during their stay in 
Italy. By contrast, in its observations the Government wrote that it issued three refusal-
of-entry in respect of the applicants on September 27 and 29. Moreover, it wrote a 
record indicating that the applicants refused to sign or receive a copy of those orders. 
When they arrived at Tunis airport, they were released. 
 
1.2. The Chamber judgment  
On March 9, 2012 the applicants brought an action (application no.16483/12) against 




some of the principles stated in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. The application was allocated to the Second Section of the 
Court (Rule 52§1 of the Rules of Court). Precisely,  the accusation concerned articles 
3,4,5 and 13. With regard to Article 5, they claimed that they had been deprived of their 
personal freedom in the absence of the legal requirements (Article 5§1, right to liberty 
and security), that they had not received any explanation for their detention (Article 
5§2, right to be promptly informed of the reasons for deprivation of liberty) and they 
had not had the opportunity to contest such deprivation (Article 5§4, right to a speedy 
decision on the lawfulness of detention). Moreover, with reference to Article 3 and 4 
Protocol No. 4, they claimed that they had been detained in inhuman and degrading 
conditions both in the Lampedusa CSPA and on board of the Vincent and Audace 
(Article 3, prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) and to have been subjected to 
collective expulsion (Article 4 Protocol No. 4, prohibition of collective expulsion of 
aliens). Lastly, invoking Article 13, they complained the lack of the possibility to have a 
judicial remedy against these violations (Article 13, right to an effective remedy, in 
conjunction with Article 3 and Article 13 in conjunction with article 4 Protocol no.4). 
On September 1, 2015 the Chamber delivered a judgment, finding unanimously that 
there had been a violation of Article 5§§1,2 and 4 of the Convention, while no violation 
of Article 3 resulted as to the conditions in which the applicants were held on board the 
ships Vincent and Audace. By five votes to two, the Chamber found a violation of 
Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions in which the applicants were 
held in the reception center, a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, and a violation of 
Article 13 of the Convention, taken together with Article 3 and with Article 4 of 
Protocol No.4.  
 
1.3. The Grand Chamber decision 
On December 1, 2015 the Government requested the referral of the case to the Grand 
Chamber, which was accepted by its panel on February 1, 2016. The case attracted the 
attention of human rights groups: the Coordination Français pour le droit d’asile 
(French coalition for the right of asylum), the Center for Human Rights and Legal 
Pluralism of McGill University, the AIRE Centre and the European Council on 




the following paragraphs we are going to present in detail the decision of the Grand 
Chamber in regard to the violation of the above-mentioned articles of the Convention. 
 
1.3.1. Article 5§1 of the Convention 
Article 5§1 shall guarantee liberty and freedom as a fundamental right to everyone3 
and consequently it shall protect the individual against the arbitrary interference by the 
States. However, the Convention covers a series of exceptions listed from subparagraph 
a) to f), by which a State is allowed to deprive the liberty of an individual. No 
deprivation of liberty is considered as lawful, unless it falls within one of those grounds, 
indeed.  Moreover, the Convention states that the detention shall rest on a legal basis in 
domestic law4. As mentioned above, the applicants accused the Italian Government of 
having been detained unlawfully in CSPA and on Vincent and Audace ships. Here, the 
Court confirmed what had already been said in the Chamber judgment: the applicants’ 
deprivation of liberty fell within subparagraph (f) of Article 5§1, as it is evidently aimed 
at controlling the entry of foreigners into the national territory: “the lawful arrest or 
detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or 
of a person against whom action is being with a view to deportation or extradition”. 
However, this exception had no legal basis in Italian law at that time, but the 
Government was expected to present proof of it. Firstly, the Government provided the 
Court with Article 14 of the “Consolidated text of provisions concerning immigration 
regulations and rules on the status of aliens” which states that “the questore provides for 
the alien to be kept for the time strictly necessary at the nearest identification and 
expulsion center […]5”. However, it could not have constituted the legal basis for the 
applicants’ case, since the applicants  had been held in a CSPA, which is only aimed at 
first aid and identification, and not in a facility covered by that instrument, namely a 
CIE (identification and removal center). Secondly, the Government considered Article 
10 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 as the legal basis for detention which refers to 
 
3Cfr. Article 5§1 “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. […]”. 
4Cfr. Khlafia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §91). 




the rejection of aliens6. However, the Court did not find any reference therein to 
detention or other measures regarding the deprivation of liberty, therefore it could not 
be considered as the legal basis for the applicants’ detention. Thirdly, the Government 
regarded the bilateral agreement between Italy and Tunisia of April 2011 as the legal 
basis for detention. However, the Court noted that the full text of this agreement had not 
been made public and therefore it had not been accessible to the applicants, who 
accordingly could not have foreseen the consequences of its application. Because of 
scant information, the bilateral agreement could have not been considered as the legal 
basis for detention. The lack of legal basis for the applicants’ detention was confirmed 
by the report of the Senate’s Special Commission7 . In addition, the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-
Committee8 had expressly recommended that the Italian authorities should “clarify the 
legal basis for the de facto detention in the reception centers in Lampedusa9”. The Court 
added that the persons placed in CSPA could have not benefit from the safeguards 
applicable to placement in a CIE, which had to be validated by an administrative 
decision subject to review by the Justice of the Peace. In this regard, the Palermo 
preliminary investigations judge stated in his decision on June 1, 2012 that the police 
authority had merely registered the presence of the migrants both in CSPA and in their 
transfer to the ships, without ordering their placement. Consequently, the applicants 
were not only deprived of their liberty unlawfully, but also of the protection under 
fundamental safeguards of habeas corpus laid down in the Article 13 of the Italian 
Constitution10. The applicants’ detention had not been validated by any judicial or 
administrative decision, which led a violation of important safeguards. To conclude, 
there had been a violation of article 5§1 of the Convention, because the applicants’ 
deprivation of liberty had not been compliant with the general principle of legal 
certainty and it had not pursued the aim of protecting the individual against 
arbitrariness.  
 
6Cfr. Article 10, Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998. 
7Cfr. Khlafia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §35). 
8The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) set up an “Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the 
larger-scale arrival of irregular migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees on Europe’s southern shores” 
which wrote a report after the visit to Lampedusa on 23 and 24 May 2011.  





1.3.2. Article 5§2 of the Convention  
The Article 5§2 shall guarantee that “everyone who is arrested shall be informed 
promptly, in a language that he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and ay charge 
against him”. The violation of this article is a consequence of the violation of Article 
5§1: as the applicants’ detention had no clear legal basis, the authorities could have not 
given them proper information on time. The migrants were aware that they had entered 
the country illegally, but still they had the right to know the legal and factual reasons for 
their detention. The Court stated that the Government did not write any official 
documents containing the information needed. Conversely, the Government said it had 
provided the migrants with the refusal-of-entry orders. Still, the Court noted that these 
orders could have not be considered as official documents capable of satisfying the 
requirements of Article 5§2  as they did not mention the legal and factual grounds for 
detention and they were given to the applicants belatedly11. Therefore, they did not 
satisfy the condition of “prompt” information and consequently there had been a 
violation of Article 5§2. 
 
1.3.3. Article 5§4 of the Convention  
According to the Article 5§4, everyone deprived of his/ her liberty has the right to 
lodge an appeal before a court, which has the duty to decide speedily whether the 
detention was lawful or not12. Since the applicants were not promptly given legal and 
factual information about the reasons of their detention, as a consequence, they could 
not have asked for a remedy before a court. Their right to let the lawfulness of their 
detention be checked have been deprived of all substance and the Italian legal system 
did not provide the applicants with any remedy, whereby they could have obtained a 
decision by a court on the lawfulness of their detention. Therefore, there had been a 
violation of Article 5§4.  
 
11The refusal-of-entry orders were notified to the applicants only on September 27 and 29, 2011, but they 
had been placed in the CSPA on September 17 and 18, 2011.  
12Cfr. Article 5§4: “Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release 




1.3.4. Article 3 of the Convention  
The applicants accused the Italian Government of inhuman or degrading treatment 
during their detention in the CSPA at Contrada Imbriacola in Lampedusa and on board 
of the ships Vincent and Audace moored in Palermo harbor. Article 3 of the 
Convention13 represents an important cornerstone in a democratic society, indeed. In 
order to determine whether a violation of this article had taken place, the Court needs to 
take into account its consolidated case-law14. Firstly, the Court’s case-law states that ill-
treatment must attain a minimum level of severity, which depends on all the 
circumstances of the case, such as: a) the purpose of an ill-treatment; b) the intention 
behind an ill-treatment and c) the context. Secondly, the case-law of the Court needs to 
analyze whether the victim is vulnerable, which is strictly connected to the status of the 
migrant. Thirdly, it is important to consider the consolidated case-law on prison 
overcrowding, which states that the violation of Article 3 of the Convention takes place 
not only when the allocation of a living space is less than 3 square meters, but also 
when there is a larger space devoid of access to the open air, minimum standards of 
confidentiality, adequate sanitary conditions, and convenient access to toilets. Lastly, 
the Court recalls that the parties have to support their allegations with clear evidence. 
After having cited its case-law, the Court found necessary to analyze the general context 
in which the facts arose: Italy had been facing a humanitarian crisis following the events 
related to the Arab Spring, which brought many migrants to leave their home countries 
heading for Italian coast. The increasing number of migrants created organizational, 
structural and logistical difficulties for the Italian authorities which declared a state of 
humanitarian emergency on the island of Lampedusa and appealed for solidarity from 
the Member States of the European Union. Therefore, Italy argued that the migrants 
were detained in an exceptional humanitarian emergency. Both in CSPA at Contrada 
Imbriacola and on ships Vincent and Audace, the Courts stated that the migrants were 
not considered vulnerable as they were neither asylum seekers nor children, but they 
 
13Cfr. Article 3: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”.  
14As regards the Court’s case-law of the judgment, it is interesting the online article by Giliberto A., “La 
pronuncia della Grande Camera della Corte EDU sui trattenimenti (e i conseguenti respingimenti) di 




were young and in good health15 and that the duration of both confinements was 
relatively short16. In regard to the conditions of the CSPA at Contrada Imbriacola and 
on Vincent and Audace ships, the Court decided to analyze them separately. Regarding 
the reception center, the Court acknowledged that its conditions were far from being 
good. Problems of overcrowding, poor hygiene and lack of contact with the outside 
world were confirmed by the reports of the Senate’s special Commission17 and 
Amnesty International18, which stated that the center was not suited to stays of several 
days. Also, in its report the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee expressed in its concerns 
about the sanitary conditions as a result of overcrowding in the CSPA19. Nevertheless, 
the report20 also stated that the general conditions could have not been as rough as those 
compared to other judgments in which a violation of this article had taken place21. In 
addition, a revolt broke out among the migrants and the center had been guttered by 
fire. Consequently, the migrants were taken to a sport complex in Lampedusa, which 
demonstrated that the authorities had not been inactive toward the situation and the 
migrants. In addition, the Court observed that there was any precise data of the capacity 
of the center and of the actual number of people in the CSPA, therefore the Court made 
approximate calculations noticing that the percentage of overcrowding did not exceed 
75%, which allowed migrants to have a minimum freedom of movement within the 
center. Lastly, the Court observed that the applicants did not claim that they had been 
 
15At that time, Mr Khlaifia was 28, Mr Tabal was 24 and Mr Sfar was 23: they were all relatively young.  
16In the CSPA at Contrada Imbriacola, Mr Khlafia stayed from 16 September to 20 September (four 
days), whereas  Mr Tabal stayed from September 17 to September 20(three days); the confinement on the 
ships began on September 22, 2011 and ended on 29 for Mr Khlaifia (seven days) and on September 27 
for Mr Tabal and Mr Sfar (five days).   
17Cfr. Khlafia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §35). 
18Ibidem, §50. 
19Parliamentary Assembly, “Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-scale arrival of irregular migrants, 
asylum-seekers and refugees on Europe’s southern shores”, September 30, 2011, §§30,48. 
20Parliamentary Assembly, “Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-scale arrival of irregular migrants, 
asylum-seekers and refugees on Europe’s southern shores”, September 30, 2011, §§28,29,32,47: the 
associations of “Praesidium Project” (UNHCR, the IOM, the Red Cross and Save the Children) could 
remain permanently inside the reception center; there was cooperation among all participants with the 
aim of saving lives at sea; the reception conditions were decent, although basic; it was possible to ask for 
a medical visit and a regular inspection of the sanity facilities and food at the center was carried out by 
the Head of the Palermo Health Unit. 
21Cfr. M.S.S. v. Belgium  and Greece (no. 30696/09, §§ 223-34, November 21, 2011);  S.D. v. Greece  
(no. 53541/07, §§ 49-54, June  11, 2009); Tabesh v. Greece  (no. 8256/07, §§ 38-44, November 26, 
2009);  A.A. v. Greece (no. 12186/08, §§ 57-65, July 22, 2010): all these cases are cited in Khlafia and 




deliberately ill-treated by the authorities in the center, or that there had been insufficient 
food or water. To conclude, the treatment they complained of had not exceeded the 
level of severity and therefore there had been no violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention regarding the CSPA at Contrada Imbriacola. As regards the situation on the 
ships Vincent and Audace, the applicants alleged that they stayed in bad and 
overcrowded conditions, among which sleeping on the floor and waiting several hours 
to use the toilets, that they were occasionally insulted and ill-treated by the police and 
that they did not receive any information about the reason of their detention from the 
authorities. However, the Court replied that all these allegations were not based on any 
objective element other their own testimony, for example a document proving any 
signs, evident signs of the alleged ill-treatment or any third-party testimony. Although 
the case-law allocates the burden of the proof to the Government, in this case there had 
been any clear evidence of ill-treatment. Moreover, the Government referred to the 
judicial decision of the Palermo preliminary investigations judge dated June 1, 2012, 
which indicated that the migrants were provided with medical assistance, hot water, 
electricity, meals and hot drinks22. The judicial decision cited also a press agency note 
dated September 25, 2011, where a member of the parliament, T.R., with the deputy 
chief of police and police officers boarded on the vessels moored in Palermo harbor and 
he confirmed that the migrants were in good health conditions and that they had 
assistance, warm food and water. For the Court, there was no reasons to doubt such 
affirmations, and again the applicants did not produce any evidence capable of showing 
the ill-treatment. In conclusion, a violation of Article 3 had not taken place on the ships 
Vincent and Audace.  
 
1.3.5. Article 4 of the Protocol No.4 to the Convention  
The applicants claimed that they had been victims of collective expulsion23. 
According to the Court’s case-law, the concept of expulsion is interpreted in the generic 
meaning of driving someone away from a place24. In this case, the applicants were 
undoubtedly subject to expulsion as they were on Italian territory, they were removed 
 
22Cfr. Khlafia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §27). 
23Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 of the Convention: “Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited”.  




from the State and then sent back to Tunisia. The Court needed thus to understand 
whether this expulsion was collective or not. In this regard, the Court cited the ILC 
(International Law Commission) which indicated that “collective expulsion means 
expulsion of aliens, as a group”25 and the Court’s case-law which sees collective 
expulsions as “any measure compelling aliens, as a group, to leave a country, except 
where such a measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of 
the particular case of each individual alien of the group26”. The Article 4 Protocol No. 4 
of the Convention did not explicitly require individualized processing, but what is 
important is that each person concerned has an effective possibility to individually 
submit arguments against deportation. The Court agreed with the Government’s 
statements about the fact that the applicants had had many opportunities to explain the 
reason why they should have stayed in Italy or why they should have not returned back 
to their home country as they had undergone identification twice: by the Italian civil 
servants immediately after their arrival at the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA and by the 
Tunisia Consul before boarding the planes for Tunis. As to the conditions of the first 
identification, the Government argued that an individual interview had been carried out 
in the presence of an interpreter or cultural mediator and that “information sheet” 
containing personal data and specific circumstances had been then filled out by the 
authorities. Although this information sheet was destroyed by the fire in the reception 
center, the Court recognized that ninety-nine social operators, three social workers, 
three psychologists, and eight interpreters and cultural mediators were working at the 
center and thus they all were there in order to facilitate the cooperation and the 
communication between the migrants and the authorities. This demonstrated that the 
applicants could have talked about their situations to all of these operators at any time. 
This was also proved by the fact that seventy-two migrants applied for asylum during 
their stay in CSPA at Contrada Imbriacola, which demonstrated that the Italian 
authorities would have remained unreceptive to any request of legitimate and legally 
arguable impediments to their removal. As to the conditions of the second 
identification, the Court accepted the Government’s submission, according to which the 
 
25Cfr. Article 9§1 of the Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens and the Commentary to that Article.  
26Cfr. Georgia v. Russia (no. 13255/07, June 30, 2009); Vedran Andric v.Sweden (no.45917/99, February 
23, 1999); Davydov  v. Estonia  (no. 16387/03, May 31, 2005); Sultani v. France (no. 45223/05, 




refusal-of-entry orders took into account the specific conditions of each migrant. Its 
simple and standardized format was just due to the fact that the applicants did not have 
their travel documents, they had not alleged either that they feared ill-treatment in the 
event of their return or that there were any other legal impediments to their expulsion27. 
Moreover, in this occasion some of the migrants listed by the Italian authorities had not 
been removed at all, which demonstrated again that the applicants could have had the 
last chance to put forward their application before the Tunisian Consul, but they did not 
do it. Therefore, the virtually simultaneous removal of the three applicants did not lead 
to the conclusion that their expulsion had been “collective” in nature. To sum up, as the 
applicants had undergone identification twice and their nationality had been established, 
they could have put forward their arguments against their expulsion, but they did not do 
it. Consequently, there had been no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.  
 
1.3.6. Article 13 of the Convention taken together with Articles 3 and 5 of the 
Convention and with Article 4 of the Protocol No. 4 
According to Article 13 of the Convention, everyone has the right to an effective 
remedy28, which had not allegedly been granted to the applicants during their stay in 
Italy. The Court analyzed thus whether a violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken 
together with Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention and with Article 4 of the Protocol no. 4 
had taken place. First of all, the Court stated that the violation of Article 13 taken 
together with article 5 was covered by the findings under Article 5§4. Secondly, 
although violation of Article 3 of the Convention and 4 of the Protocol No. 4 had not 
taken place, the applicants had the right to afford their remedy. This is because of the 
nature of the Article 13 of the Convention, which must be effective in practice and in 
law and the “effectiveness” of “a remedy” does not depend on the certainty of a 
favorable outcome for the applicant. As to the violation of Article 13 taken together 
with Article 3, the Court observed that the Government did not provide the applicants 
 
27The applicants had unlawfully crossed the Italian border and they stay did not meet the conditions of 
Article 10§4 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 (political asylum, granting for refugee status or the 
adoption of temporary protection measures on humanitarian grounds). For all these reasons, the Court 
found reasonable that the refusal-of-entry orders had been justified merely by the applicants’ nationality.  
28Article 13 of the Convention: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are 
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has 




with any remedy neither in the CSPA at Contrada Imbriacola nor on the ships Vincent 
and Audace. Therefore, there had been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken 
together with Article 3 of the Convention. As to the violation of Article 13 taken 
together with Article 4 Protocol No. 4, the Court observed that the refusal-of-entry 
orders indicated the opportunity to appeal an effective remedy against their expulsion 
before the judge29. As a matter of fact, the Agrigento Justice of the Peace had already 
accepted an appeal by two migrants, and he had examined the procedure of these orders 
and assessed the lawfulness of that procedure in the light of domestic law and the 
Constitution. However, what the applicants argued is that these refusal-of-entry orders 
had not had a suspensive effect30. The Court pointed out that the need for suspensive 
effect is not absolute, but it is strictly related to the risk of ill-treatment31 or irreversible 
damage to the person32 as a consequence of the return in their home country33. This 
principle can be applied to Article 4 Protocol No. 4 in case the applicants would be 
exposed to a harm of potentially irreversible nature. As Mr Khlaifia, Mr Tabal and Mr 
Sfar did not make an appeal against their expulsion before the Agrigento Justice of the 
Peace and they had not stated that their lives would have been in danger or exposed to 
ill-treatment back in Tunisia, there was no violation of Article 13 of the Convention 
taken together with Article 4 of the Protocol No. 4.  
 
1.3.7. Article 41 of the Convention  
By fifteen votes to two, the Court established that the Italian Government had to pay 
each applicant 2,500 euros in respect of non-pecuniary damage and, unanimously, that 
it had to pay 15,000 to the applicants jointly in respect of costs and expenses.  
 
29Cfr. Khlafia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §19). 
30Ibidem. 
31Cfr. Article 3 of the Convention, Prohibition of torture: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. 
32Article 2 of the Convention, Right to life: “1) Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one 
shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2) Deprivation of life shall not be 
regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no 
more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to 
effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken 
for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”.  
33In this argumentation, the Court referred to the case of Souza Ribero v. France (no. 22689/07, 




1.4. The relevance of the case in the migration flows management 
Since January 2011 there has been an increasing number of arrivals on Lampedusa 
from North Africa, following the uprisings of Tunisia and Libya. However, the island 
was not equipped to serve as a large reception and accommodation center and the Italian 
authorities had to face logistical and organizational problems34. The Khlaifia and Others 
v. Italy case takes place in this context of humanitarian crisis. The issues raised by the 
complainants as well as the principles affirmed by the Grand Chamber are more 
relevant than ever to the current management of the "migration emergency" that the EU 
institutions and Member States are called upon to address even today. Particularly, it 
involves the so- called hotspot approach, adopted by Italy in the framework of the 
immediate actions provided for by the European Migration Agenda and the expulsion 
procedures negotiated by the agreements between Italy and non-European States. Using 
the words of Jill I.Goldenziel, this judgment is a “mixed result”35: on one hand progress 
has been made with regard to the protection of migrants under unlawful detention, on 
the other hand backward steps have been taken in regards to inhuman treatment and 
collective expulsion.  
 
1.4.1. Steps forward regarding the protection of migrants’ rights 
The Khlaifia case represents a turning point in the protection of migrants’ rights as 
the illegality of their detention was ascertained by a judicial body for the first time36. 
Indeed, the violation of Article 5 of the Convention sheds light on the importance to re-
evaluate the lawfulness of detention in domestic laws and the cross-border practices to 
which migrants are subject when crossing European borders without any valid entry 
document. First of all, migrants must be informed about the legal basis for their 
detention and about effective opportunities to challenge the conditions of their 
 
34According to a report by Amnesty International, the humanitarian crisis was created by the Italian 
authorities as they could have prevented the situation, but they did not do it. For further information, here 
the report: Amnesty International, Briefing Paper, “Italy: Amnesty International findings and 
recommendations to the Italian authorities following the research visit to Lampedusa and Mineo”, April 
21, 2011: https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/28000/eur300072011en.pdf. 
35Cfr. Goldenziel J.I., “Khlaifia and Others v. Italy”, ed. Wuerth I., in The American Society of 
International Law, Cambridge University, April 25, 2018, pgg. 278- 280.  





confinement and the legality of their detention, indeed. The Court pointed out that no de 
facto detention prevented from judicial review is in line with the purpose of Article 5 of 
the Convention, “even in a context of a migration crisis”37. Secondly, the Khlaifia 
precedent imposes Member States to change their laws regarding substantive conditions 
and procedural rights for migrants. While the judgment was pending, the CSPA of 
Lampedusa was being converted into a hotspot38, without any clear legal measure in 
international and domestic laws. The idea behind the hotspots was to develop a system 
that could put an end to the Italian practice of not processing and identifying people 
after they had been rescued at sea or had landed on Italian shores39.This approach 
became more systematical after the introduction of the Roadmap Italy40 in the Italian 
legal system in 2015.  However, it was again devoid of legal effects and that is why the 
European Commission expressly asked Italy to provide a more solid legal framework 
for the activities carried out within the hotspots41. It was only in 2017 that the Italian 
Government finally passed a legislation – Law 46/2017 - for regulating hotspots and 
their operations. Hotspots were thus identified as places where migrants were provided 
with first aid and where administrative procedures such as international protection or 
return were initiated42. In this way, the Government can manage the immigration flow 
 
37Cfr. Khlafia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §106). 
38 The word hotspot refers to both a concept and a place. However, this dissertation refers to hotspot as a 
“center for the identification, processing and first assistance of newly arrived refugees and migrants, 
usually taken to shore after search and rescue operations at sea”, cfr. Amnesty International,” Hotspot 
Italy, How EU’s flagship approach leads to violations of refugee and migrant rights”, November 3, 2016.   
39 Immediately after their identification, the migrants were categorized into vulnerable individuals and 
economic migrants, indeed. Cfr. Santoro, G., “The Contemporary Relevance of Khlaifia and Others v. 
Italy”, in University of Oxford, Faculty of Law, February 27, 2020: https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-
subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2020/02/contemporary. 
40 In May 2015, the European Commission adopted the European Agenda on the Migration, which set out 
a series of measures to address the challenges posed by the increasing migration flows. In this context, 
the Roadmap Italy was conceived and accepted thereafter by the Italian Government. The Roadmap Italy 
marks the beginning of the implementation phase of the hotspot approach in Italy. It includes appropriate 
measures to improve the capacity, quality and efficiency of the Italian system in the sectors of asylum, 
first reception and repatriation and to ensure the right measures for the implementation of the decision. 
Cfr. Ministero dell’Interno, “Roadmap italiana”, September 15, 2015: 
https://www.meltingpot.org/IMG/pdf/roadmap-2015.pdf .  
41 Cfr. One of the several communications that the Council of Europe sent to Italy is that on 15 December 
2015; European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council, Progress Report on the Implementation of the hotspots in Italy”, December 15, 2015, 
Strasbourg, pg. 2: https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2015/dec/eu-com-italy-hotspot-
rep-com-679-15.pdf . 
42 The issue of the lawfulness of the hotspots is much more complicated and controversial than what is 




more systematically guaranteeing to migrants more clarity on their legal status and on 
their rights.   
 
1.4.2. Steps backwards in the protection of migrants’ rights 
The decision of the Court in Khlaifia case showed that Italy managed the mass 
influxes of migrants the way it wanted as it did not have enough resources to provide 
migrants with basic needs such as accommodations with basic standards. This led to a 
violation of human rights. Regarding the decision on Article 3 of the Convention, the 
Court focused on to the general context of the humanitarian crisis which Italy had to 
face rather than to the absolute character of the prohibitions within Article 3. This 
contradicted the case- law of the Court43 and contributed to significantly aggravate the 
consequences of the humanitarian emergency in terms of overcrowding and poor 
sanitary conditions of the CSPA of Lampedusa. The decision regarding Article 4 
Protocol No.4 was even more troubling as the Judge Serghides pointed out in his partly 
dissenting opinion44. The purpose of Article 4 Protocol No. 4 requires that individuals 
have the right to an individual interview before being expelled. However, the applicants 
had been sent back to their home country following the simplified procedures set out by 
the bilateral agreement between Italy and Tunisia. This procedure evidently aimed to 
avoid the individual examination of the migrant, excluding him/ her from legal 
assistance, and to promote the maximum procedural simplification of the expulsion 
once the national membership has been verified. Moreover, in the Government's 
opinion there was no obligation to conduct individual interviews, as no risk to the life or 
physical integrity of the complainants emerged under Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Convention. However, a personal interview is necessary, otherwise the police 
authorities would be discretionally allowed to carry out an approximate examination on 
migrants and the burden of the proof would be shifted to migrants, instead to the 
 
important to mention the hotspot approach as it was one of the first alleged attempts to bring more clarity 
to the practice of migration management in Italy. 
43This case-law marks a step backwards from the principles established in the M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece (no. 30696/09, January 21, 2011, no. 27765/09, §223) and Jamaa and Others v. Italy (no. 
27765/09, February 23, 2012, §§122, 176) precedents.  






Government. Lastly, the Judge pointed out the close logical-consequential link between 
the proof of the violation of Article 5§2 of the Convention and that of Article 4 Protocol 
No. 4: if the applicants were not informed about the reasons for their detention, the 
Government unlikely provided them with information regarding their rights to assert the 
reasons opposing the repatriation. The Judge Serghides did not also agree with the 
interpretation of Article 13 of the Convention taken together with Article 4 of Protocol 
No.4.  According to him, the item "collective expulsion" does not refer to the number of 
migrants, but to the procedures and this applies to all migrants on the territory, 
regardless if they are economic migrants or asylum seekers. Moreover, Article 4 
Protocol No. 4 is to be considered as an absolute right. It follows that the suspensive 
effect of the expulsion is the only effective internal remedy under Article 13 of the 
Convention to contrast the alleged collective expulsion. This interpretation is aimed to 
protect migrants without valid documents from possible abuses and arbitrary decisions 
by border authorities: in this perspective, therefore, it seems that the Strasbourg Court 
has missed an important opportunity to impose a high level of protection of 
fundamental rights within the current migration crisis that characterizes the European 
context.  Indeed, with the Italian-Tunisian bilateral agreement and the refusal-of-entry 
orders, the Government has shown that it wants to proceed with a discriminatory policy 
towards migrant. Migrants are not considered individually as human beings, but their 
expulsion is based on mere nationality. In this way, migrants are deprived of their 
rights.  
Chapter 1 has focused on the narration of the facts that had led the applicants to 
lodge the case with the European Court of Human Rights and of the decisions taken by 
the Grand Chamber. Additionally, it has explained the relevance of Khlaifia case in the 
development of human rights. Chapter 2 will therefore analyze and compare all the 
national, European and supranational legal texts considered by the panel of judges while 





The migration issues between Italian law and European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR): a comparison 
 
As seen in the previous chapter, the judgment concerns migration - related issues, 
namely illegal detention, prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment and collective expulsion. In this chapter, we are going to analyze each of 
them in the light of the domestic law and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).  
 
2.1. Illegal detention  
Etymologically, the meaning of the word detention is “holding back” or a “holding 
away”, a condition of being “held” in custody, normally without a legal status or a 
possibility of referral. Although detention is institutionalized as a merely administrative 
measure, it often leads to a coercive deprivation of a person’s most elementary liberties. 
This is because detention implies a hierarchical relationship, where a sovereign state 
imposes its power on the lives of non-citizens45. States have increasingly been using 
detention to govern migration. Aliens thus may be deprived of their liberty after a 
violation of the legislation of the territory in which they are, or they have entered. This 
is called “immigration detention”, which is a form of administrative detention in most 
Council of Europe member states. In line with its administrative nature, immigration 
detention should not be punitive. On the contrary, it should be a measure of last resort 
taken after a careful and individual examination of each case46.  
 
2.1.1. Immigration detention in Italy 
The increasing number of migrants after the events of the Arab Spring led Italy to 
boost its domestic detention system.  The Khlaifia and Others v. Italy case was the first 
 
45De Genova N., “Detention, Deportation, and Waiting: Toward a Theory of Migrant Detainability”, in 
Global Detention Project, Working Paper No. 18, 2016, pgg. 92-95. 
46European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 




attempt to report the violation of liberties and securities as a consequence of this new 
system. The case also brought out how the language denoting detention in Italy can be 
misleading, which can have serious implications in guaranteeing the rights afforded to 
detainees and lead to confusion about practices in the country. In an e-mail 
Correspondence in 2017, Valeria Ferrari (Association for Juridical Studies on 
Immigration, ASGI47), wrote to Michael Flynn (Global Detention Project, GDP48) that 
“in Italian legislation, administrative detention is defined as administrative holding 
(trattenimento amministrativo). The word detention is not used. However, people are 
held in place and they cannot go out. Ironically, the fact that it is not defined as 
detention makes the condition and the accessibility to rights worse than in prison”49. 
Basically, authorities are not aware first that they are using in practice methods of 
detention as an instrument to prevent immigration, secondly that they do not see the 
gravity of the consequences on migrants’ rights.  
 
2.1.2. Reception and detention facilities in Italy 
We will start by giving a look at the structure involved in the management of 
migrants illegally landed on Italian shores and how it has changed. Over the years Italy 
has developed a system of facilities for detaining or accommodating both irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers. There were three types of structure: CDAs (Reception or 
Welcome Centers)/ CPSAs (Center for First Aid and Reception), CARAs (Centers for 
the Reception of Asylum Seekers) and CIEs (Identification and Expulsion Centers)50. 
The CDAs/ CPSAs were intended as initial accommodation for new arrivals in order to 
provide them with first aid and medical care. Here, migrants were identified and 
photographed, and they could apply for international protection. As they were 
 
47The Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI) is a membership-
based association focusing on all legal aspects of immigration. ASGI's members provide their 
contribution at various levels: administrative, policy-making and legal, both in national and European 
contexts. 
48The Global Detention Project (GDP) is a non-profit research center based in Geneva, Switzerland, that 
investigates the use of immigration-related detention as a response to global migration: 
https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/.   
49Global Detention Project, “Italy Immigration Detention Profile”, January 2018, pg.2.  
50Commissione straordinaria per la tutela e la promozioni dei diritti umani, “Rapporto sullo stato dei 
diritti umani negli istituti penitenziari e nei centri di accoglienza e trattenimento per migranti in Italia”, 




considered as transfer centers, migrants stayed there for as long as necessary to establish 
their identities and their status. The CARAs were facilities for undocumented asylum 
seekers. Here, they were identified for the initiation of the procedures required to apply 
for asylum. Their stay there could vary between 20 and 30 days. CDAs, CPSAs and 
CARAs are run by the European Union51. In 2015, this acronym-based reception system 
of CDAs, CPSAs and CARAs was replaced by another system composed by the so-
called CPA (First reception center)52 (Legislative Decree 142/2015) and the hotspot 
approach53 (the Minniti-Orlando Decree - Law 46/2017). The hotspot approach was 
developed by the European Commission as part of the immediate action to assist EU 
Member States located at the external EU border and in the European Agenda on 
Migration in May 2015. Hotspots are located at arrival points in frontline member states 
(among which, of course, Italy). Migrants are here identified, registered, fingerprinted 
and properly processed54. Also, they are provided with first aid, reception, medical care 
and information on asylum55. However, hotspots in Italy were not regulated by any 
specific domestic laws, but only at a policy level through a Roadmap56 developed by the 
Ministry of the Interior and standard operating procedures (SOPs)57 drafted with the 
assistance of the European Commission, Frontex, Europol, the European Asylum 
Support Office, UNHCR and the IOM. Only with Article 17 of the Law 46/2017 
(Minniti-Orlando decree), the concept of hotspots was introduced in the Italian 
legislation and converted into Article 10-ter of the Consolidated Immigration Act under 
the name punti di crisi58. Lastly, the CIEs were facilities destined to the detention of 
 
51Goldenziel J.I., “Khlaifia and Others v. Italy”, ed. Wuerth I., in The American Society of International 
Law, Cambridge University, April 25, 2018, pg. 274. 
52The CPAs have no reference in Italian legislation or policy. 
53 The hotspot approach was emphasized by the European Commission in its Agenda on Migration in 
2015. 
54Asylum seekers are channeled to the Centri di Prima Accoglienza (CPA), whereas economic migrants 
were transferred to CPRs.  
55Ministero dell’Interno, “Centri per l’immigrazione”, June 19, 2020: 
https://www.interno.gov.it/it/temi/immigrazione-e-asilo/sistema-accoglienza-sul-territorio/centri-
limmigrazione. 
56Ministero dell’Interno, “Roadmap italiana”, September 25, 2015: 
https://www.meltingpot.org/IMG/pdf/roadmap-2015.pdf. 




58Cfr. Article 10-ter of the Consolidated Immigration Act: “Presso i punti di crisi il cittadino è sottoposto 




irregular migrants approved by the Justice of the Peace. According to Article 14 of the 
Consolidated Immigration Act, the aim of these centers was to avoid the dispersion of 
irregular migrants on the territory and to allow their expulsion. The length of detention 
was up to maximum 18 months. The CIEs are run and authorized by Italian 
legislation59. In 2017 the Minniti-Orlando Decree changed the name of Centers of 
Identification and Expulsion (CIEs) into Return Detention Centers (CPRs). Here, Italy 
has recently enacted a new decree on immigration (Legislative Decree 130/202060) 
where Article 3§1 introduced modification into Article 14§§1,5 of the Consolidated 
Immigration Act. According to it, the length of detention in CPRs shall not exceed 90 
days and shall be extended for another thirty days if the migrant is a national of a 
country with which Italy has signed agreements on removal61.  
Despite this varied number of these facilities, Italy officially recognizes only the 
Return Detention Centers (CPRs) as detention centers. However, also the other above-
mentioned reception facilities resort in practice to de facto detention measures62. 
 
 
14 del regolamento Eurodac. Al contempo, lo straniero riceve informazioni sulla procedura di protezione 
internazionale, sul programma di ricollocazione in altri Stati membri dell’Unione europea e sulla 
possibilità di ricorso al rimpatrio volontario assistito”. However, Article 17 does not specify the 
functions of the hotspots.  
59Goldenziel J.I., “Khlaifia and Others v. Italy”, ed. Wuerth I., in The American Society of International 
Law, Cambridge University, April 25, 2018, pg. 274. 
60The new decree on immigration has been enacted on October 22, 2020 and it has replaced the previous 
security and immigration decree of 2018 (the so- called Salvini’s decree). There have been changes in 
some issues, among which the detention length for migrants in CPRs from 180 days to 90 days.  
61Cfr. Article 3§1 of Legislative Decree 130/2020: “Al decreto legislativo 25 luglio 1998, n. 286 sono 
apportate le seguenti modificazioni: […] c) all’articolo 14, sono apportate le seguenti modificazioni: 1) 
al comma 1, dopo il primo periodo, inserire il seguente: “A tal fine effettua richiesta di assegnazione del 
posto alla Direzione centrale dell’immigrazione e della polizia delle frontiere del Dipartimento della 
pubblica sicurezza del Ministero dell’interno, di cui all’articolo 35, della legge 30 luglio 2002, n. 189”; 
2) dopo il comma 1, è inserito il seguente: “1.1. Il trattenimento dello straniero di cui non è possibile 
eseguire con immediatezza l’espulsione o il respingimento alla frontiera è disposto con priorità per 
coloro che siano considerati una minaccia per l’ordine e la sicurezza pubblica o che siano stati 
condannati, anche con sentenza non definitiva, per i reati di cui all’articolo 4, comma 3, terzo periodo e 
all’articolo 5, comma 5-bis, nonché per coloro che siano cittadini di Paesi terzi con i quali sono vigenti 
accordi di cooperazione o altre intese in materia di rimpatrio, o che provengono da essi.”; 3) al comma 
5: a) al quinto periodo le parole “centottanta giorni” sono sostituite dalle seguenti: “novanta giorni ed è 
prorogabile per altri trenta giorno qualora lo straniero sia cittadino di un Paese con cui l’Italia abbia 
sottoscritto accordi in materia di rimpatri.”: 
https://www.money.it/IMG/pdf/decreto_immigrazione_testo.pdf.  




2.1.3. The right to liberty in the Italian legislation and in the European Convention on 
Human Rights 
Migrants’ detention may lead to a deprivation of their liberties. Personal liberty is of 
the highest importance in a democratic society, indeed. It has a universal character as it 
is related to the "human being", regardless of his/ her nationality and any other element 
of discrimination. For these features, the right to liberty is considered the logical and the 
legal requirement to all other rights63. Both the Italian Constitution64 and the European 
Convention on Human Rights65 underline the importance of the right to liberty. 
 
63Edizioni Simone, “La libertà personale: articolo 13 costituzione”, in La legge per tutti, November 25, 
2016: https://www.laleggepertutti.it/140923_la-liberta-personale-articolo-13-costituzione.  
64Cfr. Khlafia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §32). 
65Ibidem, §55. 
Article 13 of the Constitution 
 
 
Personal liberty is inviolable.  
No one may be detained, inspected, or searched, 
or otherwise subjected to any restriction of 
personal liberty, except by a reasoned order of a 
judicial authority and only in such cases and in 
such manner as provided by law.   
 
In exceptional circumstances and under such 
conditions of necessity and urgency as shall be 
precisely defined by law, the police may take 
provisional measures that shall be referred within 
48 hours to a judicial authority and which, if not 
validated by the latter in the following 48 hours, 
shall be deemed withdrawn and ineffective.  
 
Any act of physical or mental violence against 
persons subjected to a restriction of personal 
liberty shall be punished.  
 
The law shall establish the maximum duration of 
any preventive measure of detention (carcerazione 
preventiva).”  
 
Article 5 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights 
 
Right to liberty and security  
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security 
of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty 
save in the following cases and in accordance 
with a procedure prescribed by law:  
(a) the lawful detention of a person after 
conviction by a competent court;  
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for 
noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or 
in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation 
prescribed by law;  
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person 
effected for the purpose of bringing him before 
the competent legal authority on reasonable 
suspicion of having committed an offence or when 
it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent 
his committing an offence or fleeing after having 
done so;  
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for 
the purpose of educational supervision or his 
lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him 
before the competent legal authority; (e) the 
lawful detention of persons for the prevention of 
the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of 
unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or 
vagrants;  
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to 
prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into 
the country or of a person against whom action is 








According to the Italian Constitution, the right to liberty is the essential right of the 
person not to be subjected to coercion, physical restrictions and arrests and it protects 
individuals against the abuses of the authority. The importance of the article is 
strengthened by the use of the adjective “inviolable” which underlines the centrality of 
this right. Both the Constitution and the Convention contemplate the physical liberty of 
the person. The Convention also states that the right to liberty means that every person 
has the right to be protected against arbitrary detention66. Therefore, detention 
necessarily needs a both procedural and substantive legal basis67. The Constitution then 
goes further to explain in practice that deprivation of liberty means to “[…] be detained, 
inspected, or searched, or otherwise subjected to any restriction of personal liberty”. 
There are only two exceptions on this deprivation: if there is an order by a judicial 
authority and only if it is due according to the law. In this provision, there are three 
types of guarantee: absolute legal reservation (riserva di legge assoluta), reservation of 
jurisdiction (riserva di giurisdizione) and reservation to state reasons (obbligo della 
motivazione). Firstly, the absolute legal reservation (riserva di legge assoluta) gives the 
competence to decide on the restriction of liberty to the legislative power68. Before 
proceeding in limiting the liberty, the Parliament has to bear in mind these principles: 
principle of determinacy and clarity (principio di tassatività o determinatezza)69, 
 
66Ktistakis Y., “Protecting migrants under the European Convention on Human Rights and the European 
Social Character”, Council of Europe, February 2013, pg. 25.  
67The violation to liberty of Article 5 is not to be confused with the restrictions on liberty of movement of 
Article 2 Protocol No. 4.  
 
69The principle of determinacy and clarity (principio di tassatività o determinatezza) consists in 
formulating the law in a clear and concrete way to avoid misunderstanding. In this way, the judge who 
reads that law will not take a decision on a case arbitrarily.  
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed 
promptly, in a language which he understands, of 
the reasons for his arrest and of any charge 
against him.  
 
 
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by 
arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his 
detention shall be decided speedily by a court and 





principle of guilty (principio di colpevolezza)70, principle of the personality of criminal 
liability (principio della personalità della responsabilità pensale)71 and principle of the 
harmfulness of the offence (principio di offensività e lesività del reato)72. Secondly, the 
reservation of jurisdiction (riserva di giurisdizione) allows the judicial authority to limit 
the liberty. Lastly, reservation to state reasons (obbligo di motivazione) guarantees that 
every decision narrowing personal freedom is motivated73. In addition, the article also 
provides police officers with guidelines for restricting liberty in emergency cases: they 
are authorized to apply for interim measures, which are consequently submitted for 
validation to the judicial authority within 48 hours. The judicial authority has to validate 
(or not) this measure within the next 48 hours. This was exactly what the police officers 
did not do in the Khlaifia and Others v. Italy judgment. For these reasons, the detention 
was not considered as lawful. Unlike the Constitution, Article 5 of the Convention does 
not specify concretely the meaning of deprivation of liberty. According to the case-law, 
the starting point must be the concrete situation which takes into account criteria as the 
type, duration, effects and implementation of the measure in question74. The 
Convention is considered “a living instrument which […] must be interpreted in the 
light of present-day conditions75”, indeed. This also means that the application of 
Article 5 must consider the national law and, where appropriate, other applicable legal 
standards in international law76 or European law77. Indeed, Article 5 of the Convention 
states that in order to meet the requirement of lawfulness, detention must be “in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”. Afterwards in the Article, there is a set 
 
70The principle of guilty (principio di colpevolezza) states that a penalty can be imposed only in case of a 
guilty conduct. The conduct may be both a malice and negligence.  
71The principle of the personality of criminal liability (principio della personalità della responsabilità 
penale) enunciates that no one can be criminally responsible for acts committed by third parties.  
72The principle of the harmfulness of the offence (principio di offensività e lesività del reato) reminds the 
legislator to take into account the real gravity of the damage.  
73Edizioni Simone, “La libertà personale: articolo 13 costituzione”, in La legge per tutti, November 25, 
2016: https://www.laleggepertutti.it/140923_la-liberta-personale-articolo-13-costituzione.  
74Cfr. Khlaifia and Others v. Italy  (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2015, §71), H.L. v. the United Kingdom 
(no. 45508/99, October 5, 2004, §90), H.M. v. Switzerland (no. 39187/98, February 26, 2002, §§30 and  
48),  Creangă v Romania (no. 29226/03, February 23, 2012, §91). 
75Garlicki L., “Judicial Deliberations: The Strasbourg Perspective”, in N.Huls, M.Adam and J. Bomhoff 
(eds), “The Legitimacy of Highest Courts’ Ruling: Judicial Deliberation and Beyond”, The Hague, TMC 
Asser Press, pg. 390. 
76Cfr. Medvedyev and Others v. France (no. 3394/03, March 29, 2010, §79); Toniolo v. San Marino and 
Italy, (no. 44853/10, June 26, 2012, §46). 
77Cfr. Paci v. Belgium (no. 45597/09, April 17, 2018, §64) and Pirozzi v. Belgium (no. 21055/11, April 




of exceptions to the right of liberty. The case-law states that no deprivation of liberty 
will be lawful unless it falls within one of the permissible grounds specified in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5§178. Clearly, these sub-paragraphs must be interpreted 
in the light of national law. In immigration detention issues, the Court has often to 
determine whether a violation of Article 5§1 f) has taken place. The sub-paragraph f) 
allows States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context in two different 
situations: the first one permits the detention of an asylum-seeker or other immigrant 
prior to the State’s grant of authorization to enter79, whereas the second one points out 
that states are entitled to keep an individual in detention for the purpose of his 
deportation or extradition80. With regard to the consequences on a person the restriction 
of liberty may lead, the Constitution punishes any act of physical or mental violence 
against that person. On the contrary, Article 5 of the Convention does not make mention 
of it. With reference to its length, detention must generally last for the shortest possible 
period. Article 13 of the Constitution establishes the “maximum duration of any 
preventive measures of detention”, whereas Article 5 of the Convention points out the 
absence of a provision prescribing maximum time-limits. The case-law states that “the 
question whether the length of deportation proceedings could affect the lawfulness of 
detention under this provision thus depends solely on the particular circumstances of 
each case81”. In addition, prolonged periods of detention or uncertainty as to the length 
of detention may lead to inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention82. Unlike the Constitution, the Convention provides procedural safeguards. 
Article 5§2 states that any person arrested must be promptly told in a comprehensible, 
simple and non-technical language the legal and factual grounds for his/ her deprivation 
of liberty. In this way, he/ she can lodge an appeal against the lawfulness of detention 
according to Article 5§4. Additionally, the Court points also out that migrants deprived 
of their liberties may have given legal advice83. In this regard, however, it is important 
 
78Cfr. Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2015, §88). 
79European Court of Human Right, “Guide on the case-law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights- Immigration”, pg. 12: https://rm.coe.int/court-case-law-guide-immigration-eng/16809f1556. 
80European Court of Human Right, “Guide on the case-law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights- Immigration”, pg. 26: https://rm.coe.int/court-case-law-guide-immigration-eng/16809f1556.  
81Cfr. Auad v. Bulgaria (no. 46390/10, October 11, 2011, §128).  
82Ktistakis Y., “Protecting migrants under the European Convention on Human Rights and the European 
Social Character”, Council of Europe, February 2013, pg. 33. 




to mention the new decree on immigration in the Italian context (Legislative Decree 
130/2020) whose Article 3§1 has modified the Article 10ter §3 of the Consolidated 
Immigration Act. This article states that a foreigner in a CPR must be informed about 
his/ her rights regarding detention in a language that he/ she has84.  
 
2.1.4. Legal detention according to the Return Directive and the International Law 
Commission 
European and international law deal also with migration detention issue. In the 
Khlaifia judgment, the Court cited the Return Directive85 with regard to Articles 15 
(detention) and “draft articles on the expulsion of aliens” by the International Law 
Commission86. They both state that detention is only allowed for those people who are 
subjected to return processes. Particular attention is given to those cases where there is a 
risk of absconding or non- collaboration with the third-country national. Article 19 of 
ILC’s draft refers particularly to detention of an alien for the purpose of expulsion, 
which shall be neither arbitrary nor punitive in nature. It adds that the alien detained for 
the purpose of expulsion shall be separated from other people condemned to penalties 
involving deprivation of liberty. With reference to its length, detention shall be as short 
as possible and for as long as the return processes are completed. The Directive of 
Return also imposes to Member States that detention shall not exceed six months. Only 
in particular circumstances, they shall extend the duration until twelve months87. 
Moreover, detention shall be ordered by a written decision of administrative or judicial 
authorities and take into account with in fact and in law reasons and it shall be reviewed 
 
84Cfr. Article 3§1 of Legislative Decree 130/2020: “Al decreto legislative 25 luglio 1998, n.286 sono 
apportate le seguenti modificazioni: a) all’articolo 10-ter, comma 3, è inserito in fine il seguente periodo: 
Lo straniero è tempestivamente informato dei diritti e delle facoltà derivanti dal procedimento di 
convalida del decreto di trattenimento in una lingua da lui conosciuta, ovvero, ove non sia possibile, in 
lingua francese, inglese o spagnola”: https://www.money.it/IMG/pdf/decreto_immigrazione_testo.pdf.  
85In the European Union context, the return of irregular migrants is governed by Directive 2008/115/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 “on common standards and 
procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third -country nationals”.  
86The International Law Commission (ILC) is an expert body, composed of "persons of recognized 
competence in international law", that works on the progressive development and codification of 
international law. In 2014, it adopted a set of “Draft articles on the expulsion of aliens”. This text was 
submitted to the United Nations General Assembly.  
87This extension of time shall be in line with the national law and it shall occur when there is a lack of 
cooperation by the concerned third- country individual and there are problems in getting the 




regularly. If detention is unlawful, the third- country national should be released 
immediately. Article 16 of the Return Directive goes further with the legal conditions of 
detention. Firstly, detention shall take place in a specialized detention facility. As 
written above, Italy recognizes officially only the CIE (Identification and Expulsion 
Center) later converted into CPR (Return Detention Center) as a detention center. 
There, competent national, international and non-governmental organizations and 
bodies shall enter these facilities with an authorization. The migrants in CIEs have the 
right to ask for contact with legal representatives, family members and consular 
authorities. Additionally, they shall be always provided with information about the rules 
of the facility, their rights and obligations. Particular care should be given to vulnerable 
individuals. However, the situation is not exactly like that in the reality. As seen above, 
the Khlaifia case shows that other reception facilities had been used de facto as 
detention ones, instead. In this way, migrants could not only benefit from the legal 
safeguards provided by detention centers88, but they were also subjected to the 
arbitrariness of police officers working in the CSPA both in terms of detention practice 
and its length. This led to a violation of migrants’ rights.   
 
2.2. Prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment 
The European Convention on Human Rights establishes in its Article 3 that:  
No one shall be subjected to torture or 
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.89 
Despite its brief length, Article 3 entails a right of paramount significance under 
international human rights law. The case-law of torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment has changed over time. This is due to the dynamic nature of the 
Convention and to the real importance of this article: some acts that were categorized in 
the past as “inhuman and degrading treatment” as opposed to “torture” could be 
classified differently in the future. What is important for the Court is the distinction 
between torture, inhuman treatment or punishment and degrading treatment or 
punishment. The UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
 
88The applicants were in a CSPA which is a transfer center and not a detention one.  
89Cfr. Article 3, European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, “European Convention on Human 




Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) of December 10, 198490defines torture 
as any act by which severe pain or suffering whether physical or mental which has a 
purpose such as obtaining of information or confessions, or the infliction of punishment 
and it is generally an aggravated form of inhuman treatment91”. Basically, torture shall 
have two elements: a severe inhuman treatment and a particular purpose. By contrast, 
there is no universally accepted definition of inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment. In the Greek case92, “inhuman” treatment was described as a treatment 
which deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which, in the particular 
situation, is unjustifiable93, whereas “degrading” treatment is a treatment that grossly 
humiliates an individual before others or drives him/ her to act against his/ her will or 
conscience94. What distinguishes inhuman from degrading treatment is that the latter 
shall have two additional elements: a serious humiliation and a conduct which lowers 
the victim in his/ her eyes95. The Court distinguishes torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment and punishment on the basis of the degree of severity of ill-treatment96. By 
the degree of severity, it is meant the duration of the treatment, its physical and 
psychological effects and, sometimes, the sex, age and state of health of the victims. 
Other decisive factors are the purpose of ill-treatment and the context97. Generally, by 
torture and inhuman treatment or punishment, the suffering caused must have reached a 
sufficient level of severity, whereas in the case of degrading treatment, the key element 
is the humiliation98. Additionally, the Court states that torture, inhuman or degrading 
 
90The UNCAT was ratified by the Italian Government with the Law n.498/1988.  
91Cfr. Article 1, UN Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, “Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment”, June 26, 1987: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cat.aspx.  
92The Greek case concerns the finding of serious violations, among which torture, by the Greek junta. 
This case was lodged in 1967 by Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Netherlands against the Greek junta to 
the European Commission of Human Rights and it was one of the most famous ones in the Convention’s 
history.  
93Council of Europe, “Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights”, Volume 12, 1 July 1972, 
paragraph 186.  
94Ibidem. 
95Duffy P.J., “Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights”, in International and comparative 
law quarterly, 1983, pg. 319.  
96“Conduct must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3”, cfr. 
Ireland v. The United Kingdom (no. 5310/71, January 18, 1978, §162), Tyrer v. The United Kingdom (no. 
5856/72, April 25, 1978, §30).  
97De Franceschini P., “Divieto di tortura: dai principi internazionali alla Legge 110/ 2017”, in 
Giurisprudenza penale, February 18, 2016, pg.5: www.giurisprudenzapenale.com.  
98Duffy P.J., “Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights”, in International and comparative 




treatment or punishment must be proved with strong evidence, and not with mere 
hypothetical speculations99. Another important feature of Article 3 is its absolute nature. 
The force of Article 3 of the ECHR comes from the fact that in the Court’s own opinion 
it enshrines one of the fundamental values of the democratic societies making up the 
Council of Europe100 and that there can never be under the Convention, or under 
international law, a justification for acts in breach of that provision101. Its absolute 
character has been codified in a wide range of universal and regional instruments and, 
today, is recognized as part of customary international law102. In order to give a 
practical effect to the prohibition, international law establishes both positive and 
negative obligations for States103. Briefly, in positive terms States must take effective 
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture and ill-
treatment in every territory, whereas in negative terms States must abstain from any act 
of torture or ill-treatment104. In all their decisions, acts and omissions, States must 
interpret and perform their international obligations in good faith105. 
 
2.2.1.  Torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in migration-related 
detention 
In many parts of the world, migrants have been victims of torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment in different ways106. The Khlaifia and Others v. Italy 
judgment sheds light upon the real conditions under which migrants are detained and it 
showed how reception facilities are de facto detention structures. Theoretically, any 
detention of migrants must take place in appropriate, sanitary, non- punitive facilities, 
 
99Cfr. Khlafia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §208). 
100Cfr. Soering v. United Kingdom (no. 14038/88, July 7, 1989, §88).  
101Cfr. Ireland v. The United Kingdom (no. 5310/71, March 20, 2018, §162). 
102Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment”, February 26, 2018, pg. 4.  
103Positive obligations are ”duties to ensure”, whereas negative obligations are “duties to respect”.  
104Ibidem, pg. 5. 
105The good faith concept comes from the Latin expression “pacta sunt servanda” which means 
“agreements must be kept”.  
106The above-mentioned “Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment” has described the violation of Article 3 ECHR towards migrants in 
different contexts such as in detention, in smuggling and trafficking of migrants and with reference to 
non-refoulment principle. In this paragraph, we are only going to deal with the detention issue, since it 
has been taken into account in the analyzed judgment Khlaifia and Others v. Italy. Due to its importance, 




but this is far from reality. Among the most common problems, numerous press and 
stakeholder reports have listed the awful physical and hygiene conditions, extreme 
overcrowding, solitary confinement, insufficient access to food, water and medical care. 
This is all complicated by deliberate abuse by State officials, private guards or fellow 
detainees, sexual abuse, enslavement and torture and ill-treatment of migrant 
children107. What emerges from the Khlaifia judgment is that the violation of Article 3 
of the Convention is strictly connected to overcrowd. According to the case-law, both a 
3 square meters space and a larger space with no open air and sanitary conditions can be 
considered a violation of Article 3108. Therefore, the conditions of the center play an 
important role: ill-treatment or grossly inadequate detentions can even turn into torture 
if intentionally imposed, encouraged or tolerated by States for reasons based on 
discrimination of any kind, among which that based on immigration status. Migrants 
with irregular status or other vulnerabilities are the most affected by torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, indeed. This is due to the prolonged 
and potentially indefinite duration of their detention causing them mental and emotional 
stress which is added to their already extremely vulnerable status of irregular migrants. 
Also, they are victims of arbitrary detention by the authorities who decide the length of 
migrants’ detention according to their status (irregular or not) and not to the state of 
law.  
 
2.2.2. The prohibition of torture and ill-treatment in the light of the principle of non-
refoulement 
The prohibition of torture and ill-treatment is further concretized by the principle of 
non-refoulement. Refoulement refers to every act of returning a person to a country 
where the migrant fears or risks his/ her life because of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion109. Refoulement includes 
 
107For more detailed information, it is recommended to read the research carried out by Amnesty 
International in Italy. Amnesty International, “Hotspot Italy: how EU’s flagship approach leads to 
violations of refugee and migrant rights”, November 03, 2016: 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur30/5004/2016/en/%20/.  
108Cfr. Khlafia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §§163-168). 
109Lambert H., “Protection Against Refoulement from Europe: Human Rights Comes to the Rescue”, in 




acts of expulsion, removal, extradition, sending back, return or rejection of a person 
from a country to the frontiers of a territory where there exists a danger of ill-treatment, 
namely persecution, torture, or inhuman treatment110. As an inherent element of the 
prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, the principle of non-refoulement 
is characterized by its absolute nature without exceptions111. The principle of non-
refoulement imposes obligations on States: they cannot expel, return or extradite a 
person to another State when he/she would be in danger or subjected to torture if he/ she 
returned to his/ her home country. Therefore, States have the duty to analyze all relevant 
conditions of that State112. A refugee, an asylum seeker waiting for a decision in refugee 
status113 or a person under risk of persecution if returned to his/ her home country114can 
benefit from the principle of non-refoulement. The protection against refoulement is 
thus closely related to protection against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. 
Generous protection against refoulement from Europe lies in the development of the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Indeed, Article 3 of the Convention 
has been interpreted by the Court as providing an effective means of protection against 
all forms of return to places where there is a risk that an individual would be subjected 
to torture, or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Before the Court, an 
 
110Ibidem, pg. 519. 
111Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment”, February 26, 2018, pg. 12. 
112Cfr. Article 3§§1,2, UN Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, “Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment”, June 26, 1987: “1) No State 
Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 2) For the purpose of 
determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant 
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of 
gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.”: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cat.aspx.  
Cfr. Article 33§§1,2 Secretary-General of the United Nations, “The Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugee”, July 28, 1951: “prohibition of expulsion or return (“refoulement”) 1. No Contracting State 
shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where 
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion. 2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be 
claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the 
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”: https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10. 
113Lambert H., “Protection Against Refoulement from Europe: Human Rights Comes to the Rescue”, in 
online Cambridge University Press, January 17, 2008, pg. 516. 
114Ibidem.  The 1951 Refugee Convention applies the non-refoulement principle only to refugees and 
asylum seekers, whereas the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights is broader, and it refers to all 




asylum seeker (or whoever wants to be protected by the non-refoulment principle) must 
demonstrate the existence of “substantial ground” (whether he/ she would face ill-
treatment in the event of expulsion) and the existence of a real risk115 (whether he/ she 
is expected to face ill-treatment in the event of expulsion). On an international level116, 
the European Court of Human Rights has recently demonstrated developments in the 
application of Article 3 of the Convention as it had a direct impact on the protection of 
asylum-seekers. Progress has been made at national level, too. Italy has recently taken 
steps further regarding the protection of migrants who may be at risk of torture if sent 
back in their home countries. In particular, we are making reference at Article 3§1of the 
new Legislative Decree 130/2020, which modified Article 19 of the Immigration 
Consolidated Act extending the cases in which refoulement, expulsion or extradition are 
prohibited117. To sum up, the principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition of torture 
 
115The Court recognizes a “real risk” when "the foreseeable consequences" of the State party's decision to 
extradite (expel or deport) is that the applicant will be subject to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the 
requesting country. In assessing such foreseeability, the Court takes various considerations into account 
(e.g. the general and special circumstances of each individual case, the relevant national legislation and 
practice relating to expulsion, the situation in the country of destination, in particular the current 
probability of torture, persecution, inhuman or degrading treatment, according to the reports and 
conclusions of investigations carried out by the national authorities, the United Nations and even 
sometimes certain non-governmental organizations). 
116On an international level, when dealing with the principle of non-refoulement, it is important to 
mention, the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights, the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, the 1966 
UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1984 UN Convention against Torture. 
 
• European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, “European Convention on Human 
Rights”, November 04, 1950: https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf. 
• Secretary-General of the United Nations, “The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee”, 
July 28, 1951: https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10. 
• UN Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, “International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights”, December 16, 1966: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx  
• UN Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, “Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment”, June 26, 1987: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cat.aspx 
 
For further reading about comparative studies among all these Conventions, it is interesting the above-
mentioned article by Lambert:  
Lambert H., “Protection Against Refoulement from Europe: Human Rights Comes to the Rescue”, in 
online Cambridge University Press, January 17, 2008. 
117Cfr. Article 3§1 of Legislative Decree 130/2020: “Al decreto legislative 25 luglio 1998, n.286 sono 
apportate le seguenti modificazioni: […] f) all’articolo 19: 1) il comma 1.1 è sostituiti dal seguente: 1.1. 
Non sono ammessi il respingimento o l’espulsione o l’estradizione di una persona verso uno Stato 
qualora esistano fondanti motivi di ritenere che essa rischi di essere sottoposta a tortura o a 
trattenimenti inumani o degradanti. Nella valutazione di tali motivi si tiene conto anche dell’esistenza, in 
tale Stato, di violazioni sistematiche e gravi di diritti umani. Non sono altresì ammessi il respingimento o 
l’espulsione o l’estradizione di una persona verso uno Stato qualora esistano fondati motivi di ritenere 




and inhuman and degrading treatments or punishment impose to States to pay much 
more attention to the rights of migrants in the process of expulsion.  
 
2.2.3. Prohibition of torture in the Italian legislation 
At the time of Khlaifia case, the domestic law did not contain any reference to the 
crime of torture. It was only in 2015 that the Italian Government speeded up the process  
of alignment of Italian legislation to international and supranational law in this field and 
introduced the crime of torture into the Italian legislative system as suggested by the 
European Court of Human Rights judgment in the Cestaro case v. Italy118. Article 1 of 
Law 110/2017 introduced into the Penal Code119 the crimes of torture (Article 613-bis) 
and the incitement to torture (Article 613-ter). Generally, the aim of this law is to 
protect citizens from the abuse of power by public officials. Article 13-bis120 punishes 
with imprisonment from four to ten years whoever causes acute physical suffering or 
 
vita privata e familiare, a meno che esso non sia necessario per ragioni di sicurezza nazionale ovvero di 
ordine e sicurezza pubblica. Ai fini della valutazione del rischio di violazione di cui al periodo 
precedente, si tiene conto della natura e della effettività dei vincoli familiari dell’interessato, del suo 
effettivo inserimento sociale in Italia, della durata del suo soggiorno nel territorio nazionale nonché 
dell’esistenza di legami familiari, culturali o sociali con il suo Paese di origine”:  
https://www.money.it/IMG/pdf/decreto_immigrazione_testo.pdf.  
118Cfr. Cestaro v. Italy (no. 6884/11, April 7, 2015). The case concerned events occurred at the end of the 
G8 summit in Genoa in July 2001 in the school Diaz – Pertini made available by the municipal authorities 
to be used as a night shelter by demonstrators. An anti-riot police unit entered the school around 
midnight, and they led acts of violence which amounted to torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the 
Convention. The judgment imposed the positive obligation to introduce a properly adapted legal 
framework the Italian Government including effective criminal-law provisions with regard to torture 
crime.  
119Title XII (Crimes against the Person), Section III (Crimes against morality).  
120Cfr. Article 613-bis, Penal Code: “Chiunque, con violenze o minacce gravi, ovvero agendo con 
crudeltà, cagiona acute sofferenze fisiche o un verificabile trauma psichico a una persona privata della 
libertà personale o affidata alla sua custodia, potestà, vigilanza, controllo, cura o assistenza, ovvero che 
si trovi in condizioni di minorata difesa, è punito con la pena della reclusione da quattro a dieci anni se 
il fatto è commesso mediante più condotte ovvero se comporta un trattamento inumano e degradante per 
la dignità della persona.  
Se i fatti di cui al primo comma sono commessi da un pubblico ufficiale o da un incaricato di un pubblico 
servizio, con abuso dei poteri o in violazione dei doveri inerenti alla funzione o al servizio, la pena è 
della reclusione da cinque a dodici anni.  
Il comma precedente non si applica nel caso di sofferenze risultanti unicamente dall'esecuzione di 
legittime misure privative o limitative di diritti.  
Se dai fatti di cui al primo comma deriva una lesione personale le pene di cui ai commi precedenti sono 
aumentate; se ne deriva una lesione personale grave sono aumentate di un terzo e se ne deriva una 
lesione personale gravissima sono aumentate della metà.  
Se dai fatti di cui al primo comma deriva la morte quale conseguenza non voluta, la pena è della 
reclusione di anni trenta.  




psychological trauma using threats and violence to a person deprived of his/ her 
personal freedom or in conditions of impaired defense. The act shall be committed with 
more than one conduct or to involve inhuman and degrading treatment for the dignity of 
the person. Then afterwards, the Article added particular facts of the case: the first one 
refers to crimes committed by a public official or public service officer with abuse of 
power or other violations. For them, the imprisonment is from five to twelve years. The 
second group of particular facts consists of having caused common personal injuries 
(increase of up to 1/3 of the penalty), serious injuries (increase of 1/3 of the penalty) or 
very serious injuries (increase of 1/3 of the penalty). The aggravated offence is 
characterized by more than one conduct. The last specific case concerns death as a 
consequence of torture. If death is not intentional, the imprisonment is up to thirty 
years. If it is, the perpetrator is condemned to life imprisonment. Article 613-ter121 
punishes the incitement of public officials or public service officers to commit torture. 
For them, imprisonment varies from six months to three years. With regard to 
immigration, the Law 110/ 2017 introduced into article 19 of Consolidated Immigration 
Act 122 a new paragraph 1-bis which establishes that expulsion, removal and extradition 
are not allowed in case the migrant would be at risk of torture back in his/ her home 
country. Article 4123 of the Law 110/ 2017 excludes any immunity to migrants who are 
investigated or convicted of the crime of torture in another State or by an international 
court. It refers to Heads of State or Government as well as diplomatic and consular 
members who may be accredited to Italy by a foreign State. Lastly, the article provides 
an obligation to extradite the migrants suspected or convicted of the crime of torture to 
the requesting State. In case of a proceeding before an international court, the migrant is 
 
121Cfr. Article 613-ter, Penal Code: “Istigazione del pubblico ufficiale a commettere tortura. Il pubblico 
ufficiale o l'incaricato di un pubblico servizio il quale, nell'esercizio delle funzioni o del servizio, istiga in 
modo concretamente idoneo altro pubblico ufficiale o altro incaricato di un pubblico servizio a commettere 
il delitto di tortura, se l'istigazione non è accolta ovvero se l'istigazione è accolta ma il delitto non è 
commesso, è punito con la reclusione da sei mesi a tre anni.” 
122Cfr. Article 19, Consolidated Immigration Act: “Non sono ammessi il respingimento o l'espulsione o 
l'estradizione di una persona verso uno Stato qualora esistano fondati motivi di ritenere che essa rischi 
di essere sottoposta a tortura.” 
123Cfr. Article 4, Law 110/ 2017: “Esclusione dall'immunità. Estradizione nei casi di tortura. 1. Non può 
essere riconosciuta alcuna forma di immunità agli stranieri sottoposti a procedimento penale o 
condannati per il reato di tortura in altro Stato o da un tribunale internazionale. 2. Nel rispetto del 
diritto interno e dei trattati internazionali, nei casi di cui al comma 1, lo straniero è estradato verso lo 
Stato richiedente nel quale è in corso il procedimento penale o è stata pronunciata sentenza di condanna 
per il reato di tortura o, nel caso di procedimento davanti ad un tribunale internazionale, verso il 




extradited according to the international law.  Although criticized124, Law 110/2017 can 
be considered a little step further regarding the protection of human rights. To conclude, 
Article 3 of the Convention focuses more on the absolute character of the prohibition of 
torture and its application depends on the context and on the national law in which the 
crime has taken place, whereas Law 110/2017 provides more clear legal remedies for 
those who have committed the crime.  
 
2.3. Collective expulsion 
The word expulsion comes from Latin expulsion, stem of the verb expellere which 
means “drive out, drive away”125. Indeed, according to the IOM, expulsion is an act by 
an authority of a State with the intention and with the effect of securing the removal of a 
person or persons (non-nationals or stateless persons) against his/ her will from the 
territory of that State126. This leads a State to exercise a sovereign prerogative on the 
presence of foreigners in its territory. However, this power is not unlimited and 
arbitrary because of national and international law which regulate the process of 
expulsion. From the Khlaifia case, we have seen domestic and international laws 
regarding expulsion, namely the Consolidate Immigration Act and Article 4 of Protocol 
No.4 which we are going to analyze in the next sub- paragraphs.  
 
 
124Law 110/ 2017 has been criticized by many organizations engaged in human rights issues, among 
which Amnesty International and Antigone. Through its legislative process, this law has been modified a 
lot in comparison to what was proposed at the beginning. Firstly, the first draft concerned the crime only 
by public officials or public service officers, whereas the new law concerns everyone who commits a 
torture. For some, it is in contrast with the meaning of torture according to UN Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ratified by Italy in 1989. In 
international law, the offence of torture was considered a typical crime by public officials and therefore 
the law should have been referred to them and not to private citizens in general. More generally the law 
against torture should have been meant to protect citizens from the abuse of power. Secondly, the new 
law punishes a crime of torture trough more than one conduct and thus it excludes a single act of 
violence. Thirdly, the new law refers to torture as an act causing acute physical suffering or verifiable 
psychic trauma. The adjective “verifiable” potentially excludes many acts from being classified as 
torture. Therefore, the law could be much less effective.  
125Expulsion, Online Etymology Dictionary: https://www.etymonline.com/word/expulsion [28/10/2020]. 
126IOM (International Organization for Migration), Perruchoud R. and Redpath-Cross J. (eds.), “Glossary 




2.3.1. The Consolidated Immigration Act  
According to the Italian law, there is a distinction between refusal-of-entry and 
expulsion. Refusal-of-entry has two different procedures: refusal of entry at the border 
and differed refusal of entry. The first one refers to the immediate rejection of those 
migrants who, after border police checks, are found not to have the requirements127 to 
enter the territory128. Conversely, the differed refusal of entry, is not immediate and it 
refers to all those foreigners who are arrested upon the entrance of a territory or 
immediately afterwards and to all those who have been temporarily allowed to remain 
for purposes of public assistance129. For as long as migrants are in Italy, they are 
 
127The requirements stated in Article 4 §§1,3,6 and Articles 5 and 13 of Schengen Border Code127 are the 
following:  
1) possession of a valid travel document or equivalent document,  
2) possession of an entry visa, unless there is an exemption prescribed,  
3) documentations confirming the purpose and the conditions of the stay,  
4) sufficient means of subsistence both for the duration of the intended stay and for the return to their 
country of origin or transit to a third country into which they are certain to be admitted or are in a position 
to acquire such means lawfully,  
5) they are not persons for whom an alert has been issued in the SIS for the purposes of refusing entry,  
6) they are not considered to be a threat to public policy, internal security, public health or the 
international relations of any of the Member States, in particular where no alert has been issued in 
Member States’ national data bases for the purposes of refusing entry on the same grounds,  
7) they are not recipient of an expulsion order,  
8) they are not subjected of a re-entry ban, unless they did not obtain the authorization by the Ministry of 
the Interior according to Article 12 of the Consolidated Immigration Act.  
 
Legislative Decree No. 286 of 1998 (Consolidated Act of Provisions concerning immigration and rules 
on the status of aliens) amended by Laws no.271 of 2004 and no. 155 of 2005, and by Legislative Decree 




European Parliament of the Council of 15 March 2006, Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006 (Schengen 
Borders Code): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006R0562&from=EN [28/10/2020].  
 
128Cfr. Article 10§1, Consolidated Immigration Act: “La polizia di frontiera respinge gli stranieri che si 
presentano ai valichi di frontiera senza avere i requisiti richiesti dal presente testo unico per l’ingresso 





129Cfr. Article 10 § 2, Consolidated Immigration Act: “Il respingimento con accompagnamento alla 
frontiera è altresì disposto dal questore nei confronti degli stranieri: a. che entrando nel territorio dello 
Stato sottraendosi ai controlli di frontiera, sono fermati all'ingresso o subito dopo; b. che, nelle 





detained in a CIE and after a careful examination, the Chief of Police accompanies them 
to the border, since they are considered to have entered and stayed in the territory 
irregularly. Both the refusal of entry at the border and the differed refusal of entry do 
not prevent migrants to re-try to enter in the territory and it does not involve an alert in 
the Schengen Information System. Therefore, the foreigner who is refused to entry for 
the lack of some requirements can at any time afterwards try again to enter regularly, 
provided that is in the possession of the previously missing requirements. Regarding 
expulsions, they are divided into administrative and judicial according to the authority 
who issues them. Administrative expulsions are ordered by the administrative authority 
who has three obligations: this authority shall justify his/ her choices in fact and in law, 
communicate them to the addressee and finally sign officially the act of expulsion. The 
obligation of translation plays an important role, too130. Administrative expulsions can 
be ordered by the Ministry of the Interior against foreigners who are considered 
dangerous for the public order or the security of the State131  or by the Prefect against 
migrants whose stay is irregular132. Judicial expulsions are ordered by the judicial 
authorities as a consequence of criminal proceedings. On the basis of the reasons, 




130ASGI, “Espulsioni e respingimenti: i profili sostanziali”, scheda pratica a cura dell’avv. Savio, G., 
giugno 2016, pgg. 19-23: https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2016_DEF_ESPULSIONI-E-
RESPINGIMENTI-_-I-PROFILI-SOSTANZIALI-stampabile.pdf. 
131Cfr. Article 13§1, Consolidated Immigration Act: “Per motivi di ordine pubblico o di sicurezza dello 
Stato, il Ministro dell'interno può disporre l'espulsione dello straniero anche non residente nel territorio 
dello Stato, dandone preventiva notizia al Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri e al Ministro degli affari 
esteri.”: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/legislative-decree-2571998-no-286-on-
consolidated-act-of-provisions-concerning-immigration-and-the-condition-of-third-country-nationals.  
132Cfr. Article 13§2, Consolidated Immigration Act: “2. L'espulsione è disposta dal prefetto quando lo 
straniero: a. è entrato nel territorio dello Stato sottraendosi ai controlli di frontiera e non è stato respinto 
ai sensi dell'art. 10; b. si è trattenuto nel territorio dello Stato senza aver chiesto il permesso di 
soggiorno nel termine prescritto, salvo che il ritardo sia dipeso da forza maggiore, ovvero quando il 
permesso di soggiorno è stato revocato o annullato, ovvero è scaduto da più di sessanta giorni e non è 
stato chiesto il rinnovo; c. appartiene a taluna delle categorie indicate nell'art. 1 della legge 27  
dicembre 1956, n. 1423, come sostituto dall'art. 2 della legge 3 agosto 1988, n. 327, o nell'art. 1 della 
legge 31 maggio 1965, n. 575, come sostituito dall'art. 13 della legge 13 settembre 1982, n. 646.” 
https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/legislative-decree-2571998-no-286-on-consolidated-
act-of-provisions-concerning-immigration-and-the-condition-of-third-country-nationals. 
133Cfr.  Article 15§1, Consolidated Immigration Act: “1. Espulsione a titolo di misura di sicurezza e 
disposizioni per l'esecuzione dell'espulsione (Legge 6 marzo 1998, n. 40, art. 13) 1. Fuori dei casi 
previsti dal codice penale, il giudice può ordinare l'espulsione dello straniero che sia condannato per 





an alternative measure to detention134 and expulsions as an alternative sanction of the 
pecuniary penalty decided by the Justice of the Peace135 in case the migrant was 
condemned for illegal entry or stay or he/ she did not respect the refusal of entry orders 
by the Chief of the Police. Both administrative and judicial expulsions have the same 
effects: they oblige the migrant to leave the territory (immediately or within a certain 
period of time), inform the Schengen Information System about the expulsion so that 
he/ she cannot enter Italy or one of the other States of the Schengen area for a certain 
period of time and suspend any eventual penal proceeding of the migrant136. 
 
2.3.2. Article 4 of the Protocol No.4 to the European Convention on Human Rights 
Unlike the Italian law, the European Convention of Human Rights provides neither a 
distinction between the concepts of refusal of entry and expulsion nor a specific 
classification of each of them. In the Convention there are two articles in which 
expulsion of aliens is mentioned: Article 1 of Protocol No.7 and Article 4 of Protocol 
No.4. If the first one dwells only on some procedural safeguards of those aliens lawfully 




134Cfr. Article 16§5, Consolidated Immigration Act: “5. Nei confronti dello straniero, identificato, 
detenuto, che si trova in taluna delle situazioni indicate nell'articolo 13, comma 2, che deve scontare una 
pena detentiva, anche residua, non superiore a due anni, è disposta l'espulsione. Essa non può essere 
disposta nei casi in cui la condanna riguarda uno o più delitti previsti dall'articolo 407, comma 2, lettera 
a), del codice di procedura penale, ovvero i delitti previsti dal presente testo unico.” 
https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/legislative-decree-2571998-no-286-on-consolidated-
act-of-provisions-concerning-immigration-and-the-condition-of-third-country-nationals. 
135Cfr. Article 16, Consolidated Immigration Act: “Espulsione a titolo di sanzione sostitutiva o 
alternativa alla detenzione”: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/legislative-decree-
2571998-no-286-on-consolidated-act-of-provisions-concerning-immigration-and-the-condition-of-third-
country-nationals.  
136ASGI, “Espulsioni e respingimenti: i profili sostanziali”, scheda pratica a cura dell’avv. Savio, G., 
giugno 2016, pg. 23: https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2016_DEF_ESPULSIONI-E-
RESPINGIMENTI-_-I-PROFILI-SOSTANZIALI-stampabile.pdf. 
137Cfr. Article 1 of Protocol No.7, European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, “European 
Convention on Human Rights”, 4 November 1950: “Procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of 
aliens 1. An alien lawfully resident in the territory of a State shall not be expelled therefrom except in 
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall be allowed: (a) to submit reasons 
against his expulsion, (b) to have his case reviewed, and (c) to be represented for these purposes before 
the competent authority or a person or persons designated by that authority. 2. An alien may be expelled 
before the exercise of his rights under paragraph 1. (a), (b) and (c) of this Article, when such expulsion is 





collective one. Protocol No. 4 was drafted in 1963 and it was the first international 
treaty to address collective expulsion. The purpose of Article 4 Protocol No. 4 is to 
prevent States from having the authority to remove a certain number of aliens without 
examining their personal circumstances and, consequently, without enabling them to 
put forward their arguments against the measure taken by the relevant authority138. The 
Article states: 
Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited. 
Generally, collective expulsion refers to any measure compelling aliens, as a group, 
to leave the country, except where such a measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable 
and objective examination of the particular case of each individual alien of the group139. 
The Court has developed its case-law on the meaning of “collective” and “expulsion”. 
Collective refers neither to the number of people involved in the expulsion nor to a 
membership of a particular group140, but it rather addresses to the modality of the 
expulsion. It means that Article 4 Protocol No. 4 offers a procedural guarantee to 
migrants, namely an individual interview. Thus, collective expulsions take place when 
two constitutive elements are simultaneously present: the aliens are expelled together 
with other aliens in a similar situation, without due examination of their own individual 
situations. With regard to expulsion, the drafters of Protocol No. 4 meant it “in the 
generic meaning141, in current use (to drive away from a place)142”. Moreover, 
expulsion refers to any forcible removal of an alien from a State’s territory and it does 
not depend on the lawfulness of the person’s stay, the length he/ she spent in the 
territory, the place in which he/ she was arrested, his/ her legal status as or his/ her 
 
138Cfr. Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy (no. 277765/09, February 23, 2012, § 177).  
139Cfr. Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, § 237); Georgia v. Russia (I) (no. 
13255/07, July 3, 2014, §167); Čonka v. Belgium (51564/99, February 05, 2002, §59); Sultani v. France, 
(no. 45223/05, September 20, 2007, §81). 
140Cfr. N.D. and N.T. v. Spain (no. 8675/15, February 13, 2020, §§193-199). 
141This is in contrast to what the Khlaifia and Others v. Italy case: indeed, the Italian Government 
emphasized that the procedure which the applicants had been subjected to was classified in domestic law 
as refusal of entry” and not as “expulsion”. However, the Court saw no reason to depart from its earlier 
established definition and it observes that there is no doubt that the applicants, who were in the Italian 
territory, were removed from that State and returned to Tunisia against their will, thus constituting an 
expulsion within the meaning of Article 4 Protocol No.4: Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, 
December 15, 2016, §244).  
142European Court of Human Rights, “Guide on Article 4 of Protocol no. 4 to the European Convention 





conduct crossing the border143. Additionally, expulsion is not only a territorial notion, 
but also extraterritorial144.  
In conclusion, expulsion is dealt by the Italian law and the case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights differently. On one hand, in the domestic law, expulsions are 
dealt detailly as the legislation provides a clear distinction between the refusal of entry 
and expulsion and a clear classification in terms of meaning, legal procedures and 
people involved. On the other hand, Article 4 of Protocol no. 4 is much shorter and 
quite vague. This is due to the nature of the Convention which not only has to be 
interpreted in the light of the present- day conditions, but also in the light of the 
domestic law to which the case refers.   
 
2.3.3. Expulsion according to the Return Directive and the International Law 
Commission 
In Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, the judges of the Court took into account other EU 
and international sources when they had to decide whether a collective expulsion had 
taken place or not. These are the Return Directive and the draft articles on the expulsion 
of aliens approved by the International Law Commission (ILC). Now, we are going to 
briefly explain the structure of each of them.  
On a European law level, the Return Directive was approved by the European 
Parliament on December 16, 2008 as the result of a long process of negotiation between 
the Parliament and the Council. The purpose of the legislation was to lay down EU-
wide rules and procedures on the return of irregular migrants that Member States have 
to apply in order to respect migrants’ fundamental rights145. Indeed, the Directive 
applies to third- country nationals staying illegally in the territory of a Member State146. 
 
143Ibidem. 
144It refers to the removal of aliens carried out in the context of interception of migrants on high seas by 
the authorities in the case Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy: Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy (no. 
277765/09, February 23, 2012, §§169-182). 
145Cfr. Article 1, The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, Directive 
2008/115/EC, December 19, 2008: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008L0115&from=EN. 
146However, there are some exceptions in Article 2§1,2: “Scope: 1. This Directive applies to third-country 
nationals staying illegally on the territory of a Member State. 2. Member States may decide not to apply 
this Directive to third-country nationals who: (a) are subject to a refusal of entry in accordance with 




Due to their vulnerabilities, children, third-country nationals whose family members are 
citizens of the Union, asylum seekers and refugees147have been given particular 
attention. The Directive contains the key provisions governing the removal process 
which involves a return decision148 and measures to enforce return149. In this time lapse, 
migrants have the opportunity to leave the country voluntarily150 which is considered 
more humane and dignified than the enforced return. If migrants refuse the voluntary 
departure, the Member State involved is required to issue an entry ban151 whose length 
will depend on all relevant circumstances of the individual case and shall not exceed 
five years, unless he/ she is a serious threat to public policy, public security and national 
security. Moreover, the Member State issuing an entry ban is expected to enter an alert 
in the Schengen Information System (S.I.S.) which enables all the Member States to 
exchange information on persons who are to be refused entry. Additionally, the 
Directive guarantees the procedural safeguards during the removal process: firstly, 
return, removal and entry ban decisions must contain written reasons in fact and law as 
well as information on remedies, and translation of the main elements152; secondly, 
migrants have the right to appeal or review of return, removal and entry ban before a 
judicial or administrative authority153; thirdly, migrants can benefit from legal 
 
authorities in connection with the irregular crossing by land, sea or air of the external border of a Member 
State and who have not subsequently obtained an authorization or a right to stay in that Member State; (b) 
are subject to return as a criminal law sanction or as a consequence of a criminal law sanction, according 
to national law, or who are the subject of extradition procedures. 3. This Directive shall not apply to 
persons enjoying the Community right of free movement as defined in Article 2(5) of the Schengen 
Borders Code.”: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008L0115&from=EN.   
147Cfr. Article 5 and Article 3§9, The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 
Directive 2008/115/EC, December 19, 2008:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008L0115&from=EN.  
148Ibidem, Article 6§§1-6. Article 3§4 defines return decision as an administrative and judicial decision or 
act, stating or declaring the stay of a third-country national to be illegal and imposing or stating an 
obligation to return.  
149Ibidem, Article 6§§1-6. Return means the process of a third-country national going back, whether in 
voluntary compliance with an obligation to return or enforced, to: 1) his/ her country of origin; 2) a 
country of transit in accordance with Community or bilateral readmission agreements or other 
arrangements; 3) another third-country, to which the third-country national concerned voluntarily decides 
to return and in which he/ she will be accepted (Article 3§3).  
150Ibidem, Article 7§§1-4. Article 3§8 defines voluntary departure as compliance with the obligation to 
return within the time-limit fixed for that purpose in the return decision.  
151Cfr. Article 11§§1-5. An entry ban is an administrative or judicial decision or act prohibiting entry into 
and stay on the territory of the Member States for a specified period, accompanying a return decision 
(Article 3§6).  
152Cfr. Article 12§§1,2.  




assistance154; fourthly, while removal is pending for those in detention, Member States 
are obliged to respect the principle of family unity, and ensure emergency health care 
and essential treatment of illness, access to basic education for minors, and special need 
of vulnerable people155. Lastly, the Directive gives also guidelines for its 
implementation: Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions necessary to comply with the Directive and they shall 
communicate to the Commission all the measures and laws adopted in the field covered 
by the Directive156. The Commission has also some duties, namely that to report every 
three years to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of the 
Directive and propose amendments if necessary157. 
On an international level, the Court cited the draft articles on the expulsion by a State 
of aliens present in its territory158 adopted by the International Law Commission in 
2014 and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report 
covering the work of that session. The draft has two purposes: defining both ratione 
materiae and ratione personae. The first one relates to all the concrete expulsion 
measures159, whereas the second one refers to aliens present in the territory160 without 
any distinction of their legal status. In defining these concepts, the draft can more 
precisely provide obligations to States during the process of removal with the aim of 
protecting migrants’ fundamental rights161. Indeed, an alien can be expelled only in 
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law162 and the State shall motivate 
the reasons for expulsion in good faith and reasonably, taking into account all the 
specific circumstances163. In all the phases of the process of expulsion, migrants’ rights 
 
154Cfr. Article 13§§3,4. 
155Cfr. Article 14§1. 
156Cfr. Article 20§§1,2.  
157Cfr. Article 19.  
158Cfr. Article 1§1, International Law Commission, “Draft articles on the expulsion of aliens, with 
commentaries”, 2014: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_12_2014.pdf.  
159The meaning of expulsion to which the scope ratione materiae refers is defined by Article 2 (a) of the 
draft: “Expulsion means a formal act or conduct attributable to a State by which an alien is compelled to 
leave the territory of that State; it does not include extradition to another State, surrender to an 
international criminal court or tribunal, or the non-admission of an alien to a State.“ In this way no other 
interpretations of the meaning of expulsion are possible.  
160 Following the above-mentioned reasoning, the meaning of aliens of the ratione personae is described 
by Article 2(b) of the draft: “alien means an individual who does not have the nationality of the State in 
whose territory that individual is present”.  
161Cfr. Article 3.  
162Cfr. Article 4.  




are protected both in terms of dignity164 and procedural rules165.Additionally, the draft 
prohibits specific types of expulsion among which expulsion of refugees166 and stateless 
persons167, collective expulsion168, disguised expulsion169 and expulsion for the purpose 
of confiscation of assets170. The States cannot also deprive the nationality of a migrant 
for the purpose of expulsion171. Lastly, the draft sets out the legal consequences of 
expulsion: if an expulsion is considered unlawful, the alien can be readmitted in the 
expelling State172. Indeed, both the expelling State173 and the State of nationality of an 
alien subject to expulsion174 have the responsibility toward that alien.  
In short, the draft by the ILC is much more specific in providing a list of all the 
rights to be protected in comparison to the Return Directive which is, by contrast, 
clearer on the part of the procedures for the expulsion. Despite these differences,  the 
texts have some features in common: firstly, they give a detailed terminology related to 
expulsion; secondly, they recognize the right of a State to expel a third-country national, 
but at the same time they impose them obligations to protect migrants’ rights and 
dignity in all the phases of the process of expulsion; thirdly, they pay particular 
attention to vulnerable people; and lastly, they take into account conditions of aliens in 
detention to be expelled guaranteeing them protection of their rights.  
 
In this chapter, we have analyzed and compared all the laws present in the Khlaifia 
and Others v. Italy case related to migration detention, torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment and collective expulsion. In the next chapter, we are going to 
see the immigration policy, namely how and if the above-mentioned laws are concretely 
put into practice. 
 
164Part Three of the draft provides a specific list of migrants’ rights that have to be protected in the 
expelling State (Chapter II), in relation to the State of destination (Chapter III) and in the transit State 
(Chapter IV). Particular care is given to vulnerable persons (Article 15§§1,2).  
165Part Four of the draft deals with specific procedural rules: procedural rights of aliens subject to 
expulsion (Article 26), suspensive effect of an appeal against an expulsion decision (Article 27) and 
international procedures for individual recourse (Article 28).  
166Cfr. Article 6.  
167Cfr. Article 7. 
168Cfr. Article 9.  
169Cfr. Article 10. 
170Cfr. Article 11. 
171Cfr. Article 8. 
172Cfr. Article 29. 
173Cfr. Article 30. 





Immigration policy: from theory to practice 
 
In this chapter we are going to analyze the immigration policy in Italy, i.e. how the laws 
mentioned in the previous chapter are put into practice. To achieve this goal, firstly, we 
are going to examine the actors involved in the migration and border management and 
their role in communicating migrants’ rights, secondly, we are going to provide some 
concrete examples of law migration policy application in Italy.  
 
3.1. Human rights and language: an introduction 
The legal texts we have analyzed in the previous chapter have dealt with some 
human rights and prohibitions related to them such as right to liberty, prohibition to 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and prohibition of collective 
expulsions. Human rights are legally guaranteed by substantive law in the form of 
national constitutions or national constitutional law or internationally in the form of 
treaties, customary international law, bodies of principles and case-law175 which all 
pursue the aim to protect individuals and groups against actions which interfere with 
fundamental freedoms and human dignity. Consequently, human rights law imposes 
obligations on States to refrain them from certain acts (negative rights), or to act in a 
certain way (positive rights). In this way, promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of individuals or groups can be guaranteed176. Generally 
speaking, human rights are commonly understood as being those rights which are 
inherent to all human beings, whatever their race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. These 
rights must be guaranteed to every person as a consequence of being human177 and they 
 
175European Judicial Training Network, “English for Human Rights EU Law- Handbook”, European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2016, pg. 24. 
176Ibidem, pg. 24.  
 
177Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Staff College Project, “Human 




are based on the respect for the dignity and worth of each person and are universal178, 
inalienable179, indivisible, interrelated and interdependent180. As shown in the Khlaifia 
case, human rights have a crucial role in the protection of migrants. In this regard, the 
Global Migration Group has recently listed some specific rights 181 which must be taken 
into account when dealing with migration issues, among which: right to life, to security 
and to liberty from arbitrary detention and right to enjoy asylum; right to be free from 
discrimination based on race, sex, language, religion, origin or other conditions; right to 
be protected from abuses, exploitation and torture; right to a fair trial and legal 
remedies; right to enjoy economic, social and cultural rights; lastly, all the other rights 
guaranteed by international treaties which the Member States have ratified. Human 
rights law shall be in written form and it requires a specific language. As human rights 
law is a branch of the law, it is necessarily written in legal language which is a language 
for specific purposes. Shortly, the language for special purposes is a functional variety 
of ordinary language related to a specific topic and therefore it requires specific 
linguistic features both in terms of lexicon and morpho-syntax. In this way, 
communication in that specific field of knowledge can be fulfilled successfully with all 
the participants182. As it resides in the legal system, legal language is also a technical 
language183. As a consequence, not all people may understand the high register of legal 
texts, although their content dealing with human rights should be available for 
everyone184. Moreover, migrants coming on European shores may not be familiar with 
the legal system in the Member State in which they have entered, or the norms related 
to the application for international protection. Some migrants arrive at the destination 
country with no or little information, while the majority of them is incorrectly informed. 
To ensure that the contents and the rights of these legal texts are applied concretely, 
 
178Universal means that they are applied equally and without discrimination to all people.  
179Inalienable means that no one can have his/ her human rights taken away other than in specific 
situations.  
180In the sense that it is insufficient to respect some human rights and not others.  
181International Commission of Jurists, “L’immigrazione e la normativa internazionale dei diritti umani- 
Guida per operatori del diritto n.6”, Switzerland, 2012, pgg. 30-31. 
182Cortelazzo M., “Lingue speciali- La dimensione verticale”, Studi linguistici applicati, Unipress, 
Padova, 1994, pg. 6.  
183There have been different opinions about the technical nature of legal language. Some argue that legal 
language does not exist in itself, but it is a part of ordinary language, whereas others think that legal 
language is an identifiable technical language. The latter is the mostly accepted theory. Cfr. Cao D., 
“Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, Buffalo, Toronto, 2007, pgg. 15-18. 
184In this chapter, we have given a broad overview of legal language, but we are going to deeply analyzed 




cooperation between all the people involved in the practice of immigration management 
is necessary. It is indeed a duty of the authorities to guarantee adequate reception 
services in order to provide assistance and information for both migrants who wish to 
apply for asylum or enter and stay in a Member State185. If cooperation works well, the 
communication of migrants’ rights can be effective, despite the difficulty of legal texts 
and their language.    
 
3.2. Communicating migrants’ rights 
Communication must be regarded as a fundamental tool for ensuring rights to 
migrants. It is a process involving local, national and international actors which provide 
migrants with widely different support. In order to better understand how the process of 
communicating rights works, it is noteworthy to understand what happens concretely 
when migrants land on Italian coasts. Therefore, the next sub-paragraphs will deal with 
first immigration and border management and second the actors involved in this 
process. Eventually, particular attention will be given to intercultural mediators who 
play a fundamental role in passing information and making it understandable.  
 
3.2.1. Immigration and border management 
When intercepting migrants on boats at sea, the Italian Coast Guard advises the 
Prefect’s office and the Provincial Police Headquarters, more specifically the 
Immigration Office, providing them with the right number of people on board, their 
gender, age and health conditions, especially if there are people who are in need of 
urgent medical attention. Civil Protection Department and local health authorities, 
associations and organizations are also alerted in order to provide first aid to and advise 
migrants during the landing. International organizations’ staff among which Praesidium 
Project partners and the Sovereign Order of Malta are among those helpers. Upon their 
arrival at Lampedusa port, migrants are subjected to an initial check on their state of 
health by medical staff. Healthcare should indeed be given absolute priority over all 
 






other interventions benefitting newly arrived migrants. Trained cultural mediators are 
also present to help the actors involved in healthcare interventions, rescue and first 
aid186. If possible, they provide migrants with general information about what happens 
after landing, including contacting their families, applying for asylum and the 
importance of providing correct personal details. However, due to the significant 
number of incoming migrants, there is normally little time both for health checks and 
giving information which are carried out soon after in the reception centers. After being 
landed, migrants are classified according to their needs through a color-coding 
system187 and are transferred to dedicated reception centers by the buses organized in 
cooperation with the competent Prefect’s office, by the police authorities or by the 
managing body of the referred centers. At the time of Khlaifia’s case188, the practice of 
receiving migrants was developed on three levels: a phase of first aid and assistance, a 
first reception phase and a second-line reception phase. In each phase, generic 
assistance (e.g. accommodation, food and provision of personal supplies), healthcare 
and psychological care, linguistic and cultural mediation, cleaning services and 
environmental hygiene were provided189. In the first stage, migrants were put in CDAs 
(Reception or Welcome Centers) or CSPAs (Centers for First Aid and Reception) which 
were centers set up in the principal places of disembarkation. In Lampedusa, there was a 
CSPA in Contrada Imbriacola. As seen in the previous chapter, here migrants were 
given first aid and identified and they were allowed to stay for as long as necessary to 
 
186Ministero dell’Interno, “Praesidium Project- Recommendation and good practices in the management 
of mixed migratory flows by sea”, 2012, pg. 17.   
187Parliamentary Assembly, “Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-scale arrival of irregular migrants, 
asylum-seekers and refugees on Europe’s southern shores”, September 30, 2011, §44. 
188As mentioned in chapter two, in 2015, the acronym-based reception system of CDAs, CPSAs and 
CARAs was replaced by another system composed by the so-called CPA (First reception center) 
(Legislative Decree 142/2015) and the hotspot approach which was first implemented by the Italian 
Roadmap in 2015 and was then inaugurated by a Circular of the Ministry of the Interior188 addressed to 
the Prefects and the Chief of Police and by the Standard Operating Procedures to be followed in the 
reception centers. However, this Roadmap did not provide a legal basis in the domestic legislation and for 
this reason in 2017 the Article 17 of Minniti-Orlando decree (Law 46/2017) was introduced and 
converted into the Article 10-ter of the Consolidated Immigration Act. In this way, the word hotspot was 
mentioned in the Italian legislation under the name punti di crisi. In the same law, CIEs (Identification 
and Expulsion Centers) were also converted into CPRs (Return Detention Centers). As the Khlaifia case 
took place in 2011, the hotspot approach was not implemented yet and therefore the applicants 
experienced the acronym-based reception system composed by CDAs, CPSAs, CARAs and CIEs. For 
this reason, the analysis of immigration policy of this dissertation will be based on the previous reception 
system. 
189Ministero dell’Interno, “Praesidium Project- Recommendation and good practices in the management 




establish their identities and status, normally for 24/ 48 hours. The center was 
supervised, monitored and controlled by the relevant Prefect’s office, and run by 
institutions, associations or cooperatives190. The Immigration Offices of the relevant 
Provincial Police Headquarters had their own representatives within the facilities to 
carry out preliminary identification procedures for migrants, including fingerprinting, 
photographing and recording arrival date and landing number. Before undergoing 
identification procedure, migrants shall receive a general medical checkup. The most 
urgent cases were transferred to adequate facilities of the National Health System (SSN) 
or were treated at the center’s medical station191. In the phase of identification, the 
police authorities recorded personal data and they entered them into the European 
EURODAC database, the SDI Investigation System and AFIS (the Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System) and they also checked whether the migrant had 
already applied for asylum in another European country and whether he/ she had a 
criminal record192. Personal details and any statements about family relationships were 
included in the Police’s database. Before the identification procedure, the Police’s 
Immigration Office with the help of a cultural mediator provided migrants with general 
information on Italian legislation about migration and asylum, with particular regard to 
the right to apply for international protection. Immediately after entering the reception 
center, all migrants should be given an information leaflet translated into several 
languages containing basic guidelines on their stay in their destination country, 
protection and guardianship schemes provided under national law193. Moreover, they 
should be informed about the rules of coexistence and of services offered by the center. 
After being identified, migrants were transferred to CARAs (Centers for the Reception 
of Asylum Seekers) if beneficiary of humanitarian protection, subsidiary protection or 
political asylum or to CIEs (Identification and Expulsion Centers) if irregular.  
Unaccompanied minors as well as asylum seekers with vulnerabilities were directly 
transferred to Base Loran in Lampedusa194. Transfers were centrally coordinated by the 
Ministry of Interior. The CARAs covered the first reception phase where migrants can 
 
190Ibidem, pg. 20.   
191Ibidem, pg. 26.   
192Ibidem, pg. 21.   
193Ibidem, pg. 24.   
194Amnesty International, “Italy: Amnesty International findings and recommendations to the Italian 




stay from 20 to 35 days. Thereafter, they are subjected to a second-line reception phase 
and thus sent to SPRAR (System of Protection for Refugees and Asylum Seekers)195. In 
case of unavailability of places due to a large influx of arrivals, first reception could be 
implemented in temporary structures also known as CAS (Emergency Reception 
Centers), established by Prefectures. When reception was provided in CAS, it was 
normally limited to the time strictly necessary for the transfer of the applicant in the 
first reception centers. By contrast, migrants in the CIEs could stay up to 180 days and 
they were subjected to removal or expulsion.  
So far, we have explained the process to which migrants were subjected after 
landing, whereas the next paragraph will emphasize the role played by all the 
stakeholders involved in the border and migration management.  
 
3.2.2. Stakeholders involved in the border and migration management 
The Khlaifia case listed many local and international stakeholders involved in the 
process of managing in coming migrants that play a different role according to their 
mandate. The Coast Guard, the Customs and Revenue Police, the Carabinieri, the Civil 
Protection Department and the Border Police are in the first line for rescue operations 
and landings. Provincial Police Headquarters are in charge of all matters related to the 
legal situations of migrants, such as international procedures or entitlement to residence 
permits196. Prefects’ offices-central government branch offices are responsible for all 
the questions related to the reception of migrants arriving on the island until they are 
transferred elsewhere197. Moreover, together with the management bodies of the 
reception centers, they are the supervisors of migrants’ and asylum seekers’ reception 
centers of CSPA in Contrada Imbriacola and Loran base as well as centers for 
identification and expulsion (CIEs). The head of the Palermo unit coordinated local and 
 
195The SPRAR (System of Protection for Refugees and Asylum Seekers) is a network of local authorities 
which implements integrated reception projects through the National Fund for Asylum (AMIF) and it was 
introduced into the Italian legislation by the Bossi-Fini Law (Law no. 189 of July 30, 2002). In 2018, 
SPRAR was changed into SIPROIMI (System of Protection for Beneficiaries of Protection and 
Unaccompanied Minors) through the decree on immigration and security (Salvini Decree). Again, in 
2020 SIPROIMI turned into SAI (Reception and integration system) by the Ministry of the Interior 
Luciana Lamorgese.  
196Ministero dell’Interno, “Praesidium Project- Recommendation and good practices in the management 





mental health authorities dealing with vulnerable cases, whereas local associations and 
the civil society provide other services to migrants and asylum seekers198. International 
stakeholders are also active on Italian soil as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the 
Sovereign Order of Malta. Médecins Sans Frontières199 is a private, international, 
independent medical humanitarian organization made up mainly of doctors and health 
sector workers, but it is also open to all other professionals which might help in 
achieving its aims. With 25 associations around the world, it works according to some 
ethical principle, among which impartiality, independence, neutrality, bearing witness, 
transparent and accountable. In Lampedusa, it provides migrants and asylum seekers 
not only with mental healthcare across multiple reception centers, but also with cultural 
mediators and psychologists who screen migrants and asylum seekers for psychological 
vulnerabilities, and they provide medical treatments to those in need. The Sovereign 
Order of Malta200 is one of the oldest institutions of Western and Christian civilization 
and it is based on principles such as neutrality, impartiality and apoliticality. It runs 
programs independently or within a framework of partnership with governments and 
international agencies in 120 countries. On the island of Lampedusa, it works with the 
Italian Coast Guard and the Customs and Revenue Police during rescue operations and 
landings.  
The other international organizations working on the island of Lampedusa are 
partners of the Praesidium project titled “Strengthening of reception capacity in respect 
of migration flows reaching the island of Lampedusa” launched in 2006 by the Ministry 
of the Interior- Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration.  
Through individual partnerships agreements signed with the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), the Italian Red Cross (CRI) and with Save the Children Italy, the 
Praesidium project aims at tackling the growing flow of migrants by enhancing 
humanitarian receptions and assisting irregular migrants. 
These organizations were chosen as project partners because they are internationally 
recognized for their commitment in the field of managing migration-related 
 
198Ibidem. 
199Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) International : https://www.msf.org/ [22/11/2020]. 





humanitarian and social emergencies as well as for their role in promoting and 
defending the human and civil rights of migrants, asylum seekers or beneficiaries of 
international protection, victims of trafficking and minors.  
At the beginning, this project was co-funded by the European Commission and by 
the Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration as part of the “Argo 2005 and 
2006” and “Security in action” programs respectively, but thereafter it was funded only 
by the Italian Ministry of the Interior201. The services provided by these organizations 
vary from giving legal information and counselling, to monitoring and identification of 
individual vulnerable cases, monitoring of migrants’ health conditions and monitoring 
of reception centers. The Praesidium project stands out thus for the multi-agency 
cooperation of all its below-mentioned partners. 
The Italian Red Cross (CRI)202 is the Italian national Red Cross society. 
Internationally, the Red Cross is known as International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) where the latter is used in place of the Red Cross in 
many Islamic countries. The IFRC is an international humanitarian movement which is 
based on the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary 
work, unity and universality and it is present in 192 countries all over the word. On the 
island of Lampedusa, the Italian Red Cross mainly provides social and medical 
assistance to refugees and migrants, carrying out activities such as reception, advocacy, 
support to family reunification efforts, providing information, education health risk 
prevention and psychological support.  
The International Organization for Migration (IOM)203 is the leading 
intergovernmental organization in the field of migration and is committed to the 
principle that human and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. IOM is part 
of the United Nations system as a related organization. As such, IOM is guided by the 
principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations including upholding human 
rights for all, including migrants. Within the Praesidium, IOM provides information and 
legal counseling to migrants and displaced people on Italian immigration regulations, 
on human trafficking and on the consequences of anyone staying in the country 
 
201Ministero dell’Interno, “Praesidium Project- Recommendation and good practices in the management 
of mixed migratory flows by sea”, 2012, pg. 5.   
202Italian Red Cross-IFCR: https://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/where-we-work/europe/italian-red-cross/ 
[22/11/2020]. 




irregularly. IOM is particularly focused on identifying and providing assistance to 
vulnerable persons, among which victims of trafficking for sexual and labor 
exploitation. Lastly, IOM monitors landing and reception procedures at immigration 
centers and it provides technical assistance to institutions and local authorities on 
immigration issues.  
Save the Children204 is the leading independent international non-profit organization 
that sheds light on the way the world treats children and it carries out projects in Italy 
and abroad. Indeed, it is a global membership organization made up of Save the 
Children International and 29 national members based on principles of accountability, 
ambition, collaboration, creativity and integrity. In the Praesidium project, Save the 
Children Italy provides information and legal advice to migrant children arriving by sea, 
monitors reception conditions of migrant children and supports the development of an 
operating system for the identification and assistance of migrant children which respects 
their rights. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees205 is the UN agency 
for refugees created by the UN General Assembly in 1950 headquartered in Geneva. 
Working in 135 countries, the UNHCR’s mandate is to aid and protect refugees, 
forcibly displaced communities and stateless people and assist in irregular migrants’ 
voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement to a third country. In the 
Praesidium Project, its duty is to improve the immigrant reception system and guarantee 
access to asylum procedures, for example by providing cultural mediators in the 
disembarkations points and in the CSPA center of Contrada Imbriacola. Moreover, it 
provides reception centers and host associations for unaccompanied minors with 
information and legal advice. Lastly, it monitors the adequate functioning of the 
reception system and contributes to the identification of vulnerable people.  
All these international organizations strongly cooperate with all the above-mentioned 
local authorities during all stages of the migration process in order to save lives, receive 
migrants and transfer them to other centers throughout Italy in the best conditions206. 
They are authorized to maintain a permanent presence inside the Lampedusa reception 
 
204Save the Children Italy: https://www.savethechildren.it/ [22/11/2020]. 
205UNHCR-The UN Refugee Agency: https://www.unhcr.org/ [22/11/2020]. 
206This cooperation was stated in the “Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-scale arrival of irregular 
migrants, asylum seekers and refugees on Europe’s southern shores” set up by the Council of Europe’s 





center and have interpreters and cultural mediators available, whose role emphasize the 
following sub-paragraph.   
 
3.2.3. The importance of providing migrants with correct information: the role of the 
intercultural mediators 
As stated in Article 11§6 of the Consolidated Immigration Act, the Italian authorities 
shall give proper information to asylum seekers who want to apply for asylum or 
migrants who want to enter and stay in the territory. The provision of information to 
migrants is a key activity within the management of mixed flows as, in most cases, 
migrants have little or no information or they are wrongly informed about asylum or 
protection procedures or about their rights207. When they arrive on Italian shores, 
migrants not only have expectations and needs, but also they may feel disoriented as 
they come from countries with different languages, cultures, religions, social, practical 
and legal norms. Mediation turns out thus to be an be indispensable tool to resolve 
communication obstacles between newly arrived migrants and authorities. In its 
broadest sense, mediation is an intermediary act occurring in a conflict between parties 
in order to help bring about an agreement. Of course, language plays a fundamental role 
in this process as mediation uses language to achieve an efficient communication 
between two or more parties. In this regard,  the Common European Framework of 
Reference for Languages (CEFR)208 has provided an exhaustive definition as follows: 
“the written and/or oral activities of mediation make communication possible between 
people who are unable, for whatever reason, to communicate with each other directly. 
Translation or interpretation, a paraphrase, summary or record, provides for a third-
party a (re)formulation of a [spoken or written] source text to which this third party 
 
207Ministero dell’Interno, “Praesidium Project- Recommendation and good practices in the management 
of mixed migratory flows by sea”, 2012, pg. 32.   
208The Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) is an international standard 
for describing language ability. It describes language ability on a six-point scale, from A1 for beginners, 
up to C2 for those who have mastered a language. This makes it easy for anyone involved in language 
teaching and testing, such as teachers or learners, to see the level of different qualifications. It also means 
that employers and educational institutions can easily compare our qualifications to other exams in their 




does not have direct access. Mediating language activities – (re)processing an existing 
text- occupy an important place in the normal linguistic functioning of our society209”.  
Indeed, the most common problems related to linguistic communication between 
migrants and authorities may lie upon language, its register and terminology for 
example in understanding technical legal texts concerning migrants’ rights and duties or 
upon the unfamiliarity with certain concepts or processes of the Member State migrants 
have enter, for example related to its legal system and procedures. The mediator is thus 
someone who acts as a dynamic bridge between Italian authorities and migrants arriving 
on the island of Lampedusa. Given the heterogeneity of professional experiences and 
the lack of a homogeneous definition on an international, European and national level, 
the mediator is designed with several names which goes from210social interpreter, 
communication facilitator, mother-tongue mediator, linguistic mediator, technician of 
linguistic mediation for immigrants, linguistic-cultural mediator, intercultural mediator, 
cultural mediator to social mediator and intercultural operator211. However, the concept 
of intercultural mediator better summarizes and expresses all the meaning of the role: 
the prefix “inter” refers to a relationship, an interaction and a dynamic dialogue of 
different cultures where the language is the primary means of communication212.  
An intercultural mediator is indeed a social operator able to carry out linguistic-
cultural mediation, non-professional interpretation and translation and social mediation, 
promoting intercultural mediation as a systemic device in integration policies. In doing 
so, he/ she optimizes the network, improves the organization and delivery of services 
and strengthens the professional role of the mediator213. This definition highlights the 
added value of intercultural mediators in which they combine linguistic, cultural and 
 
209Council of Europe, “Common European framework of reference for languages: learning, teaching, 
assessment, pg. 14:  https://www.coe.int/en/web/lang-migrants/linguistic-and-cultural-mediation 
[24/11/2020].  
210Baldwin J.R., Coleman R.R.M., González A., Shenoy-Packer S., “Intercultural Communication for 
Everyday Life”, Wiley Blackwell, 2014, pg. 5.   
211These names are listed in descending order from the one more related to the “linguistic factor” to the 
one related to the “cultural factor” where for culture is meant the way of life of a group of people 
including symbols, values, behaviors, artifacts, and other shared aspects. 
Cfr. AA.VV., “Linee di indirizzo per il riconoscimento della figura professionale del mediatore 
interculturale- del Gruppo di Lavoro Istituzionale per la promozione della Mediazione Interculturale”, 
December 21, 2009, pg. 9.  
212Ibidem, pg. 22.  
213AA.VV., “La qualifica del mediatore interculturale- Contributi per il suo inserimento nel futuro 




social elements found separately in interpreters and social operators214. Indeed, to 
achieve their goals, intercultural mediators require relational, interpersonal, 
intercultural, linguistic skills. Firstly, he/ she stands out for his/ her clear 
communication skills which allow him/ her to collaborate and work well with others 
and to manage and solve conflicts. As they may be confronted with unjust situations, 
discriminations, racism and prejudices towards migrants, it is important that they can 
monitor and manage the emotional impact of these phenomena on their professional 
performance and try to be as objective as possible. His/ her forthcoming and caring 
attitude is a requirement for analyzing and better understanding migrants’ needs. 
Intercultural mediators should be thus empathetic, trustworthy, respectful and have a 
non-judgment attitude. Secondly, intercultural mediator shall be aware of cultural 
differences. Indeed, among the principles of deontological ethics, we can find 
neutrality, respect for others, confidentiality, equidistance, objectivity and 
transparency215. Thirdly, he/ she needs a good knowledge of migrants’ culture and 
language and therefore he/ she should preferably be a migrant himself/herself who has 
also already first-hand experienced migration. Indeed, most intercultural mediators are 
themselves migrants or belong to an ethnic minority216. Not only, an intercultural 
mediator shall possess a B1 level of Italian, too, especially when tackling with technical 
terminology, for example with legal one. Terminology is a field of knowledge where 
regular upskilling is needed. Moreover, given that the removal of linguistic barriers is 
essential to the function of intercultural mediator, interpreting skills are also considered 
of a great importance. In addition, intercultural mediators are required to deepen their 
knowledge in migration channels, history and immigration rules and legislation on an 
international, European and national level. Intercultural mediators intervene in different 
contexts such as in schools, in healthcare, in justice, in criminal institutes, in social 
service offices, in helping migrants find a job, in public administration, in phases of first 
 
214Morniroli A., Cipolla A., Fortino T. (eds.), “Dialoghi- Metodologie e strumenti di mediazione 
linguistica e culturale”, pg. 13.  
215Cfr. AA.VV., “La qualifica del mediatore interculturale- Contributi per il suo inserimento nel futuro 
sistema nazionale di certificazione delle competenze”, 2014, pg. 28; and European Union, “Intercultural 
Mediator Profile and Related Learning Outcomes”, TIME Project, pg.10. 





aid and assistance, first reception and second-line reception phases217. In Khlaifia case, 
we have seen the role of intercultural mediators in cases of emergency, namely in 
rescue operations and landings and in the CSPA in Contrada Imbriacola on the island of 
Lampedusa in order to smooth communication between actors involved in healthcare 
interventions in rescue and healthcare interventions and first aid to migrants. 
 
3.3. Immigration policy in Lampedusa 
The legal texts analyzed in the previous chapter set the goal to protect human rights 
and more precisely those of migrants. Despite the varied personnel engaged in the 
migration management supposed to put into practice what written laws state, this was 
not however what happened in Lampedusa in 2011. In the Khlaifia case, the judges of 
the European Court of Human Rights examined three reports describing the real 
situation on the island, namely the report on the state of human rights in prisons and 
reception and detention centers in Italy by the Italian Senate’s Special Commission for 
Human Rights, the fact-finding of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly Ad 
Hoc Sub-Committee and Amnesty International findings and recommendations to the 
Italian authorities following the research visit to Lampedusa and Mineo.  
 
3.3.1. Lampedusa and the humanitarian crisis 
Because of its geographical location 167 kilometers off Tunisia coasts and 355 
kilometers off Libyan ones218, Lampedusa has been destination of a large flux of 
 
217Since this dissertation mainly focuses on the analysis of the Khlaifia case, I will restrict myself to 
dealing with the role of intercultural mediators in the judgment, namely in the phases of first aid and 
assistance. For further readings about the role of intercultural mediators in other fields, I recommend 
these reports:  
• AA.VV., “Linee di indirizzo per il riconoscimento della figura professionale del mediatore 
interculturale- del Gruppo di Lavoro Istituzionale per la promozione della Mediazione 
Interculturale”, December 21, 2009, pgg. 12-18. 
• AA.VV., “La qualifica del mediatore interculturale- Contributi per il suo inserimento nel futuro 
sistema nazionale di certificazione delle competenze”, 2014, pgg. 15-19. 
• Consiglio Nazionale dell’Economica e del Lavoro- Organismo Nazionale di Coordinamento per 
le politiche di integrazione sociale degli stranieri, “Mediazione e mediatori interculturali: 
indicazioni operative”, 29 October 2009, pg. 7.  
• Morniroli A., Cipolla A., Fortino T. (eds.), “Dialoghi- Metodologie e strumenti di mediazione 
linguistica e culturale”, pgg. 25-34. [27/11/2020]. 
 




incoming migrants, following the uprising in Tunisia and in Libya, which led the island 
to declare the status of humanitarian emergency in February 2011. With its scarce 
dimension of around 20 km², the island was not equipped to receive the 55.298 people 
who arrived on September 2011219. It was in this period that the applicants were 
illegally detained, as the ECHR sentenced. The reception system was indeed collapsed: 
migrants were sleeping on streets or in makeshift tents, they had no access to toilets or 
washing facilities and piles of garbage and human waste were in public areas. 
Moreover, the stakeholders involved in the migration management was not sufficient 
and inadequate to face such an immigration wave. However, this humanitarian crisis 
was exacerbated by Italian authorities’ indolent decision-making processes. Indeed, 
Italian authorities were unable to promptly and effectively re-open reception centers 
effectively, and to ensure transfers of meaningful numbers of people off the island onto 
Sicily or to other Italian regions220. The inadequate and belated management of the 
crisis had bad consequences not only for the migrants and the actors involved in this 
process, but also for the inhabitants and the tourism of Lampedusa221. 
 
3.3.2. Lack of information for migrants  
Cooperation between all parties involved in migration management ensures that 
rights are communicated efficiently to all subjects of law. According to a study carried 
out by the Parliamentary Assembly, a number of critical issues concerning the 
management of migration flows have emerged. Theoretically, migrants should be 
informed soon after their landings, but due to consistent number of them coming at the 
same time, their transfer is made quickly, risking that some of them are sent back to 
their home countries without being informed about the possibility of obtaining 
international protection222.  After their disembarkation, the applicants of Khlaifia case 
 
219Parliamentary Assembly, “Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-scale arrival of irregular migrants, 
asylum-seekers and refugees on Europe’s southern shores”, 30 September 2011, §13. 
220Parliamentary Assembly, “Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-scale arrival of irregular migrants, 
asylum-seekers and refugees on Europe’s southern shores”, 30 September 2011, §15-19; Amnesty 
International, “Italy: Amnesty International findings and recommendations to the Italian authorities 
following the research visit to Lampedusa and Mineo”, 21 April 2011, pg. 2. 
221Parliamentary Assembly, “Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-scale arrival of irregular migrants, 
asylum-seekers and refugees on Europe’s southern shores”, 30 September 2011, §§77-81. 
222Parliamentary Assembly, “Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-scale arrival of irregular migrants, 




were transferred to CSPA where ninety-nine social operators, three social workers, 
three psychologists and eight interpreters and cultural mediators were working223. 
According to the Italian Government, cultural mediators and interpreters were there to 
facilitate communication and mutual understanding between the migrants and the Italian 
authorities224, for example in conducting first identification procedures and in filling out 
information sheets containing personal data and regarding any circumstances specific to 
each migrant. It is to remember that in Khlaifia case these forms were destroyed 
thereafter in the fire225. Moreover, they were supposed to provide migrants with 
information on Italian legislation about migration and asylum, about the rules of 
coexistence and the services offered by the center, such as medical, psychological and 
legal assistance in the initiation of asylum or protection legal procedures. The number 
of interpreters and cultural mediators may not have been sufficient in order to attend to 
all the needs required226: the interpreters and the cultural mediators were eight, whereas 
the migrants were more than 1000227. 
As seen above, intercultural mediators are of enormous importance for an effective 
communication between migrants and local authorities. Since these professional figures 
are needed at different stages of the migration flow management in order to help all the 
actors involved varying from police authorities to doctors, from asylum seekers to 
irregular migrants, their presence must be consistent. The Khlaifia case demonstrated 
how the lack of their presence or their small presence led to a violation of migrants' 
rights: the breach of Article 5§4 “everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or 
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention 
shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not 
lawful” is due to the impossibility of the applicants to appeal the reasons of their 
detention in the CSPA of Contrada Imbriacola which was not equipped with the 
 
223Cfr. Khlafia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §152). 
224Ibidem, §246. 
225Ibidem, §§224, 246. 
226Ibidem, §192. According to the applicants, the maximum capacity in the center was 804 (§142), 
whereas the Government replied that the center could host up to 1000 (§153). Moreover, the applicants 
added that on September 16,17,18,19 and 20, the center housed 1.357, 1.325, 1.399, 1.265 and 1.017 
migrants respectively. Those figures do not correspond to the indications provided by the Government, 
which at the hearing before the Court stated that at the time of the applicants’ stay there had been 917 
migrants in CSPA.  
227Cfr. Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §35 of Partly dissenting opinion 




adequate number of cultural mediators and interpreters who could have translated for 
them the information needed. Given that the applicants were not been informed about 
the reasons for their detention, violating thus Article 5§2 which states “everyone who is 
arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons 
for his arrest and of any charge against him”, most likely they were not even informed 
about their rights or about the procedures for requesting asylum or protection or 
anything else. It is a duty of the authorities to establish the status of migrants, hence 
whether they are irregular or not228. In its report describing its visit on the island of 
Lampedusa in 2011, Amnesty International reported that the number of people 
responsible for providing information regarding asylum was totally inadequate and only 
a handful of individuals were providing basic information about asylum procedures and, 
in many cases, even about the consequences of their illegal arrival. For example, some 
migrants did not even know for how long they would have to stay on the island or what 
their eventual destination would be once moved off the island 229, which led to 
considerable anxiety, loss and mental stress.  
 
3.3.3. Conditions at Contrada Imbriacola  
Lampedusa has two reception centers: the Loran base and the main reception center 
in Contrada Imbriacola230. The first one is located on the premises of an old NATO base 
and it is meant for vulnerable migrants among which children and pregnant women.  
The second one is a Center for First Aid and Reception (CSPA) whose capacity is up 
to 800-1000 places231 and divided into two parts, one for people coming from Libya and 
unaccompanied minors, and the other which consisted of a closed center within the 
center itself reserved only for Tunisian adults. They are both run by private companies 
 
228Parliamentary Assembly, “Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-scale arrival of irregular migrants, 
asylum-seekers and refugees on Europe’s southern shores”, September 30, 2011, §56. 
229Amnesty International, “Italy: Amnesty International findings and recommendations to the Italian 
authorities following the research visit to Lampedusa and Mineo”, April 21, 2011, pg. 2. 
230 Parliamentary Assembly, “Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-scale arrival of irregular migrants, 
asylum-seekers and refugees on Europe’s southern shores”, September 30, 2011, §§33-35; Amnesty 
International, “Italy: Amnesty International findings and recommendations to the Italian authorities 
following the research visit to Lampedusa and Mineo”, April 21, 2011, pg. 3. 
231According to the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee the capacity was up to 1000 places, whereas according to 




under the surveillance of the Prefect and neither of them is designed for lengthy 
stays232.  
Despite in Khlaifia case the violation of Article3 of ECHR “no one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” had not 
attained the minimum level of severity, reportedly bad conditions both in the base 
Loran and in the CSPA in Contrada Imbriacola cannot be denied.   
The base Loran is considered a satellite facility and it does not satisfy capacity 
standards, nor sanitary or safety international requirements: among the problems, the 
Parliamentary Assembly lists overcrowding, mattresses placed on the ground, few and 
inadequate sanitary facilities. Moreover, people complained not to be able to 
communicate by telephone with their relatives because the mobile phone signal was 
very weak233. Regarding the CSPA reception center in Contrada Imbriacola, at the time 
of the applicants ‘arrival, the conditions were far from ideal: overcrowding, poor 
hygiene and lack of contact with the outside world. The rooms of the center contained 
four-tier bunk beds placed side by side which hosted up to 25 persons. Torn foam- 
rubber mattresses were along the corridors or outside on stairs, light bulbs were absent, 
and rainwater carried dampness and dirt into living quarters. Toilets and showers were 
smelly and unusable, and privacy was ensured only by cloth or plastic curtains and 
water pipes were sometimes blocked or leaking234. MSF and the Italian Red Cross 
expressed their concerns regarding health conditions in the center because of 
overcrowding conditions235, which was confirmed by the center’s Director interviewed 
by Amnesty International236. The judgment also demonstrated that when states are 
overwhelmed by large migration flows, they may not have resources to provide 
migrants with the basic standards provided by the law, which may lead the police 
 
232Parliamentary Assembly, “Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-scale arrival of irregular migrants, 
asylum-seekers and refugees on Europe’s southern shores”, September 30, 2011, §§36, 37. 
233Parliamentary Assembly, “Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-scale arrival of irregular migrants, 
asylum-seekers and refugees on Europe’s southern shores”, September 30, 2011, §§36, 37. 
234Italian Special Commission for Human Rights, report on “the state of human rights in prisons and 
reception and detention centers in Italy”, February 11, 2009, pgg. 152,153; Amnesty International, “Italy: 
Amnesty International findings and recommendations to the Italian authorities following the research 
visit to Lampedusa and Mineo”, April 21, 2011, pg. 3. 
235Parliamentary Assembly, “Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-scale arrival of irregular migrants, 
asylum-seekers and refugees on Europe’s southern shores”, September 30, 2011, §§47,48. 
236Amnesty International, “Italy: Amnesty International findings and recommendations to the Italian 




authorities to take more leeway to manage mass influxes of migrants237. First of all, 
detention was not lawful according to domestic law and the principles of the 
Convention, violating thus the real aim of Article 5§1 which is that to avoid arbitrary 
detention238. Indeed, no one shall be deprived of his/ her own liberty239, unless detention 
falls under specific circumstances240 or in conditions of necessity and urgency justified 
by law241. In this latter case, the police shall inform a judicial authority about the 
provisional measures within 48 hours and receive an answer in the following 48 
hours242. Nevertheless, detention shall be a measure of last resort243. In Khlaifia case 
however, the Agrigento Chief of the Police merely registered the presence of the 
migrants in the CSPA without taking any decisions about their detention244 and thus 
without informing any judicial authorities245. Secondly, migrants should have been 
brought to CIEs as being the only center allowing detention according to Italian 
legislation246: in this way, not only the applicants were detained illegally, but also they 
could not benefit of the safeguards of habeas corpus  applicable to a placement in a 
 
237Goldenziel J.I., “Khlaifia and Others v. Italy”, ed. Wuerth I., in The American Society of International 
Law, Cambridge University, April 25, 2018, pg. 279.   
238Cfr. Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §64). 
239Cfr. Article 13 of the Italian Constitution and Article 5§1 of the Convention.  
240Cfr.  5§1 of the Convention “[…] No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases 
and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after 
conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with 
the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the 
lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal 
authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered 
necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a 
minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose 
of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the 
prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts 
or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry 
into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or 
extradition.”. 
241Cfr. Article 13 of the Italian Constitution “In exceptional circumstances and under such conditions of 
necessity and urgency as shall be precisely defined by law, the police may take provisional measures that 
shall be referred within 48 hours to a judicial authority and which, if not validated by the latter in the 
following 48 hours, shall be deemed withdrawn and ineffective”. 
242Ibidem. Cfr. Article 13 of the Italian Constitution “In exceptional circumstances and under such 
conditions of necessity and urgency as shall be precisely defined by law, the police may take provisional 
measures that shall be referred within 48 hours to a judicial authority and which, if not validated by the 
latter in the following 48 hours, shall be deemed withdrawn and ineffective”. 
243Cfr. Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §86). 
244Ibidem, §25. 
245Ibidem, §78. 
246Cfr. Article 14 of the Consolidated Immigration Act: “[…]  il questore dispone che lo straniero sia 
trattenuto per il tempo strettamente necessario presso il centro di permanenza per i rimpatri più vicino, 
tra quelli individuati o costituiti con decreto del Ministro dell'interno, di concerto con il Ministro 




CIE247. Indeed, the CSPA was meant to be a transfer center and therefore stays were 
supposed to be limited to the time strictly necessary to establish the migrant’s identity 
and the lawfulness of his/ her presence in Italy or to decide his/ her removal. However, 
many organizations working on the spot, among which the UNHCR, reported extended 
stays up to over twenty days, without any formal decision as to the legal status of the 
person held. Together with the inability to communicate with the outside world, the lack 
of freedom of movement and of any legal or administrative measure providing for such 
restrictions, this all brought tension, often manifested in acts of self-harm248. Moreover, 
the revolt that broke out on September 21 showed that migrants wanted to escape from 
Italian authorities in CSPA as they were under their surveillance249 and they were there 
against their will250. Lastly, the Italian authorities did not fulfill their duties to 
communicate migrants of their legal and factual grounds for detention throughout their 
stays in Italy. The refusal-of-entry orders could have not indeed been considered 
satisfying as they did not mention any reasons for it251 and were notified to the 
applicants very belatedly252. The information needed should have been provided by the 
authority carrying out the arrest or the placement in detention or from official 
sources253. 
 
3.3.4. Collective expulsion  
The non-violation of collective expulsion in Khlaifia case is another demonstration 
of how states arbitrarily managed the migration flow. On April 5th, 2011, the Italian and 
the Tunisian Governments entered into agreements: Tunisia was in charge of 
undertaking measures to strengthen its border controls with the aim of avoiding 
departures of irregular migrants, by using logical resources provided by Italy. In 
addition, Tunisia committed itself to accepting the immediate return of Tunisians who 
had unlawfully reached the Italian shores after the date of the agreement. Tunisians 
 
247Cfr. Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §105). 
248Italian Special Commission for Human Rights, report on “the state of human rights in prisons and 
reception and detention centers in Italy”, February 11, 2009, pgg. 103, 104. 
249Khlafia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §65). 







were sent back through simplified measures254, namely through the mere identification 
of the citizenship of the person before the Tunisian consular authorities without any 
proper examination of his/ her personal situation255. This agreement has been 
criticized256 as violating migrants’ rights for the following reasons. Firstly, the text of 
the agreement has never been made public, only quotas of between 30 and 60 returns 
per day have been mentioned. Therefore, migrants could have not known the real 
consequences of crossing the Mediterranean Sea, and landing on Italian shores257. 
Secondly, this agreement goes against the real aim of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 which 
is to prevent States from having the authority to remove a certain number of aliens 
without examining their personal circumstances and consequently without enabling 
them to put forward their arguments against the measures taken by the relevant 
authority258. The word collective refers indeed not to the number of people involved in 
the expulsion, not to a membership of a particular group259, but rather to the modality of 
the expulsion. This means that migrants can benefit from procedural guarantees, namely 
an individual interview. This is an absolute right for everyone regardless whether they 
reside or domiciliate or not in the territory of the State they have entered260. According 
to Serghides, one of the judges taking part to the Grand Chamber in Khlaifia’s case, the 
nature of collective expulsions of aliens presumes that these expulsions are carried out 
arbitrarily and in a discriminatory manner, and therefore the prohibition of them is 
aimed at avoiding arbitrariness and discrimination261. Professor James Crawford, judge 
of the International Court of Justice, observes that collective expulsion of aliens is a 
serious breach of international law and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 is an absolute and 
non-derogable prohibition262. As a consequence, all Member State that had accepted the 
Convention shall respect its principles, even in a context of a migration crisis263.  
 
254Cfr. Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §74). 
255Ibidem, §§36-38. 
256Ibidem, §8 of Partly dissenting opinion of judge Serghides. 
257Parliamentary Assembly, “Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-scale arrival of irregular migrants, 
asylum-seekers and refugees on Europe’s southern shores”, 30 September 2011, §53. 
258Cfr. Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy (no. 277765/09, February 23, 2012, §177). 
259Cfr. N.D. and N.T. v. Spain (no. 8675/15, February 13, §§193-199). 
260Cfr. Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §56 of Partly dissenting opinion 
of judge Serghides). 
261Ibidem, §11 of Partly dissenting opinion of judge Serghides). 
262Crawford J., “Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law”, in Collected courses of the 
Hague Academy of International Law, vol.365, Leiden/Boston, 2013, pg.208, §350).  




Also Amnesty International states in its report that collective expulsions are strictly 
prohibited under international, regional and domestic human rights and refugee law and 
standards which shall guarantee an effective remedy against the removal of migrants, 
otherwise a violation of human rights could take place264. Before the Court, the Italian 
Government stated that individual interviews had been taken place twice, namely in 
CSPA in Contrada Imbriacola and before boarding on Tunisian planes. In CSPA in 
Contrada Imbriacola, police officers and cultural mediators or interpreters carried out 
personal interviews with all the applicants, filling also information sheets with personal 
information which, according to the Government, were thereafter destroyed in the fire 
and thus not available anymore. The applicants replied that the Italian authorities should 
have made a fresh record as being of an absolute importance and also an obligation of 
the State265. In his partly dissenting opinion, the judge Serghides doubted about the fact 
that an individual interview had taken place in the presence of cultural mediators and 
interpreters: first, the Government did not name the persons involved in carrying out the 
interview,266, and second it did not specify whether the interview was done by a cultural 
mediator or by an interpreter267. These all show that the Italian authorities did not know 
exactly who and if someone was working in the CSPA. The second identification was 
conducted by a Tunisian consular before boarding on the plane heading for Tunisia and 
not by Italian authorities, instead268. The personal interview should have been 
conducted by the authorities of the State the applicants have entered and thus by Italian 
ones. Moreover, the applicants were given the refusal-of-entry orders which according 
to the Government could have been considered as documents providing personal 
interview, but, on the contrary, they did not contain any reference of it, but rather they 
just mentioned the general personal information and citizenship of the applicants. The 
negative consequences of the bilateral agreement between Italy and Tunisia have 
mainly affected Tunisians landed on Italian soil. Even if most of them fall into the 
category of economic migrants and therefore subject to repatriation, this does not mean 
 
264Amnesty International, “Italy: Amnesty International findings and recommendations to the Italian 
authorities following the research visit to Lampedusa and Mineo”, 21 April 2011, pg. 6. 
265Cfr. Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §29 of Partly dissenting opinion 
of judge Serghides). 
266Ibidem, §31 of Partly dissenting opinion of judge Serghides. 





that their rights must not be respected. During their visit to Lampedusa, PACE Ad Hoc 
Sub-Committee members found that the Italian authorities were not themselves able to 
tell them when they could resume repatriations to Tunisia, which demonstrated the 
inadequacy and the illegality of Tunisians' detention on the island for long periods, 
without the possibility of a judge. This was not only a significant stress factor for 
migrants, but also a violation of Article 5§§1,2,4 of the Convention. Collective 
expulsion is thus an absolute prohibition and authorities should not be given the power 
to decide as they want, even though they are in a humanitarian crisis. In this regard, the 
PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee and Amnesty International firstly recommended Italian 
authorities not to conclude bilateral agreements with the authorities of countries which 
are not safe and where fundamental rights are not properly guaranteed. If these 
agreements are necessary, the parties involved shall at least make them public. 
Secondly, the reception and detention conditions shall not violate migrants’ rights and 
provide an adequate screen to assess any potential protection needs and information 
about their right to challenge removal on international protection or other human rights 
grounds. Moreover, detention shall have legal basis and subjected to periodic judicial 
review. Thirdly, Italian authorities shall desist from any further collective expulsions.  
 
In this chapter, we have seen how cooperation between all stakeholders involved in 
the migration management is vital for communicating and ensuring human rights. 
Indeed, human rights laws are specialized texts written in legal language which may be 
not comprehensible to all subjects of law. Therefore, Italian authorities with the help of 
other actors among which intercultural mediators shall render those principles available 
in a simple and non-technical language to everyone. This is not what happened in the 
analyzed judgment of Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, though, where the applicants were 
victims of the violations of some rights enshrined in the ECHR. Indeed, in the 
Khlaifia’s judgment, the report on the state of human rights in prisons and reception and 
detention centers in Italy by the Senate’s Special Commission, the fact-finding of the 
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly Ad Hoc Sub-Committee and Amnesty 
International findings and recommendations to the Italian authorities following the 




managed arbitrarily, although there are laws to be respected. The case sheds also light 
on the importance of communicating human rights properly, which is one of the 
activities promoted by the European Court of Human Rights through translation in 
different languages. Indeed, in order to avoid incomprehension between parties and to 
allow access to legal texts to readers from different countries, legal translation turns out 
to be an effective solution which has also been used by the European Court of Human 
Rights. In the next chapter, we are going thus to analyze firstly the general role of the 
European Court of Human Rights in ensuring human rights to all individuals, secondly 
its translation activities in spreading human rights, thirdly, we will provide concrete 














































The European Court of Human Rights and legal translation  
 
This chapter sheds light on the role of translation in disseminating migrants’ rights. For 
this purpose, a first glance will be given at the role of the European Court of Human 
Rights with particular regard to the translation activities and programs, secondly legal 
translation and legal language theory will be broadly exposed, and thirdly concrete 
examples of legal translation of the cross-references taken from the Khlaifia’s case will 
be provided.  
 
4.1. The European Court of Human Rights  
When dealing with human rights, we cannot forget to talk about the role of the 
European Convention and the Court of Human Rights. After the serious human rights 
violations that Europe had witnessed during the Second World War, the forty-seven 
Member States of the Council of Europe decided to sign an international treaty269 in 
1950 in Rome whose aim was to defend democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in Europe270. The creation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) led to the establishment of its Court in 1959 in Strasbourg, 
France. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is an international court, a 
“supranational judicial body271” whose duty is to protect individuals from violations of 
those rights established in the ECHR by a Contracting Party. In doing so, the 
Contracting States have negative and positive obligations arising from the ECHR. 
Negative obligations place duty on national authorities to refrain from acting in a way 
that unjustifiably interferes with ECHR rights. Most of the ECHR rights are framed in 
 
269The Convention was signed by forty-seven Member States of the Council of Europe in Rome in 1950 
and came into force in 1953. It was the first instrument to give effect to certain of the rights stated in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and make them binding upon states. However, it was only in 
1959 that the first member of the Court was elected by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (Parliamentary Assembly).  
270Cfr. Letsas G. (2009), in Peruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic analysis of 
European Court of Human Rights judgments in English”, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2019, pg. 
14. 
271Peruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic analysis of European Court of 




this way. In some circumstances, however, the ECHR also imposes positive obligations 
on the state to ensure that the rights are protected. Therefore, a right can be violated by 
the state’s failure or omission to act.   
 
4.1.1. The internal structure of the Court  
The Court consists of a number of judges equal to the number of Member States of 
the Council of Europe that have ratified the Convention, namely forty-seven, who are 
elected by the Council's Parliamentary Assembly. Although judges are elected in 
respect of a state, they examine cases in their individual capacity and do not represent 
that state. They are totally independent and cannot engage in any activity that would be 
incompatible with their duty of independence and impartiality. The mechanism of 
protecting human rights at the Court is exemplary: the Court can rule in law on alleged 
violations of the European Convention, and the Committee of Ministers supervises the 
execution of judgments delivered by the Court whose compliance must be assured on 
domestic level. This complementarity is a guarantee of effectiveness, since the judicial 
body has the power to deliver judgments while the policy body monitors their 
enforcement272. The structure of the Court can be analyzed both according to 
administrative and judicial formations. 
The administrative formations are the Plenary Court and the Sections, where the first 
one is the highest formation of ECtHR which has jurisdiction to examine administrative 
and organizational matters related to the working of the ECtHR; whereas the second 
one is, instead, divided into five administrative units where the judges are grouped into. 
Each section is composed by the ordinary panels of judges (judicially called 
chamber)273. Each section is presided over by a President and a Vice-President and is 
assisted by a number of lawyers who may be defined administratively as staff members 
and functionally as part of the Registry. The composition of the Section is designed to 
ensure, as far as possible, geographical and gender balance.  
 
272Renucci J. F., “Introduction to the European Convention on Human Rights- The rights guaranteed and 
the protection mechanism”, Council of Europe Publishing, 2005, pgg. 95-96.  
273The word section indicates an administrative entity, whereas a chamber is a judicial formation of the 




As far as judicial formations are concerned, according to Article 26 of the 
Convention, the Court may sit in four different judicial panels: single judge, committee 
of three judges, chamber of seven judges and Grand Chamber.  
Of great importance is the role of the Registry which supports the ECtHR by 
providing legal and administrative support in the exercise of judicial functions. Indeed, 
the Registry is composed of case-law lawyers, administrative and technical staff and 
translators that are grouped into several sectors of activity. Additionally, a Section 
Registrar and a Deputy Section Registrar assist each of the Court’s five judicial 
Sections while delivering a judgment. The head of the Registry is the Registrar who 
holds overall responsibility for its judicial and administrative activities.  
 
4.1.2. The Convention as a “living instrument” 
Given the heterogeneity of the legal and linguistic systems of the Member States 
composing the Council of Europe, both the Convention and the Court do not represent a 
single identity, but they are rather "a merger of different traditions arising from different 
legal systems274". Therefore, the Convention cannot be applied statically, but 
dynamically as it is a “living instrument” which the Court must be able to keep up to 
date, interpret, and apply in the light of the present-day conditions275. Indeed, the 
Convention contains generic notions evolving necessarily over time, which means that 
the precise content of the rights may change according to the circumstances and the 
domestic legal system of the Member State taken into account. Consequently, in 
guaranteeing the rights secured by the Convention, the ECtHR will have regard to the 
developments in the Contracting States and changing circumstances.  
 
4.1.3. Language regime, translation activities and programs of the Court 
Although the effect of the ECtHR’s case-law is formally limited to the concrete 
circumstances of one single case, the principles it promotes should be considered as 
fundamental rights to be safeguarded in all the Contracting States. Both the need for 
 
274Cfr. Garlicki L. (2009), in Peruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic analysis 






judgments to be executed by domestic justice systems and the desire to disseminate the 
principles beyond the national boundaries of the State involved in the specific case have 
a significant impact on the linguistic choices of the ECtHR. Despite the fact that the 
official languages of the Court are only English and French276, legal translation from 
and into different non-official languages plays a fundamental role in the daily agenda of 
the Court and for the protection of human rights. Translation has become more and 
more an activity of utmost importance to make human rights widely accessible277. The 
Court makes use of translation in two stages: in the drafting and in the dissemination of 
its case law and principles. 
The phase of drafting a case-law is a collegial activity278: during the delivering of a 
judgment, the President appoints a drafting committee composed by the Registry lawyer 
who drafts the judgment, the Judge Rapporteur279, and the Registrar assigned to the case 
who both accept or amend the text drafted. All judgments are given either in English or 
in French, unless the Court decides they have to be written in both official languages280. 
In this case, the translation from English into French or vice versa can be carried out 
before delivery when both texts are to be authoritative (as is the case for Grand 
Chamber judgments), or otherwise after delivery purely for publication on the on-line 
HUDOC database and more rarely in printed reports281. In case applicants, Contracting 
Parties involved in the case, witnesses, experts and other persons appearing before the 
Court do not speak either English or French, they may be allowed by the President of 
the Chamber to communicate their submission orally or in written form in their 
 
276Cfr. Article 34 of the Rules of Court: https://echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf 
[18/12/2020]. 
277Cfr. Popović D. (2007), in Peruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic analysis 
of European Court of Human Rights judgments in English”, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2019, 
pg. 34. 
 
279The Judge Rapporteur is the highest expert in national law and in national context appointed within a 
Chamber during a judgment. Cfr. Garlicki L. (2009), in Peruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-
law: A linguistic analysis of European Court of Human Rights judgments in English”, EUT Edizioni 
Università di Trieste, 2019, pg. 25. 
280Cfr. Article 76 of the Rules of Court: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf 
[22/01/2021].  
281Cfr. Garlicki L. (2009), in Peruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic analysis 





languages and the Registrar has to make the necessary arrangements for their 
interpretation and translation into English or French282.   
The same cannot be said of the dissemination phase of the case-law and related 
materials, which the Court has only recently dealt with. A significant turning point 
came from the Interlaken Process, namely a series of conferences in Interlaken (2010), 
Izmir (2011), Brighton (2012), Brussels (2015) and Copenhagen (2018) where the 
future of the Court was discussed and from which it emerged that the principles, 
standards and case-law of the Court needed to be disseminated and thus translated into 
the non-official languages of the Member States. This would facilitate the 
implementation of these principles at the national level and thus ensure greater 
protection of human rights. Several projects were initiated including “Bringing the 
Convention Closer to Home: Translation and dissemination of key ECHR case-law in 
target languages283" whose aim is to translate the Court’s key judgments, and decision 
in order to further disseminate its case law via HUDOC (the Court’s database) and 
partners at national level. The project was launched by the Court and funded by the 
Human Rights Trust Fund (HRTF) where 70 translator-freelancers were hired, and 
3,500 texts were translated into twelve languages. Not only the case-law of the Court 
was translated, but also case-law guides, factsheets, legal summaries and the Rules of 
Court. However, the Court points out that the responsibility for translation into non-
official languages lies with the national authorities284.  
Thus, translation challenges appear at all stages of the Court proceeding, ranging 
from submitting documents to judgment delivering and disseminating and it has been 
proved an important means in enhancing the role of the Court in protecting and 
promoting human rights.  
 
282Cfr. Article 34 of the Rules of Court: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf 
[22/01/2021]. 
283European Court of Human Rights, “Bringing the Convention Closer to Home. The Court ‘s Case-Law 
Translations Project (2012-2016): Achievements and Remaining Challenges”:    
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HRTF_standards_translations_ENG.pdf [21/12/2020]. 
284Cfr. Peruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic analysis of European Court of 
Human Rights judgments in English”, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2019, pgg. 34-40; and Kjær 
A.L., “Translation of Judgements of the European Court of Human Rights into Non-official Languages: 
The Politics and Practice of European Multilingualism”, iCourts-The Danish National Research 
Foundation’s Centre of Excellence for International Courts, in Oxford University Press (Oxford Studies in 




4.2. Legal translation and legal language: an overview  
Legal translation is a technical translation, a specialized area of translational activity 
involving special language use, that is, the language for special purposes (LSP) in the 
context of law285. The linguist Cortelazzo has provided a detailed definition of LSP as 
follows:  
“Per lingua speciale si intende una varietà funzionale di una lingua naturale, dipendente da un 
settore di conoscenze o da una sfera di attività specialistici, utilizzata, nella sua interezza, da un gruppo 
di parlanti più ristretto della totalità dei parlanti la lingua di cui quella speciale è una varietà, per 
soddisfare i bisogni comunicativi (in primo luogo quelli referenziali) di quel settore specialistico; la 
lingua speciale è costituita a livello lessicale da una serie di corrispondenze aggiuntive rispetto a quelle 
generali e comuni della lingua e a quello morfosintattico da un insieme di selezioni, ricorrenti con 
regolarità, all'interno dell'inventario di forme disponibili nella lingua286”.  
As shown, the LSP is a functional variety of ordinary language which is related to a 
specific topic and therefore it addresses to a specific target and it requires specific 
linguistic features both in terms of lexicon and morpho-syntax in order to make 
communication clear with all the subjects involved. Legal language is a language for 
special purposes as it refers to a specific topic: the language of and related to law and 
legal process287. Many scholars have provided different definitions of legal language288. 
In her definition, the linguist Kalinowski289 uses “legal language” as a superordinate 
terms including the “language of Law”, i.e. the language used by legislator to express a 
legal rule and the “language of Jurists290”, i.e. the language used in legal literature and 
legal science. Similarly, the linguist Trosborg291 (1997) sees “legal language” as a 
 
285Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, Buffalo, Toronto, 2007, pg. 8. 
286Cortelazzo M., “Lingue speciali- La dimensione verticale”, Studi linguistici applicati, Unipress, 
Padova, 1994, pg. 6.  
287Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, Buffalo, Toronto, 2007, pg. 9.  
288The classification of legal language is wide because of the multiple perspectives that can be adopted 
when observing the interaction between language and law. Some scholars have focused on legal 
language, whereas others on legal genres or legal texts. However, in this dissertation I will not delve into 
all the literature regarding legal language, but I will only provide few general definitions. For further 
readings, I vividly recommend the research conducted by Petruzzo K., “National law in supranational 
case-law: A linguistic analysis of European Court of Human Rights judgments in English”, EUT Edizioni 
Università di Trieste, 2019, pgg. 41-50.  
289Cfr. Kalinowski G. (1965), in Petruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic 
analysis of European Court of Human Rights judgments in English”, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 
2019, pg. 42. 
290The word “jurists” is used to encompass whoever speaks about the law: experts other than legal 
scholars (for example historians, sociologists, psychologists), legal practitioners (such as legal counsels, 
judges, prosecutors, businesspeople, etc). 
291Cfr. Trosborg A. (1997), in Petruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic analysis 





superordinate category including all the sublanguages within the legal domain one of 
which is the “language of the law” referring to legal documents. On the contrary, the 
linguistic Kurzon292 points out that lawyers and linguistics have erroneously used the 
terms as synonyms as, according to him, “legal language” is the “language used when 
people talk about the law”, which can be both written (including judgment and 
textbooks) and spoken (including formal speech, witness questioning and other types), 
whereas the “language of the law” is “the language or the style used in documents that 
lay down the law, in a very broad sense” and it includes both legislation and private law 
documents such as contracts, wills and deeds293. 
Interestingly, as Cortelazzo states in his above-mentioned definition, LSP is a variety 
of natural language appropriate to different occasions and situations of use and, in the 
case of legal language, a variety of language appropriate to the legal situations of use 
which the linguistic Cao defines as “register”. It follows that legal texts refers to the texts 
produced or used for legal purposes in legal setting and, according to Cao, they may be 
classified into four variants in written form: legislative texts (e.g. domestic statues, 
international treaties or multilingual laws), judicial texts produced in the judicial process 
by judicial officers and other legal authorities, legal scholarly texts produced by academic 
lawyers or legal scholar and private legal texts including texts written by lawyers (e.g. 
contracts, leases, wills) or non-lawyers (e.g. private agreements or witness statements)294.  
However, legal language does not just cover the language of law alone, but all the 
communications in legal settings295. It follows that legal translation is an activity of 
translating law and other communication in legal setting with the aim of rendering legal 
texts from the SL into the TL. Some scholars, among which the linguistics Cao and 
Šarčević, have stressed the importance of taking into account the function of both SL and 
TL texts when translating. Cao distinguishes legal translation according to the purpose of 
TL: normative, informative and for general legal or judicial purposes. Translation for 
 
292Cfr. Kurzon D. (1989), in Petruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic analysis 
of European Court of Human Rights judgments in English”, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2019, 
pg. 45. 
293Cfr. Petruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic analysis of European Court of 
Human Rights judgments in English”, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2019, pgg. 41-47. 
294Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, Buffalo, Toronto, 2007, pg. 9. 




normative purpose refers to translation of the law, or better translation of law itself296, 
where both SL and TL texts have equal force297. Translation for informative purposes has 
descriptive functions as it translates texts written by legal professionals from source 
enforceable language into a target non-forceable one. Lastly, legal translation for general 
legal or judicial purpose is yet descriptive, but written by laypeople. This does not mean 
that it is of less noteworthiness, on the contrary, it can be of vital importance for example 
in court proceedings as part of documentary evidence. By contrast, the linguistic Šarčević 
classifies translation according to the functions of the SL texts. Firstly, primary 
prescriptive texts containing rules of conduct or norms (e.g. laws, regulations, codes, 
contracts, treaties or conventions); secondly, primarily descriptive but also prescriptive 
used to carry on judicial and administrative proceedings such as actions, pleadings, briefs, 
appeals, requests or petitions, which are also called “hybrid texts”; thirdly, purely 
descriptive texts (e.g. scholarly works written by legal scholar such as legal opinions, law 
textbooks or articles). According to this classification, the translation of Khlaifia case has 
been carried out for informative purposes, because it aims to disseminate the principles 
of the judgment to a wider readership including specialists and laymen.  
The complexity of translating legal texts resides in the nature of law, the language that 
law uses, and the associated differences found in intercultural and interlingual 
communication298. Firstly, the nature of the law is normative as it shall give guidelines 
about ideals and standards that citizens shall follow in a society in order to live on the 
basis of principles such as equity, justice, rights, liberty, equal protection and general 
welfare299 and therefore legal language is related to creation, production and expression 
of norms300. Secondly, legal language is a technical language301 because it resides in a 
 
296Cfr. Šarčević S. (1997), in Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, Buffalo, 
Toronto, 2007, pg. 10. 
297Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, Buffalo, Toronto, 2007, pg. 10. 
298Ibidem, pg. 13.  
299Cfr. Jenkins I. (1980), in Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, Buffalo, 
Toronto, 2007, pg. 13. 
300Cfr. Jori M. (1994), in in Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, Buffalo, 
Toronto, 2007, pg. 13. 
301There have been different opinions about the technical nature of legal language. Some argue that legal 
language does not exist in itself, but it is a part of ordinary language, whereas others think that legal 
language is an identifiable technical language. The latter is the mostly accepted theory, and the one which 
we refer to in this dissertation. Cfr. Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, 




specific legal system and thus it requires a specific lexicon which is different from that 
of the ordinary language302.  
Due to its important function to guide human behavior and regulate human relations, 
law governs all areas of social life and therefore legal language shall be addressed to a 
wide target, namely the whole population: from professional layers to citizens with 
different ages or levels of education. When dealing with human rights, this concept is 
more intensified as human rights are commonly understood as being those rights which 
are inherent to every person as a consequence of being human303.  
 
4.2.1. European legal English 
In the European multilingual context, English is the cross-linguistic or international 
medium of communication304 to respond to the need for simplification in increasingly 
globalized legal and economic transactions305. Because in this multilingual area it is used 
by both native and non-native speakers, English has lost its role as an exclusively native 
language, becoming thus Europe’s lingua franca whose main function is to enable 
intelligibility, comprehensibility and interpretability among speakers of mutual 
unintelligible languages306. By European English it is meant indeed a variety of English 
developed mainly in continental Europe not only within the institutions of the European 
Union, but also by other international organizations of European interest, such as the 
Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights307. Linguistically, on the 
one hand European legal English shares features with legal English, on the other it stands 
out for its own particular characteristics, especially with regard to terminology. We are 
going now to list all of them with concrete examples taken from the Khlaifia and Others 
 
302Cfr. Jackson B. S. (1985), in Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, 
Buffalo, Toronto, 2007, pg. 16. 
303Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Staff College Project, “Human 
Rights: A Basic Handbook for UN Staff”, 2020, pgg.2,3. 
304Cfr. Seidlhofer B., Breiteneder A. & Pitzl M. (2006), in Peruzzo K., “European English terms for 
Italian legal concepts: the case of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure”, in Rivista internazionale di 
tecnica della traduzione, 2014, pg. 147. 
305Brutti N., “Diritto privato comparato-Letture disciplinari”. G.Giappichelli Editore, 2019, pg. 52.  
306Cfr. Berns M. (2008), in Peruzzo K., “European English terms for Italian legal concepts: the case of 
the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure”, in Rivista internazionale di tecnica della traduzione, 2014, pg. 
147. 
307Peruzzo K., “European English terms for Italian legal concepts: the case of the Italian Code of 




v. Italy case. Generally speaking, what distinguishes European legal English from legal 
English is its slightly lower level of formality308. 
 
4.2.1.1. The syntactical features of the European legal English 
As far as syntax is concerned, European legal language and legal English have in 
common the following features: 
1) Complex and long sentences: in legal texts, sentences are longer and more 
complex than in other types309 as found in Article 14 of the Consolidated 
Immigration Act which is composed by 127 words: “Where, in  view  of  the  
need to  provide  assistance  to  an alien, to  conduct additional checks of his or 
her identity or nationality, or to obtain travel documents, or on account  of  the  
lack  of  availability  of  a  carrier, it  is  not  possible  to  ensure  the  prompt 
execution of the deportation measure by escorting the person to the border or  
of  the  refusal-of-entry  measure, the  Chief  of  Police (questore)  shall order  
that the  alien be  held  for  as long  as is strictly  necessary  at the  nearest  
Identification and Removal Centre, among  those  designated or  created by  
order  of  the  Minister  of  the Interior in collaboration (di concerto) with the 
Minister for Social Solidarity and the Treasury, the Minister for the Budget, and 
the Minister for Economic Planning” (found in §33 of the Khlaifia judgment, 
cfr. Article 14 of the Consolidated Immigration Act). 
2) Auxiliary- main verb separation: grammatically, the auxiliary verb must not 
be separated by the verb to which it is referred. This grammatical rule is often 
not maintained in legal texts as provided in the following examples: “the Court 
shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party (as in § 282 of 
Khlaifia and Others v. Italy judgment, cfr. Article 41 ECHR); “An alien 
detained for the purpose of expulsion shall, save in exceptional circumstances, 
be separated from persons sentenced to penalties involving deprivation of 
 
308European Judicial Training Network, English for Human Rights EU Law- Handbook, pg 10.   
309Cfr. Salmi-Tolonen T. (2004), in Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, 




liberty (as in Article 19§3, b) of the draft article on the expulsion of aliens by 
the International Law Commission, §46 of Khlaifia’s case). 
3) The use of the third person singular: “it is not possible to ensure the prompt 
execution of the deportation measures by escorting the person to the border or 
of the refusal-of-entry measure, […]” (found in §33 of the Khlaifia judgment, 
cfr. Article 14 of the Consolidated Immigration Act). 
4) Things rather than people as subjects of sentences: “Personal liberty is 
inviolable” (found in §32 of the Khlaifia judgment, cfr. Article 13 of the Italian 
Constitution); “This Directive applies to third-country nationals staying 
illegally on the territory of a Member State. […]” (found in §41 of Khlaifia’s 
case, cfr. Article 2§1 of the Return Directive).  
5) Passive form of the verb: passive form is functional to obscure the agent or to 
render the register higher310as in the following examples: “2.  Detention shall be 
ordered by administrative or judicial authorities. Detention shall be ordered in 
writing with reasons being given in fact and in law. […] The third-country 
national concerned shall be released immediately if the detention is not lawful” 
(found in §41 of the Khlaifia judgment, cfr. Article 15 of the Return Directive). 
6) Nominalization: it is the process of word formation by way of conversion from 
verb or adjective to noun311:  
o with no change of form: “to remedy” and “remedy” (found in §§3,41, 50, 
126,130, 133, 256, 260, 268, 272, 274, 276, 278, 279,280 of Khlaifia 
judgment)and “to stay” and “a stay” (found in §§19, 26, 35, 41, 42, 45, 87, 
104, 109, 143, 153, 182, 190, 192, 195, 197, 221, 226, 260, 261of Khlaifia 
judgment); 
o with morphological derivation: “application” (found in §4 of the judgment) 
deriving from the verb “to apply”, “admissibility” (found in §7 of the 
judgment) deriving from the verb “to admit”,  and “procedure” (found in 
§§25, 38, 40, 41, 43, 44, 55, 74, 77, 80, 83, 91, 96, 102, 104, 131, 213, 214, 
 
310Cfr. Cortelazzo M.A. (eds.), “La comunicazione nelle pubbliche amministrazioni”, EDK Editore, 2010, 
pg. 6.  
311European Judicial Training Network, “English for Human Rights EU Law- Handbook”, European 




223, 226, 230, 233, 235, 242, 243, 247, 272, 279 of the judgment) deriving 
from “to proceed“.  
7) Modal verbs expressing obligations: in legal texts, the modal verbs occurring 
the most are:  
6.1. shall: it is perhaps the most used modal verb in legal texts. The primary 
function of “shall” in general English is to express that an action is intended to 
take place in the future312. However, in legal texts, “shall” is used for several 
purposes as to impose a duty (“a person shall”), to prohibit a conduct (“no 
person shall/ shall not”), to create formal or substantive conditions precedent 
(“to achieve x, a person shall…”), and to declare legal effects (“the contract 
shall be deemed valid”, or “[a particular word] shall mean…”)313. Some 
examples taken from Khlaifia case are: “The detention of an alien for the 
purpose of expulsion shall not be arbitrary nor punitive in nature” (found in §46 
of Khlaifia’s case, cfr. Article 19§1, a) of the draft article on the expulsion of 
aliens by the International Law Commission); and “The ground for expulsion 
shall be assessed in good faith and reasonably, […]” (found in §46 of Khlaifia’s 
case, Cfr. Article 5§3 of the draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the 
International Law Commission). As in recent years many efforts to simplify 
legal language to make it more accessible to the general public have been made, 
“shall” has been substituted by “must” for compulsory obligations and “must 
not” for prohibitions. The linguist Garzone has stated that the modal function 
can be also replaced by the use of simple present (“this Directive applies to 
third-country nationals314”) or by the semi-modal “is to” (“the respondent State 
is to pay to each applicant, within three months, EUR 2,500315”)316; 
6.2. may: of no less importance is the modal “may” signifying permission and 
indicating discretionary obligations. According to Sullivan, “may” is used to 
 
312Cfr. Thornton G.C. (1996) and Butt P./Castle R. (2006), in Garzone G., “Variation in the use of 
modality in legislative texts: Focus on shall”, in Journal of Pragmatics 57, 2013, pg. 72. 
313Cfr. Sullivan R. (2002), in Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, Buffalo, 
Toronto, 2007, pg. 116. 
314Article 2§1 of the Return Directive: Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, 
§41). 
315Cfr. Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, December 15, 2016, §41). 
316Garzone G., “Variation in the use of modality in legislative texts: Focus on shall”, in Journal of 




confer an authority or a power (“a person may lawfully do something that 
would otherwise be unlawfully”), confer a right (“a person may claim a benefit 
or protection under the law”), impose conditions on a grant of authority or a 
right (“the authority is exercisable, the right can be claimed only if certain 
conditions are met”), impose procedural limitations (“a person may do 
something only by proceeding in a stipulated way”), and refer to future actions 
or events317. Some examples taken from Khlaifia case are: “An alien may be 
expelled only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law.” 
(found in §46 of Khlaifia’s case, cfr. Article 4 of the draft article on the 
expulsion of aliens by the International Law Commission); and “2. Member 
States may decide not to apply this Directive to third-country nationals […]” 
(found in §41 of Khlaifia’s case, cfr. Article 2§2 of the Return Directive). 
8) Conditional clauses: according to Crystal and Davy318, a common linguistic 
formula in legal texts is “if X, then Z shall be Y” or “if X, then Z shall do Y” 
which is found for example in Article 13 of the Italian Constitution (cfr. §41 of 
Khlaifia’s case): “ […] the police take provisional measures that shall be 
referred within 48 hours to a judicial authority and which, if not validated by 
the latter in the following 48 hours, shall be deemed withdrawn and 
ineffective.“. However, there are many variations of conditional expressions 
including conjunctions as “unless” as in “unless a temporary suspension is 
already applicable under national legislation.” (found in §41 of Khlaifia’s case, 
cfr. Article 13 of the Return Directive), or “in the case” as in “In case of 
prolonged detention periods, reviews shall be subject to the supervision of a 
judicial authority” (found in §41 of Khlaifia’s case, cfr. Article 15§3 of the 
Return Directive)319. 
9) Provisos: they are qualifications and expressions used to narrow the effect of 
the relevant sections. As the linguistic Bennion cited, provisos are verbal 
 
317Cfr. Sullivan (2002), in Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, Buffalo, 
Toronto, 2007, pg. 116. 
318Cfr Crystal D. and Davy D. (1969), in Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, 
Cleventon, Buffalo, Toronto, 2007, pg. 121-122. 




formula usually constructed as operating to qualify that which precedes320. 
Some of the provisos found in Khlaifia case are “provided that” as in “A State 
may expel concomitantly the members of a group of aliens, provided that the 
expulsion takes place after and on the basis of an assessment of the particular 
case of each individual member of the group in accordance with the present 
draft articles.” (found in §46 of Khlaifia’s case, cfr. Article 9§3 of the draft 
article on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law Commission), 
“subject to” as in “All aliens subject to expulsion shall be treated with humanity 
and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person at all stages of the 
expulsion process.” (found in §46 of Khlaifia’s case, cfr. Article 13§1 of the 
draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law Commission), 
and “notwithstanding” as in “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth 
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a 
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity.” (found in §32 of Khlaifia’s case, cfr. 
Article 13 of the Italian Constitution).  
 
4.2.1.2. The terminological features of the European legal English 
As far as terminology is concerned, European legal English and legal language 
terminology can be broadly divided into three categories321. 
1) Technical terminology: they are words that are not employed in everyday speech 
outside the legal context. As Khlaifia judgment mainly deals with immigration 
issues, technical words found in the Khlaifia’s case may be classified into 
technical law-related words as “coercive measures” (found in §41 of Khlaifia and 
Others v. Italy judgment) and immigration-related words such as “extradition” 
(found in §41 of Khlaifia and Others v. Italy judgment). 
 
320Cfr Bennion F.A.R. (2002), in Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, 
Buffalo, Toronto, 2007, pg. 117-122. 
321The following classification of both European legal English’s vocabulary and syntax is based on the 
guidelines provided by the European Judicial Training Network, “English for Human Rights EU Law- 
Handbook”, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2016, pgg.8-13. 




2) Semitechnical words: they are words whose meaning in legal contexts differs 
from the one they have in general language322: “action” meaning “proceeding323” 
as in “the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an 
unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being 
taken with a view to deportation or extradition” (found in §55 of the judgment, 
cfr. Article 5§1 (f)), or “service” meaning “notification324”as in “An appeal may 
be lodged against the present order within a period of sixty days from the date of 
its service, with the Justice of the Peace of Agrigento” (found in §19 of the 
Khlaifia judgment). 
3) General words: they are words used in legal contexts, but that they can be 
understandable for everyone325 such as “police”, “border police” or “prefect”. 
Both European legal English and legal English have been strongly influenced by 
French and Latin, as we can see in the below-mentioned examples.  
4) Latin-based words: legal texts have a large amount of Latin words that have 
been borrowed, among which “inter alia” (found in §33 of Khlaifia’s case), 
meaning “among other things326”, “ratione materiae” (found in §73 of the 
judgment and §12 of partly dissenting opinion of judge Serghides), meaning 
“determination of competence based on the subject of controversy327”, “ratione 
personae” (found in §12 of the judgment and in §53 of partly dissenting opinion 
of judge Serghides), meaning “immunity given to a person not for the act(s) 
committed but for the qualities of the delinquent person such as official rank or 
other328”, “mutatis mutandi” (found in §§68,71, 96, 120, 133, 193, 195, 201, 
269, 279, 288 of Khlaifia’s case), meaning “change where change is needed329” 
and “de facto” (found in §31 of the judgment), meaning “literally, in reality330”. 
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326Online etymology dictionary:  https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=inter+alia [13/01/2021].   
327European Judicial Training Network, “English for Human Rights EU Law- Handbook”, European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2016, pg. 9. 
328Ibidem. 
329Ibidem.  




Other words have been translated literally as “good faith” (found in §46 of 
Khlaifia’s case, cfr. Article 5 of the draft articles on the expulsion of aliens) 
from the Latin expression “bona fides”, meaning “good faith, fair dealing, 
freedom from intent to deceive331”. 
5) French-based words: according to the linguistic Tiesma, legal English has been 
impacted by a large amount of technical vocabulary deriving from French332 
which have been translated into English differently. Some words have been 
borrowed as in “non-refoulement” (found in §§50, 222,230,247 of the judgment 
and §§12,15,20, 25, 37 of the partly dissenting opinion of judge Serghides”), 
meaning “having entitlement to conditions of non- expulsion from a sovereign 
state333” and “surveillance” (found in §14 of the judgment) meaning “oversight, 
supervision334”; others have been anglicized, instead, such as in “court” in  
meaning “formal assembly held by a sovereign335”or in “judge” meaning “public 
officer appointed to administer the law336”. 
 
Other common constructions present in legal texts are:  
 
6) Use of here/ there adverbs: “whereby” (found in §§80, 133, 214, 221, 226 of 
the Khlaifia case) meaning “by which way or method337”, “thereof” (found in 
§§30, 33, 59, 74 of the Khlaifia case) meaning “from the time of the cited 
item338”, “thereto” (found in §§100-128 of the Khlaifia case) meaning “actors or 
parties included339”, “thereunder” (found in §269 of the Khlaifia case) meaning 
“under that340”, “thereby” (found in §269 of the Khlaifia case) meaning “in 
 
331Online etymology dictionary:  https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=bona+fides [13/01/2021]. 
332Tiesma P.M. (1999), in Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, Buffalo, 
Toronto, 2007, pg. 56.  
333European Judicial Training Network, “English for Human Rights EU Law- Handbook”, European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2016, pgg.8-13.  
334Online etymology dictionary:  https://www.etymonline.com/word/surveillance [13/01/2021].  
335Online etymology dictionary:  https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=court [13/01/2021]. 
336Online etymology dictionary: https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=judge  [13/01/2021]. 
 
337Cambridge Dictionary: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/it/dizionario/inglese/whereby [19/01/2021]. 
338European Judicial Training Network, “English for Human Rights EU Law- Handbook”, European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2016, pg. 12. 
339Ibidem. 




connection with341”, “therein” (found in §§100-128 of the Khlaifia case) 
meaning “somewhere in the document cited”. 
7) Prepositional phrases:  “with the purpose of” (§91 of the case), “in accordance 
with” (§§18, 19, 41 of the case), “in respect of” (found in §§19, 30 of the case), 
“in the light of the foregoing” (in §29 of the case), “on behalf of” (in §19 of the 
case), “within the meaning of” (in §29 of the case), “in view of” (in §33 of the 
case), “without prejudice to” (in §46 of the case) and “pursuant to” (in §§24,50 
of the case).  
8) Acronyms and abbreviations:  ECtHR for European Court of Human Rights, 
ECHR for European Convention on Human Rights, ECRE for the European 
Council on Refugees and Exiles (in §8 of Khlaifia’s case), CSPA for Early 
Reception and Aid Center (Centro di Soccorso e Prima Accoglienza, in §12 of 
Khlaifia’s case), CIE for Identification and Removal Center (Centro di 
Identificazione ed Espulsione, in §25 of the case), and MP for member of 
parliament (in §27 of the case). 
9) Formulaic conventions: they signal the different structural components of EU 
acts:  
o whereas: ”whereas none of the situations [provided for in] Article 10 § 4 
of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998; […]” (found in §19 of Khlaifia’s 
case);  
o considering that: “considering that is appropriate to proceed in 
accordance with Article 10§2 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998” 
(found in §19 of Khlaifia’s case);  
o having regard to: “having regard to the particular circumstances of the 
case and to the conclusion it has reached as to applicants’ various 
complaints, the Court [..] (found in §285 of the Khlaifia case), and 
“having regard to the documents in the file […] (in §19 of the case).  
 
As said at the beginning of the Chapter, European legal English has some specific 
terminology which differ from properly legal English. In particular, the terminology 
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adopted by the ECtHR is unique in its genre as it is affected by its role of supervising 
human rights protection under the 1950 Convention, with the right of individual 
petition, its broad territorial jurisdiction covering diverse legal systems, and its limited 
number of official languages342. For this reason, another terminological classification 
has been proposed by the linguistic Brannan who has grouped the terminology of the 
Court in two groups, namely supranational terms and national terms.   
1) Supranational terms: they have evolved in general international law or are 
specific to the Court itself, being enshrined in its basic texts or case-law. They are 
further subdivided into: 
o convention-specific terms which derived from the European Convention on 
Human Rights such as “just satisfaction” (Article 1 ECHR), or “exhaustion of 
domestic remedies”; 
o jurisprudential creations which are unfamiliar in national legal contexts and, 
therefore, they do not appear in the texts of the ECHR, but they are rather 
created and developed in ECtHR case-law. An example could be the doctrine 
of the “margin of appreciation”;  
o linguistic precedents which comprise other terms and expressions that are 
commonly used in the ECtHR case-law, but they are not unknown in national 
contexts, such as “practical and effective”;  
o generic terms which are used because of their capacity to serve as umbrella 
terms, i.e. to cover a variety of (quasi-)equivalent national legal concepts. For 
example, the English text of Khlaifia uses “refusal of entry” to indicate 
“respingimento” in general, although the Italian legislation makes a different 
between “respingimento alla frontiera” and “respigimento in differita”.  
2) National terms: they have developed on the legislation of the Member State 
taken into account in a judgment. 
So far, we have listed all the syntactical and terminological characteristics of the 
European legal English which have to be taken into account when translating a judgment 
 
342Brannan W.S. (2013), in Petruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic analysis of 





of the European Court of Human Rights, and which we are going to see into context in 
the next chapter.  
 
4.3. Khlaifia and Others v. Italy: a legal translation analysis  
As explained in paragraph 4.1.1. (Language regime, translation activities and 
programs of the Court), in 2017 the Court launched the project “Bringing the Convention 
Closer to Home: Translation and dissemination of key ECHR case-law in target 
languages”, thanks to which the principles, standards and case-law of the Court have been 
translated into non-official languages under the responsibility of the national authorities. 
The aim of this project was (and is) to facilitate the implementation of the principles of 
the Convention and the case-law of the Court at the national level and thus ensure greater 
protection of human rights. It follows that translation has been carried out for informative 
purposes343.  
The Khlaifia and Others v. Italy case has been translated and revised into Italian by 
the linguistic assistant Rita Carnevali and the linguistic officer Dr Martina Scantamburlo 
and published on the institutional website of the Ministry of Justice and on the Court's 
HUDOC site.  
The next sub-paragraphs are thus devoted to framing ECtHR judgment as a legal 
genre, and to analyzing and comparing some parts of the translation in English and in 
Italian of Khlaifia case. 
 
4.3.1. Grand Chamber judgment as a legal genre  
The judgments of the ECtHR follow a formulaic and prefabricated structure which 
shall be borne in mind when translating, and which will be exposed by using the 
multidimensional approach adopted by the GENTT research group344. The group 
defined the judgments of the ECtHR as a “genre” meaning a notion that includes formal 
 
343Cfr. Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, Buffalo, Toronto, 2007, pg. 11. 
344The GENTT (Géneros Textuales para la Traducción/Textual Genres for Translation) group is a 
research group of the Department of Translation and Communication at Universitat Jaume I, Castellón de 





aspects (conventionalized forms), sociocultural aspects (social occasions) and cognitive 
aspects (purposes of the participants). On this basis, the group proposed a model of 
genre analysis in order to describe the judgments of the ECtHR. This genre 
characterization system comprises blocks of data regarding the sub-genre, the 
communicative situation and the macro-structure of ECtHR judgments.  
Regarding the sub-genres, the ECtHR judgment can be further classified according 
to two criteria: one is the judicial formation delivering the judgment (the Committee, 
the Chambers or the Grand Chamber), the other comprises the Articles of the 
Convention that the respondent State has allegedly violated. The sub-genres considered 
in Khlaifia case consists in a judgment rendered by the Grand Chamber only for the 
alleged violation of Article 5§§1,2,4, Article 3, Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, Article 13 
(taken together with Article 5§§1,2,4, Article 3, Article 4 of Protocol No. 4) of the 
ECHR.  
With reference to the communicative situation, instead, the GENTT’s system 
provides data subsumed under three subheadings: register, participants and function. 
Delving into its register, the Khlaifia’s judicial decision falls into the socio-professional 
field of law whose mode is written and whose level of formality is high345.  
Concerning the communicative setting, the ECtHR judgments are characterized by a 
plurality of participants: the “sender” is the Grand Chamber, i.e. panel of seventeen 
judges expressing a shared view when delivering a judgment, whereas the “receivers” 
are the parties to the case such as States as respondent (in Khlaifia’case the Italian 
Government is represented by its Agent, Ms E. Spatafora), and natural persons (three 
Tunisian nationals, Mr Saber Mr Saber Ben Mohamed Ben Ali  Khlaifia, Mr 
Fakhreddine  Ben Brahim  Ben Mustapha  Tabal  and Mr Mohamed Ben Habib  Ben 
Jaber Sfar represented by their lawyers Mr  L.M.  Masera and Mr S. Zirulia). The 
Khlaifia case sees other parties involved influencing the communicative situation of the 
genre which are four associations submitting written comments according to Article 36 
of ECHR: Coordination Française pour le droit d’asile (French coalition for the right of 
asylum), and the Center for Human Rights, and Legal Pluralism of McGill University, 
the AIRE Center and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), and the 
 
345Cfr. Borja Albi A. et al. (2009), in Petruzzo K., National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic 
analysis of European Court of Human Rights judgments in English, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 




whole population of the Member States of the Council of Europe. Because their 
different backgrounds in terms of legal, cultural and linguistic settings and knowledges, 
all these parties can influence differently the communicative situation as proposed by 
Cloître and Shinn346. According to them, the communication setting can be 
distinguished on the basis of the senders’ and receivers’ levels of education and 
therefore on the basis of the specialization into 1) intra-specialist communication (from 
specialist to specialist in the same field; 2) inter-specialist communication (from 
specialist to specialist across field; 3) didactic/ pedagogical communication (from 
specialist to non-specialist, e.g. pupil, trainee, student); 4) popular communication 
(from specialist to laypeople, i.e. the largest audience possible). According to this 
classification, the Khlaifia case is an intra-specialist communication as it involves 
specialists in the same field. 
As far as the function is concerned, the judgments of the Grand Chamber go in two 
directions: one is in line with the real function of the Court, which is to protect 
individuals against those Member States violating the human rights and the principles 
of the Convention, and thus the Grand Chamber judgments must declare the violation 
and grant remedies; the other responds to the need of disseminating and enforcing the 
principles enshrined in the ECHR and in the ECtHR case-law to all other Member 
States that are not parties to the case.  
The variety of functions and of the direct and indirect participants in the 
communicative situation taken together with the characteristics of the supranational 
arena make the judgments of ECtHR composite and unique in their kinds. This 
complexity is due to the shift from a national cultural and legal dimension to a 
supranational one, which lead not only changes in the different types of law (national, 
international and supranational), but also in the linguistic regime (English, French and 
all non-official languages of the Member States)347.  
Concerning their macro-structure, the ECtHR Grand Chamber judgments are divided 
into sections and subsections: the opining section, the procedure section, the facts 
section, the law section, the operative part of the judgment, the closing section and the 
 
346Cfr. Cloître M. and Shinn T. (1985), in Petruzzo K., National law in supranational case-law: A 
linguistic analysis of European Court of Human Rights judgments in English, EUT Edizioni Università di 
Trieste, 2019, pg. 59. 
347Cfr. Petruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic analysis of European Court of 




separate opinions section348.  
1) The opening section: it is composed by the logo of the Court, the title of the 
judgment (“case of Khlaifia and Others v. Italy”), the case application number 
(“Application no. 16483/12”), date of delivery (“15 December 2016”) and the 
list of judges composing the Chamber (“The  European Court  of  Human 
Rights, sitting  as  a  Grand Chamber composed of Luis López Guerra, 
President, Guido Raimondi, Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, Angelika Nußberger, 
Khanlar Hajiyev, Kristina Pardalos, Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Erik Møse, 
Krzysztof Wojtyczek, Dmitry Dedov, Mārtiņš Mits, Stéphanie Mourou-
Vikström, Georges Ravarani, Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, Pere Pastor 
Vilanova, Alena Poláčková, Georgios A. Serghides, judges, and Johan 
Callewaert, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar”).  
2) The procedure section: it provides information about the parties involved 
(“three Tunisian nationals, Mr Saber Ben Mohamed Ben Ali Khlaifia, Mr 
Fakhreddine Ben Brahim Ben Mustapha Tabal and Mr Mohamed Ben Habib 
Ben Jaber Sfar”, §1), the denomination of the respondent State (“against the 
Italian Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention”, §1) 
as well as information about their representatives and advisers (“The applicants 
were represented by Mr L.M.  Masera and Mr S. Zirulia, lawyers practicing in 
Milan. The Italian Government (“the Government”) was represented by its 
Agent, (“Ms E. Spatafora”)”, §2). It follows the number of the relevant 
Article(s) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (“The applicants alleged in particular that they had been 
confined in a reception center for irregular migrants in breach of Articles 3 and 5 
of the Convention. They also argued that they had been subjected to a collective 
expulsion and that, under Italian law, they had had no effective remedy by 
which to complain of the violation of their fundamental rights”, §3). The 
following information is part of this section: information on the allocation of the 
case to a Chamber / the Grand Chamber (§§4-7), other parties involved in the 
case according to Article 36§2 of the Convention and Rule 44§3 (“Coordination 
Française  pour le  droit  d’asile -French coalition for the right of asylum, the 
 




Center for Human Rights -and Legal Pluralism of McGill University, the AIRE 
Center and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE)”, §8) and 
whether a hearing has taken place (“A  hearing  took place  in public  in the  
Human Rights  Building, Strasbourg, on 22 June 2016 […]”, §9). 
3) The facts section: it is made up of three parts, namely the circumstances of the 
case, the relevant domestic law and other relevant provision.  In the subsection 
known as circumstances of the case, further information on the applicants is 
provided (“The applicants were born in 1983, 1987 and 1988 respectively. Mr 
Khlaifia -the first applicant- lives in Om Laarass, Tunisia; Mr Tabal and Mr 
Sfar- the second and third applicants- live in El Mahdia, Tunisia”, §10) together 
with the explanation of the events that led to the legal action before a national 
court (“A. The applicants’ arrival on the Italian coast and their removal to 
Tunisia”, §§11- 21) and the legal proceedings before the domestic courts (“B. 
Decision of the Palermo preliminary investigations judge”, §§22-29 and “C. 
Decision of the Agrigento Justice of the Peace”, §§30-31). In the subcategory on 
domestic law, the relevant legal provisions of the respondent State are specified 
(“A. The Constitution”, §32; “B. Legislation on the removal of irregular 
migrants”, §33; ”C. Criminal Code”, §34; ”D. Italian Senate”, §35). The third 
subsection contains other relevant provisions (“III. Bilateral agreements with 
Tunisia”, §§36-40; “IV. The Return Directive”, §§41-45; “V. Other relevant 
international law material: A. International Law Commission”, §§46- 45; “B. 
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly”, §§48- 50).  
4) The law section: it contains the grounds for the Court’s decision expressed in 
the subsequent operative part whose content is merely based on the Articles of 
the ECHR. Although this section does not have a fixed structure, it generally 
begins with the description of the Government’s preliminary objection (§§51-
54) followed by the Court’s legal reasoning and argumentation for each alleged 
violation encompassing the parties’ submissions (applicants, the respondent 
Government and the intervening parties) and the Court’s assessment of every 
issue raised (“II. Alleged violation of Article 5§1 of the Convention”, §§55- 
108; “III. Alleged violation of Article 5§2 of the Convention”, §§109- 122; “IV. 




violation of Article 3 of the Convention”, §§136- 211; “VI. Alleged violation of 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention”, §§212- 255; “VII. Alleged 
violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken together with Articles 3 and 5 of 
the Convention and with Article 4 of Protocol No.4”, §§256-281). The final part 
of this section is composed by the Court’s assessment of any damages and the 
costs and expenses claimed by the applicants and the relevant default interest 
(“VIII. Application of Article 41 of the Convention”, §§282- 289). 
5) The operative section: it entails the final decisions on each alleged violation of 
the Articles of the Convention by the Court. Here standard verbs (“holds” or 
“dismisses”) and expressions (“unanimously” or “by [no.] votes to [no.]”) are 
used (§289).  
6) The closing section: it is very formulaic as it contains the date and the place and 
the language of the hearing (“Done in English and in French, and delivered at a 
public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 15 December 
2016”, §289) as well as the name and surname of the Registrar and the President 
(“John Callewaert -Deputy of the Registrar; Luis López Guerra- President”, 
§289). 
7) Separate opinions section: here judges are entitled to submit separate opinions 
which can be concurring or dissenting. In Khlaifia case three judges have 
written their own opinion: judge Raimondi (“Concurring opinion of judge 
Raimondi”, §§1-19), judge Dedov (“Partly dissenting opinion of judge Dedov”), 
and judge Serghides (“Partly dissenting opinion of judge Serghides”, §§1-77). 
The GENTT characterization template sheds light on the complexity of the Grand 
Chamber’s judgment which can entail in itself a variety of text types, be constitutional, 
legislative and jurisprudential349. For the purpose of this dissertation, the next paragraph 
will focus on the translation analysis (ST: EN-TT:IT) of those constitutional and 
legislative texts that had been taken into account by the Grand Chamber for delivering 
the Khlaifia’s judgment and that had been compared and analyzed in the chapter two of 
this work.  I decided to analyze the translation of these texts, since they are the best 
manifestation of the interaction between the Italian and the ECtHR legal system. 
 
349Petruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic analysis of European Court of 




Thusly, we can understand how communication between national and supranational 
courts is translated into practice.  
 
4.3.2. Translation assessment of the external cross-references of the case of Khlaifia and 
Others v. Italy 
In the Grand Chamber judgment, it is inevitably that national and supranational courts 
interact with each other. This interaction is called “transjudicial legal communication350” 
and one of its possible linguistic manifestations in the judgments delivered by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is the “external cross-references”, i.e. 
references that point to sources of legislative or judicial law other than the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and its Protocols 
or the ECtHR case law351. Indeed, in Khlaifia’s case, beside the Article 5§§1,2,4, Article 
3, Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, Article 13 (taken together with Article 5§§1,2,4, Article 3, 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 4) of the ECHR, the panel of judges took into account domestic 
constitutional texts (Article 13 of the Italian Constitution), domestic legal texts 
(Legislative Decree no. 289 of 1998- also called the Consolidated Immigration Act), 
European legal texts (Directive 2008/1157EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 December 2008- also called the Return Directive) and international legal 
texts (draft articles on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law Commission). All 
these legal texts are contained in the facts section of the Khlaifia’s case under the sub-
sections “II. Relevant domestic law and material” (found in §§32-35), “III. Bilateral 
agreements with Tunisia” (found in §§36-40), “IV. The Return Directive” (found in §§32-
35), and “V. Other relevant international law material” (found in §§46-50).  The sub-
paragraphs 4.2.1.1. (The syntactical features of the European legal English) and 4.2.1.2. 
(The terminological features of the European legal English) have emphasized specific 
syntactical, morphological and lexical features of legal texts which must be considered 
while translating external cross-references, and which we are going to see now in detail.  
 
 
350Peruzzo K., “5. Finding traces of translational legal communication: cross-referencing in 
international case law”, in Testi, corpora, confronti interlinguistici: approcci qualitativi e quantitativi, 





4.3.2.1. Translating syntactical features 
In the sub-paragraph 4.2.1.1. we have seen some syntactical features of the European 
legal English. Now we are going to see whether or not some of these characteristics 
have been maintained in the Italian TT. Legal texts are characterized by complex and 
long sentences as seen in Article 18 of the Return Directive352 and Article 14 of the 
Consolidated Immigration Act353. 
 
Article 18 
Emergency situations  
“1.  In situations where an exceptionally large 
number of third-country nationals to be  returned 
places an unforeseen heavy  burden on the  
capacity  of  the  detention facilities of a Member 
State or on its administrative or judicial staff, 
such a Member State may, as long as the 
exceptional situation persists, decide to allow for 
periods for judicial review  longer  than those  
provided for  under  the  third subparagraph of 
Article 15(2)  and to  take  urgent  measures in  
respect of  the  conditions of  detention 
derogating from those set out in Articles 16(1) 
and 17(2).”  
 
Articolo 18  
Situazioni di emergenza  
“1.  Nei casi in cui un numero eccezionalmente 
elevato di cittadini di paesi terzi da rimpatriare 
comporta un  notevole  onere imprevisto  per  la 
capacità dei centri di permanenza temporanea di 
uno Stato membro o per il suo personale 
amministrativo o giudiziario, sino a  quando  
persiste la  situazione anomala  detto Stato  
membro  può decidere di  accordare per  il  
riesame giudiziario  periodi superiori a quelli 
previsti dall'articolo  15,  paragrafo  2,  terzo  
comma,  e adottare misure urgenti  quanto  alle 
condizioni di trattenimento in deroga a quelle 
previste all'articolo 16, paragrafo 1, e all'articolo 
17, paragrafo 2.” 
 
352Cfr. Article 18§1 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.   
353Cfr. Article 14§1 of the Consolidated Immigration Act, §33 of Khlaifia’s case. 
Article 14  
Execution of removal measures 
1.  Where, in view of the need to provide 
assistance to an alien, to conduct additional 
checks of his or her identity or nationality, or to 
obtain travel documents, or on account of the lack 
of availability of a carrier, it is not possible to 
ensure the prompt execution of the deportation 
measure by escorting the person to the border or 
of the refusal-of-entry measure, the Chief of 
Police  (questore)  shall  order  that the  alien be  
held  for  as long  as is strictly  necessary  at the  
nearest  Identification and Removal Centre, 
among  those  designated or  created by  order  of  
the  Minister  of  the Interior in collaboration (di 
concerto) with the Minister for Social Solidarity 
and the Treasury, the Minister for the Budget, and 
the Minister for Economic Planning.  
 
Articolo 14  
Esecuzione dell’espulsione  
1.  Quando non è possibile eseguire con 
immediatezza l'espulsione mediante 
accompagnamento alla frontiera ovvero il 
respingimento, perché occorre procedere al 
soccorso dello straniero, ad accertamenti 
supplementari in ordine alla sua identità o 
nazionalità, ovvero all'acquisizione di documenti 
per il viaggio, ovvero per l'indisponibilità, il 
questore dispone che lo straniero sia trattenuto per 
il tempo strettamente necessario presso il centro di 
permanenza temporanea e assistenza più vicino, 
tra quelli individuati o costituiti con decreto del 
Ministro dell'interno, di concerto con i Ministri 
per la solidarietà sociale e del tesoro, del bilancio 





Both articles stand out for their remarkable length: the ST of Article 18 is 98 words, 
whereas the TT 98, and the ST of Article 14 is 127 and the TT is 94, both containing 
complex sentences whose main clause is in the middle of the extracts, namely “such 
Member State, […], decide to […]”- “detto Stato membro può decidere […]” and “the 
Chief of Police (questore) shall order that the alien […]”- “il questore dispone che lo 
straniero […]”. Another syntactical feature is the separation between the auxiliary and 
the main verb which has been maintained in the translation of TT, as provided in some 
Article 10§2 of the Consolidated Immigration Act354 and Article 19§1, b) of the draft 
article on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law Commission355:    
Article 10 
Refusal of entry 
 
“2. Refusal of entry combined with removal shall, 
moreover, be ordered by the Chief of Police 
(questore) in respect of aliens: […]” 
Articolo 10  
Respingimento  
 
“2.  Il respingimento con accompagnamento alla 
frontiera è altresì disposto dal questore nei 
confronti degli stranieri: […]” 
 
 
Article 19  
Detention of an alien for the purpose of 
expulsion 
 
(b) An alien detained for the purpose of expulsion 
shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be 
separated from persons sentenced to penalties 
involving deprivation of liberty. 
 
Articolo 19 
Detenzione dello straniero ai fini 
dell’espulsione  
b)  Uno straniero detenuto ai fini di espulsione 
deve, salvo in circostanze eccezionali, essere 
separato delle persone condannate a pene 
privative della libertà. 
 
Despite being typical characteristics of legal texts, both the length of the Articles and 
the separation between auxiliary and main verb may influence negatively the 
readability, rendering the text more difficult to understand and less fluent.   
Another typical feature of legal texts is the technique of nominalization which is, 
according to Cortelazzo, the use of nouns indicating, in an abstract way, actions more 
commonly represented by verbs356. Rita Carnevali and Dr Martina Scantamburlo 
translated these constructions differently. In some cases, they have maintained literally 
the nominalization of the ST as in the following examples: “restriction of personal 
 
354Cfr. Article 10§2 of the Consolidated Immigration Act, §33 of Khlaifia’s case. 
355Cfr. Article 19§1, b) of the draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law 
Commission, §46 of Khlaifia’s case. 
356Cfr. Cortelazzo M.A. (eds.), “La comunicazione nelle pubbliche amministrazioni”, EDK Editore, 2010, 




liberty”-“restrizione della libertà personale357”, “grant of refugee status”-“ riconoscimento 
dello status di rifugiato358”, “adoption of temporary protection measures on humanitarian 
grounds”-“adozione di misure di protezione temporanea per motivi umanitari359”, “for the 
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences”-“ per la prevenzione, 
le indagini, l'accertamento e il perseguimento di reati360”, and “for the purpose of expulsion”-“ 
ai fini di espulsione361”. 
In other circumstances, nominalization has been used only in the TT, causing thus a level 
shift verb (EN) → noun (IT), namely a shift from a grammatical category into another one362,  
as follows: “to obtain”-“all’acquisizione363”, “by escorting”-“mediante l’accompagnamento364”, 
“staying illegally”-“il cui soggiorno […] è irregolare365”, “after the period has expired”-“ alla 
scadenza di tale periodo366”, and “in obtaining the necessary documentation”-“nell'ottenimento 
della necessaria documentazione367”. Other examples are provided in Article 13 of the Italian 
Constitution368 as follows: “No one may be detained, inspected, or searched […]”- “Non è 
ammessa forma alcuna di detenzione, di ispezione o perquisizione personale […]”. From this 
list, it emerges that the Articles translated into Italian uses nominalization more frequently than 
the ones in English. The nominalization of the TT may have two implications: on one hand it 
may render the register of the text higher and more formal, and it can contribute to the syntactic 
condensation369, on the other hand nominalization may be associated with slower 
comprehension processes, because considered less natural370.  
Another interesting syntactical aspect emerging from the comparison of the above-
mentioned legal texts, is the frequent use of modal verbs, namely “shall” and “may”. 
 
357Cfr. Article 13 of the Italian Constitution, §32 of Khlaifia’s case.  
358Cfr. Article 10§4 of the Immigration Consolidated Act, §33 of Khlaifia’s case. 
359Ibidem.  
360Cfr. Article 12§1 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.  
361Cfr. Article 19§1 of the draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law Commission, 
§46 of Khlaifia’s case. 
362Cfr. Translation shifts, Catford J.C. (1965), in Munday J., “Introducing Translation Studies- Theories 
and Applications”, Routledge, Fourth Edition, 2016, pg. 96.   
363Cfr. Article 14§1 of the Immigration Consolidated Act, §33 of Khlaifia’s case.   
364Ibidem.   
365Cfr. Article 2§1 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.   
366Cfr. Article 8§2 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.    
367Cfr. Article 15§6, b) of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.    
368Cfr. Article 13 of the Italian Constitution, §32 of Khlaifia’s case. 
369Cortelazzo M.A. (eds.), “La comunicazione nelle pubbliche amministrazioni”, EDK Editore, 2010, pg. 
6. 




“Shall” has been often considered as “the bigger troublemaker371” in legislative 
drafting, being, according to some scholars, uncertain, context-depending372, ambiguous 
and promiscuous in meaning373, which consequently affects translation. The Khlaifia 
case demonstrates indeed the difficulty of translating “shall” into Italian TT. The above 
and below- mentioned articles taken from the Khlaifia’s judgment have proved indeed 
the difficulty of translating “shall” into Italian TT. In legal texts, “shall” has both a 
deontic meaning as laws are normative in nature, imposing rules which incontestably 
influence people’s behavior374, and a performative one, contributing crucially to the 
realization of the speech acts that constitute a legal text’s pragmatic force and legal 
validity375. It follows that its primary function in legal texts is to impose duty (positive 
form: “shall”) or to prohibit a conduct (negative form: “shall not”) 376. In the Italian TT, 
however, “shall” has been rendered in three different ways: with the two modal verbs 
“dovere” and “potere”, or with the present simple. “Dovere” is perhaps the most 
suitable Italian modal verb as represents a strong obligation (“deve essere valutato”) or 
a strong prohibition in its negative form (“non deve essere arbitraria”), as in the 
examples provided below: 
 
 
371Cfr. Wydik R.C. (1998), in Garzone G., “Variation in the use of modality in legislative texts: Focus on 
shall”, in Journal of Pragmatics 57, 2013, pg. 72. 
372Cfr. Asprey M.M. (1992) and Bennion F. (2001), in Garzone G., “Variation in the use of modality in 
legislative texts: Focus on shall”, in Journal of Pragmatics 57, 2013, pg. 72. 
373Cfr. Garner B.A.  (1995), Nunberg G. (2001), Lauchman R. (2005), Triebel V. (2009), in Garzone G., 
“Variation in the use of modality in legislative texts: Focus on shall”, in Journal of Pragmatics 57, 2013, 
pg. 72. 
377Cfr. Article 5§3 of the draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law Commission, 
§46 of Khlaifia’s case. 
378Cfr. Article 19§1, a) of the draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law 
Commission, §46 of Khlaifia’s case. 
Article 5 of the draft articles on the expulsions 
of aliens 
Grounds for expulsion377 
 
3.  The ground for expulsion shall be assessed in 
good faith and reasonably, […] 
Articolo 5 del progetto di articoli in materia di 
espulsione 
Motivi di espulsione  
 
3.  Il motivo di espulsione deve essere valutato in 
buona fede e in modo ragionevole, […] 
Article 19 of the draft articles on the 
expulsions of aliens 
Detention of an alien for the purpose of 
expulsion 378 
 
1.  a) The detention of an alien for the purpose of 
expulsion shall not be arbitrary nor punitive in 
nature. 
Articolo 19 del progetto di articoli in materia 
di espulsione 
Detenzione dello straniero ai fini 
dell’espulsione  
 
1.  a) la detenzione di uno straniero ai fini di 





In Khlaifia case, the verb “shall” has also been translated with the Italian modal verb 
“potere”, as provided below. However, the latter means ability or possibility to do 
something or a permit. As it does not refer to an obligation, perhaps “potere” does not 
fully correspond to the real meaning of “shall”. 
Lastly, “shall” has also been rendered into TL with the use of present simple which 
renders the legal texts more fluent in reading at the expense of the modulation function 
“shall” performs.   
As seen, “dovere”, “potere” and the present simple do not share the same meaning, 
which can lead to a misunderstanding of the real function of “shall”. The modal verb 
“dovere” is apparently the most appropriate translation, whereas “potere” and present 
simple are too weak to express obligation and prohibition. Therefore, “shall” into Italian 
should have been expected to be translated more consistently, using “dovere” in all 
cases.  
 
376Cfr. Sullivan R. (2002), in Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, Buffalo, 
Toronto, 2007, pg. 116. 
377Cfr. Article 5§3 of the draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law Commission, 
§46 of Khlaifia’s case. 
378Cfr. Article 19§1, a) of the draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law 
Commission, §46 of Khlaifia’s case. 
379Cfr. Article 17 of the draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law Commission, §46 
of Khlaifia’s case. 
380Cfr. Article 15§2 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.   
Article 17 of the draft articles on the 
expulsions of aliens 
Prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment379  
 
“The expelling State shall not subject an alien 
subject to expulsion to torture or to  
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”  
 
Articolo 17 del progetto di articoli in materia 
di espulsione 
Proibizione della tortura e dei trattamenti o 
pene crudeli, inumani o degradanti  
 
«Lo Stato che espelle non può sottoporre lo 
straniero oggetto dell’espulsione a tortura, né a 
pene o trattamenti crudeli, inumani o degradanti.»  
 
Article 15 of the Return Directive380  
 
[…] 
2.  Detention shall be ordered by administrative 
or judicial authorities.  
Detention shall be ordered in writing with reasons 
being given in fact and in law.  
[…] The third-country national concerned shall 
be released immediately if the detention is not 
lawful. 
 
Articolo 15 della Direttiva Rimpatri 
 
[…] 
2.  Il trattenimento è disposto dalle autorità 
amministrative o giudiziarie.  
Il trattenimento è disposto per iscritto ed è 
motivato in fatto e in diritto.  
[…] Il cittadino di un paese terzo interessato è 





By contrast, “may” has been translated coherently with the modal verb “potere”: 
they both refer to a discretionary obligation, a possibility, and not an absolute duty. 
Interestingly, in the below-mentioned articles, “may” is often accompanied with the 
adverb “only” translated into TT with “solo” or “solamente”. Perhaps, the use of this 
adverb is meant to strengthen the discretionary obligation “may” performs.  
Article 4 of the draft articles on the expulsions 
of aliens 
Requirement for conformity with law381 
 
“An alien may be expelled only in pursuance of a 
decision reached in accordance with law.”  
Articolo 4 del progetto di articoli in materia di 
espulsione 
Obbligo di conformità alla legge 
 
“Uno straniero può essere espulso solo in 
ottemperanza ad un provvedimento adottato 
conformemente alla legge.” 
 
Article 5 of the draft articles on the expulsions 
of aliens 
Grounds for expulsion382  
 
2.A State may only expel an alien on a ground 
that is provided for by law. 
  
Articolo 5 del progetto di articoli in materia di 
espulsione 
Motivi di espulsione  
 
2.Uno Stato può espellere uno straniero soltanto 
per un motivo previsto dalla legge.  
Article 2 of the Return Directive383 
Scope 
 
2. Member States may decide not to apply this 
Directive to third-country nationals who: […] 
Articolo 2 della Direttiva Rimpatri 
Ambito di applicazione 
 
2.Gli Stati membri possono decidere di non 
applicare la presente direttiva ai cittadini di paesi 
terzi: […] 
 
Lastly, as the linguist Garzone states, modulation can be also expressed by the 
present simple384. The fortunes of modal verbs, particularly of “shall”, in legal discourse 
have deteriorated in parallel with the growing success of the Plain Language movement 
and with the consequent decline of its use in standard English385. On one hand this 
change may make the reading of legal texts more fluent, on the other hand the use of 
present simple may not perform modulation as a modal verb could do. However, we 
must bear in mind that the legal texts taken into consideration in this analysis have all a 
 
381Cfr. Article 4 of the draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law Commission, §46 
of Khlaifia’s case. 
382Cfr. Article 5§2 of the draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law Commission, 
§46 of Khlaifia’s case. 
383Cfr. Article 2§2 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.   
384Garzone G., “Variation in the use of modality in legislative texts: Focus on shall”, in Journal of 
Pragmatics 57, 2013, pg. 75. 




normative function and are, per se, prescriptive. In the TT, the present simple has been 
maintained as provided below:  
Article 2 of the Return Directive 
Scope386 
1. This Directive applies to third-country 
nationals staying illegally on the territory of a 
Member State. 
Articolo 2 della Direttiva Rimpatri 
Ambito di applicazione 
1. La presente direttiva si applica ai cittadini di 
paesi terzi il cui soggiorno nel territorio di uno 




Another common linguistic characteristic in legal texts is the frequent use of 
conditional clauses, particularly in the formula “if X, then Z shall388”. There are many 
variations of this, but in most cases “if X, then Z” is essential: every action of 
requirement, from a legal point of view, is hedged around with and even depends upon, 
a set of conditions that must be satisfied before anything can happen389. We can find 
conditional constructions in the cross-references of Khlaifia case, as provided below: 
 
Article 13 of the Italian Constitution390 
 
[…] the police take provisional measures that 
shall be referred within 48 hours to a judicial 
authority and which, if not validated by the latter 
in the following 48 hours, shall be deemed 
withdrawn and ineffective.  
 
Articolo 13 della Costituzione 
 
[…] l’autorità di Pubblica sicurezza può   adottare 
provvedimenti provvisori, che devono essere 
comunicati entro quarantotto ore all’Autorità 
giudiziaria e, se questa non li convalida nelle 
successive quarantotto ore, si intendono revocati 
e restano privi di ogni effetto.  
 
Article 8 of the Return Directive391  
 
2.  If a Member State has granted a period for 
voluntary departure in accordance with Article 7, 
the return decision may be enforced only after the 
period has expired, unless a risk as referred to in 
Article 7(4) arises during that period.  
Articolo 8 della Direttiva Rimpatri  
 
2.   Qualora uno Stato membro abbia concesso un 
periodo per la partenza volontaria a norma 
dell’articolo 7, la decisione di rimpatrio può 
essere eseguita unicamente alla scadenza di tale 
periodo, a meno che nel periodo in questione non 
sorga uno dei rischi di cui all'articolo 7, paragrafo 
4. 
 
386Cfr. Article 2§1 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.   
387Cfr. Article 13 of the Italian Constitution, §32 of Khlaifia’s case.    
388Cfr. Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, Buffalo, Toronto, 2007, pg. 121.   
389Cfr. Crystal D. and Davy D.  (1969), in Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, 
Cleventon, Buffalo, Toronto, 2007, pg. 121.   
390Cfr. Article 13 of the Italian Constitution, §32 of Khlaifia’s case.    
391Cfr. Article 8§2 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.   
Article 13 of the Italian Constitution387 
Personal liberty is inviolable. […] 
Articolo 13 della Costituzione 






Firstly, we see the formula “if X, then Z shall” in the Article 13 of the Italian 
Constitution “if [it is] not validated by the latter in the following 48 hours, shall be 
deemed withdrawn and ineffective.” which is translated into “se questa non li convalida 
nelle successive quarantotto ore, si intendono revocati e restano privi di ogni effetto.”. 
As we can see, despite the same use of the “if”-“se” conjunction, in TT the modal verb 
“shall” has not been maintained which may not properly convey the strong condition 
the ST performs. The present simple is used, instead. Thusly, the function of 
modulation may be lost in the TT.  
Secondly, in order to express conditions, legal texts make use of first conditional 
clauses. In English, this construction is expressed with the conjunction “if” followed by 
a verb in indicative form (“if [it is] not validated by the latter in the following 48 hours” 
and “If a Member State has granted a period for voluntary departure in accordance with 
Article 7, […]”). In the TT, however, “if” has been translated with two different 
conjunctions: “se” and “qualora”. Despite having the same meaning, the two Italian 
conjunctions require different verb forms: in the first conditional clause, “se” is 
followed by an indicative verb form, whereas “qualora” by a subjunctive form. The 
latter is perhaps used for rendering the Article of a higher register at the expense of the 
readability which may turn out to be less fluent. Generally, the Italian TT may tend to 
adopt constructions of a higher level, but, at the same time, less natural. Examples cited 
above are the frequent use of nominalization and the use of less frequent conjunctions 
as “qualora” followed by a subjunctive form.  
 
4.3.2.2. Translating terminology  
Of no less importance, terminology is the most visible and striking linguistic feature 
of legal language as a technical language, and it is also one of the major sources of 
difficulty in translating legal texts392. 
Indeed, when translating the judgments of the Court, systematic differences between 
the national statute law elements and judicial ones of the Court must be taken into 
 




account. The linguistic Peruzzo refers to these elements as “system-bound elements393”, 
whereas the linguist Weisflog calls them “legal concepts” meaning “authoritative 
categories to which types or classes of transactions, cases or situations are referred, in 
consequences of which a series of principles, rules and standards become applicable394”. 
Thus, translating these elements implies a process of recontextualization where elements 
originally embedded in a national legal and judicial system migrate from their natural 
context into a different environment, risking that many legal words in one language do 
not find ready equivalents in another, causing both linguistic and legal complications395. 
For this reason, it is unlikely to find absolute equivalent between words of the ST and 
those of the TT. Given the vast differences and diverse situations between different 
language pairs and different legal systems, various methods may be utilized. The 
linguistic Cao has proposed literal translation396 (or formal equivalence/ formal 
correspondence397 or word-for-word translation398), dynamic/functional equivalence399 
(or sense-for-sense translation400), and descriptive equivalence401 (where the meaning of 
elements of one legal system are explained in several words). For the analysis of the 
cross-references in Khlaifia’s case, the direct and oblique translation by Vinay and 
Darbelnet402 and the translation shifts technique by Catford403 have also been used.   
 
393Cfr. Petruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic analysis of European Court of 
Human Rights judgments in English”, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2019, pg. 71. 
394Cfr. Weisflog W.E. (1987), in Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, 
Buffalo, Toronto, 2007, pg. 54. 
395Cfr. Petruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic analysis of European Court of 
Human Rights judgments in English”, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2019, pg. 71 
396Cfr, direct translation, Vinay J.P. and Darbelnet J. (1995/2004), in Munday J., “Introducing 
Translation Studies- Theories and Applications”, Routledge, Fourth Edition, 2016, pg. 92 
397Cfr, formal equivalence (formal corresponding) and dynamic equivalence (functional equivalence), 
Nida E. (1964), in Munday J., “Introducing Translation Studies- Theories and Applications”, Routledge, 
Fourth Edition, 2016, pg. 67-68. 
398Cfr. word-for-word and sense-for-sense translation, Cicero (46 @AC), in Munday J., “Introducing 
Translation Studies- Theories and Applications”, Routledge, Fourth Edition, 2016, pg. 31. 
399Cfr. formal equivalence (formal corresponding) and dynamic equivalence (functional equivalence), 
Nida E. (1964), in Munday J., “Introducing Translation Studies- Theories and Applications”, Routledge, 
Fourth Edition, 2016, pg. 67-68.  
400Cfr. word-for-word and sense-for-sense translation, Cicero (46 @AC), in Munday J., “Introducing 
Translation Studies- Theories and Applications”, Routledge, Fourth Edition, 2016, pg. 31. 
401Cfr. Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, Buffalo, Toronto, 2007, pg. 56. 
402Cfr. supplementary translation procedures, Vinay J.P. and Darbelnet J. (1995/2004), in Munday J., 
“Introducing Translation Studies- Theories and Applications”, Routledge, Fourth Edition, 2016, pgg. 88-
95. 
403Cfr. Catford J.C. (1965), in Munday J., “Introducing Translation Studies- Theories and Applications”, 




The cross-references of Khlaifia’s case contain many law- related and immigration-
related words which are considered technical as they occur only in legal texts. Technical 
law-related words are for example “criminal law sanction”, “coercive measures” and “any 
preventive measure of detention (carcerazione preventiva)” which are found respectively 
in Articles 2 and 8 of the Return Directive and Article 13 of the Italian Constitution, and 
which have been translated using different methods.  
Firstly, “criminal law sanction” has been rendered into “sanzione penale404” using 
the technique of economy405 as less words have been used. However, “criminal law 
sanction” may not be often found in legal texts, but rather “criminal sanction” or “penal 
sanction” which are more frequent406. Perhaps the syntagma “criminal law sanction” is 
the outcome of the process of drafting the case-law of the Court which is a collegial 
activity inside the Grand Chamber composed by a panel of judges with different 
languages and culture having an influence on their English. The multilingualism of the 
Court may lead indeed to the creation of a European legal English which is, according 
to Brannan, considered to be unnatural407. The sub-paragraph 4.1.1. (Language regime, 
translation activities and programs of the Court) has indeed shed light on the 
determining role of the drafting committee in translating the case-law of the Court. By 
analyzing further cross-references in the Khlaifia’s case, we will see a large number of 
examples as such.  
By contrast, the syntagma “coercive measures” has been translated word-for-word 
into “misure coercitive”. A corpus-based research has demonstrated that both “coercive 
measures” and “misure coercitive” are almost used with the same frequency408. The fact 
 
404Cfr. Article 2 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.     
405Cfr. Supplementary translation procedures, Vinay J.P. and Darbelnet J. (1995/2004), in Munday J., 
“Introducing Translation Studies- Theories and Applications”, Routledge, Fourth Edition, 2016, pg. 89.   
406The frequency of the syntagma “criminal law sanction” has been looked for through a corpus-based 
research on sketch engine: https://www.sketchengine.eu/. From the analysis of the corpus Eur-Lex 
English 2/2016, it emerges that the most frequent syntagma is “criminal sanction”. “Criminal sanction” 
appears 1545 times on the corpus, whereas “penal sanction” 241. Moreover, “criminal law sanction” is, 
instead, the least frequent: it appears only 9 times out of 600 tokens with “criminal sanction”. To 
conclude, eve tough “criminal law sanction”, “criminal sanction” and “penal sanction” share the same 
meaning, the most frequent is “criminal sanction”.  
407Cfr. Brannan J. (2013), in Petruzzo K., National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic analysis of 
European Court of Human Rights judgments in English, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2019, pg. 
82. 
408The frequency of “coercive measures” and “misure coercitive” has been looked for through a corpus-




that they are used with the same frequency in legal texts may mean that “coercive 
measures” corresponds in meaning to “misure coercitive” in Italian and it is, thus, an 
example of equivalence in legal translation.   
Of particular interest is the translation pairs “any preventive measure of detention 
(carcerazione preventiva)” – “carcerazione preventiva409”. As its source text is found in 
Article 13 of the Italian Constitution, it may mean that, during the phase of drafting the 
Khlaifia’s case, the drafting committee of the Court had to translate the Article from its 
source text (IT) into the target text (EN).  Probably, while translating the text into 
English, the committee preferred to explain the meaning of “carcerazione preventiva” 
in English, adopting thus the technique of descriptive equivalence, and to insert the 
original source text terminology in brackets in order not to lose the real meaning of the 
syntagma. Another translation may have also been “preventive detention” which, 
according to Law Britannica410, Legal Dictionary411 and Brocardi412, shares the same 
meaning of “carcerazione preventiva”.  
The same problem arose for the translation of “Legislative Decree (decreto 
legislativo) no. 286 of 1998 (“Consolidated text of provisions concerning immigration 
regulations and rules on the status of aliens”)” which again the drafting committee had 
to translate from Italian into English, as the text belongs to the Italian legal system. For 
the syntagma “decreto legislativo”, the drafting committee adopted a literal translation 
technique “Legislative Decree”, inserting the corresponding Italian form in brackets 
“Legislative Decree (decreto legislativo)”, whereas for “testo unico delle disposizioni 
concernenti  la disciplina dell’immigrazione e  norme  sulla  condizione dello 
straniero413”, the drafting  committee used the technique of the functional equivalence, 
translating thus into “Consolidated text of provisions concerning immigration 
regulations and rules on the status of aliens”. In cases as such, the Italian translator 
maintained the original names of the directive as a legal domestic text has been used. 
 
English 2/2016 and Eur-Lex Italian 2/2016 shows that “coercive measures” is fond 726 times, whereas 
“misure coercitive” 625.  
409Cfr. Article 13 of the Italian Constitution, §32 of Khlaifia’s case. 
410Law Britannica:  https://www.britannica.com/topic/preventive-detention [14/01/2021]. 
411Legal Dictionary-The free dictionary:  https://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Preventive+Detention [06/02/2021].  
412Brocardi.it: https://www.brocardi.it/dizionario/58.html [14/01/2021]. 




By contrast, the names of legal texts emanated by the European Union have been 
rendered into the TT word-for-word as in the following examples: “Directive  
2008/115/EC of  the  European Parliament  and of the  Council  of  16 December 2008 
(Return Directive)” – “Direttiva 2008/115/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio 
del 16 dicembre 2008 (direttiva rimpatri)414”; and “Schengen Borders Code”- “Codice 
frontiere Schengen415”.  
Regarding immigration-related technical words, as already explained in sub-paragraph 
4.2.1.2. (The terminological features of the European legal English), one of the most 
difficult challenges in translating the case-law of ECtHR relies on what the linguistic 
Brennan calls “supranational terms” and “national terms”416. The following syntagma 
belong to the first category: “right to liberty and security” (cfr. Article 5§1 of the 
Convention), “prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment” (cfr. Article 3 of the Convention) and “collective expulsion” (cfr. Article 4 
of Protocol no.4), which are all convention-specific terms and have respectively been 
literally translated into “diritto alla libertà e alla sicurezza417”, “proibizione della tortura 
e dei trattamenti o pene crudeli, inumani o degradanti418”and “espulsione collettiva419”.   
By contrast, national terms have been translated with different techniques. For their 
translation analysis, we took into account the work carried out by the drafting 
committee of the Grand Chamber who, in the phase of drafting the judgment, had to 
translate domestic legal texts, among which the Consolidated Immigration Act. 
The first term is “respingimento” rendered into “refusal of entry” through the 
technique of modulation (effect<>cause)420. Modulation belongs to the oblique 
translation techniques by the linguistic Vinay and Darbelnet and it represents a change 
in semantics and point of view of the SL. In this case, “respingimento” (literally: 
pushback) is a consequence of the fact that migrants are refused to enter the territory 
 
414Cfr. Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.    
415Cfr. Article 2§2 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.    
416Cfr. Brannan J. (2013), in Petruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic analysis 
of European Court of Human Rights judgments in English”, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2019, 
pg. 80. 
417Cfr. Article 5§1 of the Convention, §55 of Khaifia’s case.  
418Cfr. Article 3 of the Convention, §136 of Khaifia’s case.  
419Cfr. Article 4 of Protocol no.4 to the Convention, §212 of Khaifia’s case.  
420Cfr. oblique translation, Vinay J.P. and Darbelnet J. (1995/2004), in Munday J., “Introducing 




(“refusal-of-entry”). However, the words share the same meaning: Article 10 of the 
Immigration Act refers to “respingimento” saying that “1. La polizia di frontiera 
respinge gli stranieri che si presentano ai valichi di frontiera senza avere i requisiti 
richiesti dal presente testo unico per l’ingresso nel territorio dello Stato. […]421”, 
whereas the official European Migration Network (EMN) Glossary of terms relating to 
the Asylum and Migration states that “in the EU, refusal-of-entry of a third-country 
national at the external EU border because they do not fulfil all the entry conditions laid 
down in Art. 5(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code) […]422”. 
Lastly, another national term found in the Consolidated Immigration Act is 
“espulsione amministrativa” which is, once again, a legal concept belonging to the 
Italian legal system. In order to translate “espulsione amministrativa” found in the 
Article 13 of the Immigration Consolidated Act, the drafting committee translated it 
into “administrative deportation423” through the technique of modulation 
(general<>particular). If we look up the definitions of “espulsione” and “deportation”, 
the first term is polysemic applicable in different contexts and circumstances424, 
whereas “deportation” only refers to the action of forcing someone to leave a country, 
especially if he/she has no legal right to stay425. The modulation refers thus to the fact 
that “espulsione” is more general in meaning than “deportation”. As regard to the whole 
syntagma “espulsione amministrativa” translated into “administrative deportation”, 
some considerations have to be taken into account. As described in sub-paragraph 2.3.1. 
(The Consolidated Immigration Act), the Italian legislation classifies the concept of 
expulsion into administrative and judicial one according to the authority who issues it, 
respectively by the Ministry of the Interior or by the Prefect, and by a judicial authority. 
However, the readership of the English version of the judgement includes all Member 
States which may not have this distinction in their legal system. Instead of 
“administrative deportation”, an alternative translation could have been “a deportation 
emanated by an administrative authoritative” using thus a descriptive equivalence.  
The cross-references of Khlaifia’s case contain also technical words taken from the 
 
421Brocardi.it: https://www.brocardi.it/testo-unico-immigrazione/titolo-ii/capo-ii/art10.html [05/02/2021]. 
422European Migration Network (EMN), EMN Glossary:  https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/refusal-entry_en [14/01/2021].  
423Cfr. Article 13 of the Consolidated Immigration Act, §33 of Khlaifia’s case. 
424Enciclopedia Treccani:  https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/espulsione/ [15/01/2021].  




European context mostly translated literally as the pairs “extradition”- “estradizione426” 
in Article 2 of the Return Directive and “voluntary departure” – “partenza 
volontaria427” in Article 8 of the Return Directive. Instead, other pairs have been 
translated through a class shift428, i.e. a shift from one part of the speech to another as in 
the pair “entry-ban”- “divieto di ingresso429” where the pre-modifying noun “entry” is 
translated by the adverbial qualifying phrase “di ingresso”,  and level shift430, i.e. a shift 
where something expressed by a non-finite verb in a language (“absconding”) is a noun 
in another (“fuga”) as in the pairs “risk of absconding”-“rischio di fuga”.  
Lastly, other technical words present in domestic documents, but whose meaning is 
also known and used on an European and international level, are “political asylum” 
(Article 10 of the Consolidated Immigration Act) translated into “asilo politico431” and 
“refugee status” and “refugee protection” both rendered respectively with a class shift 
into “status di rifugiato” and “protezione dei rifugiati432”. As these expressions have a 
concrete reference in both Italian and European legislation, their translation does not 
give rise to doubts.  
Semitechnical words are also part of the European legal English, considered as 
words whose meaning in legal contexts differs from the one they have in general 
language. The first example is “alien” contained in the Consolidated Immigration Act, 
in the Return Directive and the drafts by the International Law Commission. According 
to the Cambridge Dictionary, “alien” has three main meanings433, but, in legal contexts, 
it is a high register word only indicating someone coming from a different country, race 
or group, a foreigner, which has been rendered into the Italian TT with its formal 
equivalent: “straniero434”.  
“Detention” is also considered a semi-technical word as, according to the Cambridge 
 
426Cfr. Article 2 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.    
427Cfr. Article 8 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.    
428Cfr. Catford J.C. (1965), in Munday J., “Introducing Translation Studies- Theories and Applications”, 
Routledge, Fourth Edition, 2016, pg. 95-97. 
429Cfr. Article 12 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.    
430Ibidem.   
431Cfr. Article 10 of the Consolidated Immigration Act, §33 of Khlaifia’s case. 
432Cfr. Article 10 of the Consolidated Immigration Act, §33 of Khlaifia’s case. 
433Cambridge Dictionary: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/alien [15/01/2021]. 




dictionary, has several meanings, but legal texts narrow down its definition to the act or 
condition of being officially forced to stay in a place435. The translation of the Khlaifia’s 
case brought out how the language denoting detention in Italy can be misleading, which 
can have serious implications in guaranteeing the rights afforded to detainees: in the 
draft by the International Law Commission and in Articles 5§1, 4 of the Convention, 
the word “detention” has been translated into “detenzione436”, whereas in the Return 
Directive into “trattenimento437”. Despite the fact that “detenzione” and “trattenimento” 
may seem synonyms, according to Enciclopedia Treccani, the first is a “legal 
punishment restricting personal liberty438”, whereas the second one generally refers to 
“the act of holding someone or something439”. The case demonstrates that the 
applicants- and all migrants present in the CSPA in Contrada Imbriacola in September 
2011- had been held in reception facilities which were de facto detention measures and 
not holding ones. For these reasons, the most suitable translation for “detention” would 
be “detenzione” and not “trattenimento”, adopting thus an absolute equivalence.  
“Removal” can be also used in different contexts440, but in legal contexts it refers to 
“the act of a state in the exercise of its sovereignty in removing an alien from its 
territory to a certain place after refusal of admission or termination of permission to 
remain441” which has been rendered into Italian with the functional equivalence 
“allontamento442”. The latter is also found in the official glossary of European 
Migration Network (EMN) of the European Commission443. Moreover, 
“allontanamento” is in the “Titolo II: disposizioni sull’ingresso, il soggiorno e 
l’allontanamento dal territorio dello stato444” of the Immigration Consolidated Act, and, 
 
435Cambridge Dictionary: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/it/dizionario/inglese/detention [15/01/2021].  
436Cfr. Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case; Cfr. draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the 
International Law Commission, §46 of Khlaifia’s case; Cfr. Article 5§1 of the Convention, §55 of 
Khaifia’s case. 
437Cfr. Article 15,16 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.    
438Enciclopedia Treccani: https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/detenzione/ [15/01/2021].   
439Enciclopedia Treccani: https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/trattenimento/ [15/01/2021].   
440Cambridge Dictionary: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/removal [18/01/2021].   
441European Migration Network (EMN), EMN Glossary:  https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/removal_en [18/01/2021]. 
442Cfr. Article 8, 12, 15 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.    
443European Migration Network (EMN), EMN Glossary:  https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/removal_en [18/01/2021]. 






according to a practical sheet published by ASGI, “allontanamento” is a superordinate 
category including both “respingimento” and “espulsione”445.    
Another example of semitechnical word is “return”, which, despite being used in 
many contexts446, legally means “the movement of a person going from a host country 
back to a country of origin, country of nationality447”, and which has been translated 
into Italian into “rimpatrio448” through a functional equivalence. “Rimpatrio” is also 
found in the official glossary of European Migration Network (EMN) of the European 
Commission449. 
Lastly, legal terminology is also made up of general words whose meanings are 
understandable also for laymen such as “police” rendered with the syntagma of higher 
register “autorità di Pubblica sicurezza450” through the technique of the amplification 
and elevating the register, “border police” translated with a class shift into “polizia di 
frontiera451”, “prefect” into its absolute equivalent “prefetto452” as well as the 
translation pair “judicial or administrative authority”- “autorità giudiziaria e 
amministrativa453”.  
Legal texts have also a large amount of words coming from Latin. In the ST, these 
expressions have maintained their original form as in “inter alia” and “ex officio”. In 
the TT, on the contrary, they have been rendered with the target language as in “tra 
l’altro454” and “d’ufficio455”.   
At lexical level, the extensive use of prepositional phrases is prevalent. In some 
 
445ASGI, “Espulsioni e respingimenti: i profili sostanziali”, scheda pratica a cura dell’avv. Savio, G., 
2016, pg. 5: https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2016_DEF_ESPULSIONI-E-
RESPINGIMENTI-_-I-PROFILI-SOSTANZIALI-stampabile.pdf. 
446Cambridge Dictionary: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/return [18/01/2021].   
447 European Migration Network (EMN), EMN Glossary: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/return_en [18/01/2021]. 
448Cfr. Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.    
449European Migration Network (EMN), EMN Glossary:  https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/removal_en [18/01/2021]. 
450Cfr. Article 13 of the Italian Constitution, §32 of Khlaifia’s case. 
451Cfr. Article 10§1 of the Immigration Consolidated Act, §33 of Khlaifia’s case. 
452Cfr. Article 13§1 of the Immigration Consolidated Act, §33 of Khlaifia’s case.  
453Cfr. Article 13§1 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case. 
454Cfr. Introduction to the Immigration Consolidated Act, §33 of Khlaifia’s case.  




cases, the form has been maintained as in “in pursuance of” – “in ottemperanza a”456, 
and “in the light of all the circumstances”- “alla luce di tutte le circostanze457”. 
Other expressions have been translated both literally and with a class shift noun (EN)-
verb (IT): “for the purpose of expulsion” – “ai fini dell’espulsione458”, “for the purpose 
of bringing him before the competent legal authority- “per essere tradotto dinanzi 
all’autorità giudiziaria competente459”; and “on the basis of” – “sulla base di460”- 
“fondato su461”. 
The prepositional phrase “in accordance with”has been also translated differently: 
both word- for-word as “a norma di462”, “nel rispetto di463”, “ai sensi di464” and “in 
conformità di465”, or using a class shift from noun (EN)→ adverb (IT) as in 
“conformemente a466”,  
Interestingly, uncommon adverbs are frequent in English legal texts, but they do not 
have a correspondent into Italian and for this reason they are not translated. Among 
these adverbs we find “thereof” meaning “of or about the thing just mentioned467” as in 
“[…] the deportation of alien[…], giving prior notice thereof to the Prime Minister and 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs468” and “hereof” meaning “of the thing or document 
that is being talked about469” as in “under Article 10 hereof470”.  
 
456Cfr. Article 4 of the draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law Commission, §46 
of Khlaifia’s case. 
457Cfr. Article 9 of the draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law Commission, §46 
of Khlaifia’s case. 
458Cfr. Article 19 of the draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law Commission, §46 
of Khlaifia’s case. 
459Cfr. Article 5§1 of the Convention, §55 of Khlaifia’s case. 
460Cfr. Article 9 of the draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law Commission, §46 
of Khlaifia’s case. 
461Cfr. Article 19§3, a) of the draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the International Law 
Commission, §46 of Khlaifia’s case.  
462Cfr.  Article 8§1 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.  
463Cfr.  Article 1 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case; and Article 3 of the draft article on the 
expulsion of aliens by the International Law Commission, §46 of Khlaifia’s case. 
464Cfr.  Article 13§4 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.   
465Cfr.  Article 16§4 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.   
466Cfr.  Article 2§2, a) of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case; Article 15§6 of the Return 
Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case; and Article 4 of the draft article on the expulsion of aliens by the 
International Law Commission, §46 of Khlaifia’s case. 
467Cambridge Dictionary: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/thereof.  
468Cfr. Article 13§1 of the Immigration Consolidated Act, §33 of Khlaifia’s case.   
469Cambridge Dictionary: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/hereof.  




Lastly, legal English texts contain many acronyms and abbreviations: Khlaifia’s 
cross-references shortened “International Law Commission” into (ILC) which have 
been left out in the TT.  
 
4.3.3. Final remarks 
The Grand Chamber judgment is a complex genre, unique in its kind as not only it 
comprises different legal texts and characteristics which have to be taken into account 
when translating, but also represents the interaction between national and supranational 
courts. The case of Khlaifia and Others v. Italy has been translated, according to Cao’s 
words, for informative purposes of the target text of the target legal system471 in line 
with the aim of the project “Bringing the Convention Closer to Home: Translation and 
dissemination of key ECHR case-law in target languages472".  
However, some difficulties need to be considered while translating Grand Chamber’s 
judgment.  
Firstly, according to Reiss’s text types theory473, ST and TT may be different text 
types: the ST drafted by the drafting committee of the Grand Chamber is both operative 
and informative as not only it declares violations and grants remedies, but also it 
disseminates and enforces the principles enshrined in the ECHR and in the ECtHR case-
law. On the contrary, the TT translated and revised into Italian by Rita Carnevali, 
linguistic assistant, and Dr Martina Scantamburlo, linguistic officer is only informative. 
This may influence the other elements of the communicative situation of the judgment. 
Despite the register is the same474, and in some cases higher in the Italian version, ST 
and TT involve different participants in the communicative situation: in the ST, the 
sender is the Grand Chamber, the receivers are the parties involved in the case namely 
 
  
471Cfr. Cao D., “Translating law”, Multilingual matters LTD, Cleventon, Buffalo, Toronto, 2007, pg. 11. 
472European Court of Human Rights, “Bringing the Convention Closer to Home. The Court ‘s Case-Law 
Translations Project (2012-2016): Achievements and Remaining Challenges”:    
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HRTF_standards_translations_ENG.pdf [21/12/2020]. 
473Cfr. Reiss K. (1971), in Munday J., “Introducing Translation Studies- Theories and Applications”, 
Routledge, Fourth Edition, 2016, pg. 89.   
474Cfr. Borja Albi A. et al. (2009), in Petruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic 
analysis of European Court of Human Rights judgments in English”, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 




the Italian Government, the three Tunisian nationals and their agents and lawyers, and 
other third parties such as Coordination Française pour le droit d’asile (French coalition 
for the right of asylum), and the Center for Human Rights, and Legal Pluralism of 
McGill University, the AIRE Center and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
(ECRE); in the TT, the sender is again the Grand Chamber, but the receiver is wider, 
being the whole population of the Member States of the Council of Europe, so we 
would have expected the register of the ST to be higher. 
Secondly, another problem relies on the use of the language for delivering 
judgments. One of the official languages of the Court is English. However, the 
multicultural and multilinguistic context of the European Court of Human Rights leads 
to the creation of the European legal English which, according to the linguistic Brannan, 
is considered as a “hidden third (non-official) language” and which may sound unusual 
and unnatural to native speakers of the official languages of the Court. This variation of 
English may lead to misunderstandings while translating.   
Thirdly, the intercultural and interlingual differences between national and 
supranational courts may have an impact on linguistic features. From the analysis, it 
emerges that terminology is the most striking linguistic feature to translate. The cross-
references of Khlaifia’s case are indeed a mixture of national, international and 
supranational system-bound elements and their translation implies a process of 
recontextualization where elements originally embedded in a national legal and judicial 
system migrate from their natural context into a different environment. The analysis of 
these terms has been conducted grouping cross-references in technical and semi-
technical law-related words, immigration-related word, and general words used in legal 
contexts that are understandable to laymen. From the study, it emerges that one of the 
most difficult challenges in translating the case-law of ECtHR relies on what the 
linguistic Brennan calls “supranational terms” and “national terms”475. 
Words belonging to the first category have been mostly translated literally as in “right 
to liberty and security”- “diritto alla libertà e alla sicurezza476”, “prohibition of torture 
 
475Cfr. Brannan J. (2013), in Petruzzo K., “National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic analysis 
of European Court of Human Rights judgments in English”, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2019, 
pg. 80. 




or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”-“proibizione della tortura e dei 
trattamenti o pene crudeli, inumani o degradanti477”, “collective expulsion”- “espulsione 
collettiva478” 
By contrast, national ones have been translated with different techniques. For example, 
“respingimento” has been rendered into “refusal of entry479” through the technique of 
modulation (effect<>cause), as “respingimento” (literally: pushback) is a consequence of 
the fact that migrants are refused to enter the territory (“refusal of entry”). Another 
example is “espulsione amministrativa” rendered into “administrative deportation480” 
through the technique of modulation (general<>particular), because “espulsione” is 
polysemic and applicable in different contexts and circumstances481, whereas 
“deportation” only refers to the action of forcing someone to leave a country, especially 
if he/she has no legal right to stay482.  
The cross-references of Khlaifia’s case contain also technical words taken from the 
European context which have been translated with different techniques. Most of them 
have been rendered literally as in “extradition”- “estradizione483”, “voluntary departure” 
– “partenza volontaria484” or “political asylum” - “asilo politico485”, whereas other 
ones through class shifts as in the pairs “entry-ban”- “divieto di ingresso486”,  “refugee 
status”- “status di rifugiato” and “refugee protection”- “protezione dei rifugiati487”, or a 
level shift, as in the pairs “risk of absconding”-“rischio di fuga488”. As these 
expressions have a concrete reference in both Italian and European legislation, their 
translation does not give rise to doubts.  
Despite the above-mentioned legal translation challenges, the translation of Khlaifia 
case has contributed to convey the principles of the judgments into an Italian audience. 
 
477Cfr. Article 3 of the Convention, §136 of Khaifia’s case.  
478Cfr. Article 4 of the Protocol No.4 to the Convention, §212 of Khaifia’s case.   
479Cfr. Article 10 of the Consolidated Immigration Act, §33 of Khlaifia’s case. 
480Cfr. Article 13 of the Consolidated Immigration Act, §33 of Khlaifia’s case. 
481Enciclopedia Treccani:  https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/espulsione/ [15/01/2021].  
482Cambridge Dictionary:  https://dictionary.cambridge.org/it/dizionario/inglese/deport [15/01/2021]. 
483Cfr. Article 2 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.    
484Cfr. Article 15§3 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.    
485Cfr. Article 10 of the Consolidated Immigration Act, §33 of Khlaifia’s case. 
486Cfr. Article 12 of the Return Directive, §41 of Khlaifia’s case.    
487Cfr. Article 10 of the Consolidated Immigration Act, §33 of Khlaifia’s case. 




The translators Rita Carnevali and Dr Martina Scantamburlo have translated the TT as 
faithful as possible to the ST, using in most cases direct or oblique translation 
techniques, especially as regards terminology. Thusly, the informative purpose of 
translation has been achieved successfully. 
The translated text still makes use of a technical language and register, maintaining 
all the characteristics of the so-called “intra-specialist communication489” which is a 
communication destined for specialists in the same field. It follows that all subjects of 
law, including migrants, may not comprehend their legal content. Albeit the translation 
project of the Court has contributed to the improvement of disseminating the contents of 
human rights legal texts, there may be still a need of simplification in order to reach a 
wider readership.  
Therefore, it is hope that this study is a good starting point to open up new paths for 
further work to simplify legal texts not only for specialists, but also for laymen. 
 
489Cfr. Cloître and Shinn (1985), in Petruzzo K., National law in supranational case-law: A linguistic 
analysis of European Court of Human Rights judgments in English, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 






La migrazione è un fattore sociale che esiste da sempre e che pervade il nostro 
tempo. Una svolta significativa è avvenuta nel 2011, quando, a seguito delle primavere 
arabe, l’Europa è diventata una meta ambita da molti migranti provenienti dal Nord 
Africa. L’Italia è stata tra le protagoniste principali di questo nuovo scenario, 
dimostrando tuttavia un’inadeguata preparazione nella gestione di un flusso migratorio 
particolarmente elevato.  
Ciò si è tradotto in una frequente violazione di alcuni dei diritti e dei principi stabiliti 
nella Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo, c.d. CEDU. La seguente tesi si è 
posta dunque l’obiettivo di analizzare la politica d’immigrazione in Italia agli albori di 
questo nuovo fenomeno attraverso l’analisi di un caso esemplare, Khlaifia e Altri c. 
Italia, il quale affronta temi come la detenzione illegale, la proibizione alla tortura, alle 
pene o trattamenti inumani e degradanti e le espulsioni collettive.  
Prima di tutto, abbiamo approfondito le dinamiche che hanno portato i ricorrenti, tre 
uomini di origine tunisina, a presentare ricorso alla Corte Europea dei Diritti 
dell’Uomo, c.d. Corte EDU, contro la Repubblica Italiana. Essi lamentavano di essere 
stati privati della propria libertà personale in assenza dei presupposti legali nei centri di 
primo soccorso e di accoglienza e di non avere ricevuto alcuna giustificazione per tale 
trattamento. Non solo, i tre tunisini ritenevano di essere stati soggetti a condizioni 
disumane e degradanti culminate poi in un’espulsione collettiva verso la loro 
madrepatria senza essere stati sottoposti a dei colloqui individuali. Infine, essi 
denunciavano anche il mancato beneficio di un ricorso giurisdizionale contro queste 
violazioni.  
Data la rilevanza del caso, la Corte EDU, riunita nella Gran Camera, ha concordato 
con i querelanti la violazione della libertà personale senza giustificato motivo. Altresì, 
ritenendo il sistema di accoglienza italiano lacunoso, ha colto l’occasione per imporre 
agli Stati Membri l’adozione e l’effettivo rispetto delle leggi che disciplinano in maniera 
chiara le procedure necessarie della prassi di frontiera a cui sono sottoposti i migranti 




Al fine di comprendere la politica d’immigrazione in Italia, il caso è stato analizzato 
sia dal punto di vista giuridico che da quello linguistico.  
Ci siamo dunque focalizzati sull’analisi e sulla comparazione di tutti quei testi di 
legge nazionali, europei e sovranazionali inerenti ai temi principali del caso e presenti 
nella sentenza stessa, tra cui il Testo Unico sull’Immigrazione, la Direttiva Rimpatri e il 
Progetto di articoli in materia di espulsione degli stranieri. Nonostante i diversi ambiti 
di applicazione, in generale questi testi di legge si prefiggono l’obiettivo di garantire il 
diritto alla libertà e sicurezza, di proibire la tortura, i trattamenti e le pene disumane e 
degradanti e le espulsioni collettive, nel rispetto della dignità umana e dei diritti 
fondamentali. D’altro canto, invece, essi presentano dei punti critici comuni. Tra questi, 
la loro generalità di contenuto meglio nota come vaghezza, caratteristica tipica dei testi 
giuridici, i quali sono stati elaborati con il fine di coprire in modo esaustivo diversi atti e 
situazioni future concepibili o possibili (cfr. Cao 2007:121). A tal proposito si pensi, ad 
esempio, alla Convenzione Europea sui Diritti dell’Uomo stessa, la quale rappresenta “a 
merger of different legal systems” ed è quindi un “living instrument” (Peruzzo 2019: 14) 
da applicare e interpretare in modo più dinamico e ampio, alla luce delle circostanze e 
del sistema giuridico dello Stato Membro considerato.  Un’altra difficoltà riguarda il 
linguaggio utilizzato: i testi legali si inseriscono in un sistema culturale, legale e 
giuridico del Paese o dell’istituzione che li emette, e di conseguenza si servono di un 
lessico specializzato e di un registro elevato (cfr. Cao 2007: 15-18). Tuttavia, tali testi 
trattano tematiche relative ai diritti umani, il cui obiettivo è quello di proteggere gli 
individui e/ o gruppi di individui da azioni che interferiscono con le libertà fondamentali 
e la dignità umana. Essi dovrebbero quindi essere accessibili e comprensibili a tutti i 
soggetti di diritto, tra cui i migranti. Dalla ricerca è emerso che, una volta in Italia, i 
migranti troppo spesso non hanno alcuna familiarità con il sistema legale, hanno scarsa 
se non nessuna informazione circa la procedura da intraprendere per effettuare una 
domanda d’asilo o di protezione. 
Da questo consegue che la comunicazione e la mediazione sono una possibile e 
concreta soluzione alle lacune della politica d’immigrazione italiana. Non di meno, la 
comunicazione è anche un obbligo delle autorità nei confronti di tutti coloro che 
desiderano chiedere asilo o entrare e soggiornare in uno Stato membro (cfr. articolo 




flusso migratorio, degli attori coinvolti (con particolare attenzione alla figura del 
mediatore interculturale) e degli eventi che hanno caratterizzato Lampedusa nel 2011, si 
è poi cercato di capire come e se, nel caso specifico di Khlaifia, le informazioni 
contenute nei testi di legge siano state comunicate ai migranti in modo efficace.  
Dalla lettura di alcuni documenti tra cui “Raccomandazioni e buone prassi per la 
gestione dei flussi migratori misti in arrivo via mare” del Progetto Praesidium e a cura 
del Ministero degli Interni e il rapporto “Conclusioni e raccomandazioni di Amnesty 
International alle autorità italiane a seguito della missione di ricerca a Lampedusa e 
Mineo” è emerso che il sistema di accoglienza di Lampedusa, nel 2011, era al collasso. I 
migranti non venivano informati correttamente né sui loro diritti, né sulle ragioni del 
loro trattenimento, e, di conseguenza, non avevano possibilità di presentare ricorso 
davanti a un giudice. Nei centri di accoglienza, il personale ingaggiato era esiguo in 
confronto alla presenza numerosa dei migranti, mentre condizioni di insalubrità e di 
sovraffollamento regnavano. Il caso Khlaifia dimostra che quando gli stati sono 
sopraffatti da grandi flussi migratori, e non hanno risorse necessarie per fornire ai 
migranti gli standard di base previsti dalla legge, le autorità possono concedersi più 
libertà d’azione nella gestione dell’afflusso, e, spesso, a discapito dei diritti sanciti dalla 
legge.  
In ultimo, ci siamo prefissi l’obiettivo di fornire uno strumento linguistico per la 
diffusione dei diritti umani a tutti i soggetti di diritto: la traduzione legale. Il progetto 
Bringing the Convention Closer to Home: Translation and dissemination of key ECHR 
case-law in target languages, lanciato dalla Corte EDU con l’aiuto degli Stati Membri, 
ha permesso la divulgazione dei principi e della giurisprudenza della Corte in dodici 
lingue, rendendoli accessibili a una vasta platea di lettori. Si noti che, tra i documenti 
tradotti, vi è proprio la sentenza del caso Khlaifia. In generale, la traduzione della 
sentenza (ST: EN-TT:IT) ha contribuito a trasmettere i principi del caso presso 
l’opinione pubblica italiana. Il testo è stato tradotto nel modo più fedele possibile al ST, 
utilizzando per lo più tecniche di traduzione diretta. Dall’analisi traduttologica, emerge 
tuttavia che la difficoltà maggiore risiede nella terminologia in quanto espressione 
culturale di un sistema giuridico, con particolare riferimento ai “supranational terms” e 




Altresì, i testi tradotti hanno utilizzano ancora un linguaggio e un registro tecnico, 
mantenendo le caratteristiche della “intra-specialist communication” (cfr. Cloître and 
Shinn, 1985 in Peruzzo 2019: 59). Ne consegue che, nonostante il grande contributo 
della traduzione legale della Corte per la divulgazione dei diritti umani, il TT risulta 
ancora di difficile comprensione per un pubblico più vasto, tra cui i migranti.  
L’analisi del caso Khlaifia e Altri c. Italia ha permesso non solo di fare chiarezza 
sulla legislazione che regola il sistema di accoglienza, ma anche di capirne i 
meccanismi, attraverso uno studio approfondito della gestione del flusso migratorio, 
dalla legge alla prassi. Dall’analisi emerge infatti che un’adeguata politica migratoria è 
necessaria per far sì che gli individui o i gruppi di individui non siano soggetti a costanti 
violazioni dei diritti umani. Altresì, la seguente tesi può essere un utile approfondimento 
di tematiche come la detenzione illegale, la tortura e trattamenti disumani e degradanti e 
le espulsioni nel contesto dell’immigrazione, non giustificabili dalla situazione 
emergenziale.  
La difficoltà maggiore della ricerca, tuttavia, è stata quella di reperire delle fonti 
chiare, puntuali e adeguate che permettessero di fare luce sulla prassi migratoria, con 
particolare riguardo all’iter a cui sono sottoposti i migranti appena sbarcati sul suolo 
italiano, a quali sono le strutture di accoglienza secondo il diritto nazionale, e, infine, a 
come essi vengono informati sui loro diritti, sulla procedura di richiesta di asilo e di 
protezione. In generale, la prassi rimane una zona grigia, poco trasparente e sottoposta 
ad interpretazione individuale e ad azioni arbitrarie. 
Per quanto concerne l’aspetto linguistico della ricerca, la difficoltà maggiore è stata 
quella di trovare un’esaustiva letteratura sull’attività di traduzione della Corte. A tal 
proposito, fondamentali sono stati soprattutto i lavori di Deborah Cao e di Katia 
Peruzzo, attraverso i quali è stato possibile condurre l’analisi traduttologica del caso. Il 
confronto delle “cross-references” ha fornito un esempio concreto di traduzione di testi 
legislativi, esempio che non solo ha permesso di trasmettere i principi del caso in lingua 
italiana, ma che può essere un utile punto di partenza per ulteriori ricerche e 
approfondimenti. Rimane comunque la necessità di partire da queste traduzioni fedeli e 
specialistiche per attuare dei progetti di semplificazione che possano essere indirizzati a 





1. Technical law-related words 
abuso di potere abuse of power 
al di là di ogni ragionevole dubbio  beyond a reasonable doubt 
arbitrarietà arbitrariness  
arresto illegale unlawful arrest 
base legale legal basis 
buona fede good faith  
carcerazione preventiva preventive detention  
codice penale penal code  
colpa negligence  
comma paragraph 
condotta colpevole guilty conduct  
danno damage 
decreto legislativo legislative decree 
delitti contro la persona crimes against person 
delitto contro la libertà morale crimes against morality 
diritti culturali cultural rights 
diritti sociali social rights 
diritto alla libertà e alla sicurezza right to liberty and security 
diritto economici economic rights 
dolo malice 
effetto sospensivo suspensive effect 
equo processo fair trial 
ergastolo life imprisonment 
fattispecie particular facts 
Fondo Asilo Migrazione e Integrazione 
(FAMI)  
Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 
(AMIF) 
forma di immunità legal immunity 
garanzie procedurali procedural safeguards 
giudice di Palermo per le indagini 
preliminari (GIP)  Palermo preliminary investigations judge  
giudice di pace di Agrigento  Justice of the Peace of Agrigento 
giurisprudenza case-law 
il principio di tassatività o determinatezza principle of determinacy and clarity 
iter legislativo legislative process 
legittimità lawfulness 
Marina Militare Italiana Italian Navy  
minorata difesa impaired defense 




misure preventive - prendere misure 
preventive verso qualcuno/ qualcosa 
preventive measures - take preventive 
measures against someone/ something 
obbligazioni negative negative obligations 
obbligazioni positive positive obligations 
obbligo di motivazione obligation to state reasons 
onere della prova burden of the proof 
principio della personalità della 
responsabilità penale 
the principle of the personality of 
criminal liability  
principio di colpevolezza principle of guilty  
principio di offensività e lesività del reato 
principle of the harmfulness of the 
offence 
privazione della libertà  deprivation of liberty  
provvedimenti provvisori - adottare 
provvedimenti provvisori 
interim measures - to apply for interim 
measures 
ragioni/ motivi di diritto e di fatto  legal and factual reasons/ grounds 
reati di tortura crimes of torture 
reato banale  trivial offence  
reclusione  imprisonment 
ricorrenti applicants 
ricorso appeal 
ricorso: accettare un ricorso to accept an appeal  
ricorso: presentare un ricorso  to lodge an appeal  
rimedio legale legal remedy 
riserva di giurisdizione reservation of jurisdiction 
riserva di legge assoluta absolute legal reservation 
salvaguardia fondamentale paramount safeguard 
sanzione penalty 
dare una sanzione impose a penalty 
Sistema Sanitario Nazionale (SNN) National Health System (SSN)  
soggetto di diritto  subject of law 
stato di diritto  state of law 
stato di emergenza (umanitaria) state of (humanitarian) emergency 
tortura torture 
tortura: istigazione alla tortura incitement to torture 
più condotte (cfr. tortura) more than one conduct (cfr. torture) 
trattamenti degradanti degrading treatment 
trattamenti disumani inhuman treatment 
 
2. Immigration-related words 
accordo bilaterale Italia -Tunisia 






Alto Commissariato delle Nazioni Unite 
per i Rifugiati 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) 
asilo politico  political asylum 
Assemblea parlamentare del Consiglio 
d'Europa (APCE) 
Council of Europe's Parliamentary 
Assembly (PACE) 
Associazione per gli studi giuridici 
sull'immigrazione (ASGI)  
Association for Juridical Studies on 
Immigration (ASGI) 
Banca dati europea di dattiloscopia in 
materia di asilo (Eurodac) 
European Asylum Dactyloscopy 
database (Eurodac) 
Centri di Accoglienza (CDAs) Reception or Welcome Centers 
Centri di Accoglienza dei Richiedenti 
Asilo (CARAs) 
Centers for the Reception of Asylum 
Seekers 
Centri di Accoglienza Straordinaria (CAS)  Emergency Reception Centers 
Centri di Espulsione e di Identificazione 
(CIEs) Identification and Expulsion Centers 
Centri di Permanenza per i Rimpatri 
(CPRs) Return Detention Centers  
Centri di Prima Accoglienza (CPAs)  First reception centers/ regional hub 
Centri di Primo Soccorso e Accoglienza 
(CPSAs) Centers for First Aid and Reception 
Croce Rossa Italiana (CRI) The Italian Red Cross (CRI) 
Croce Rossa: Federazione internazionale 
delle Società della Croce Rossa e della 
Mezzaluna Rossa (FICR) 
International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)  
decreti respingimento refusal-of-entry orders 
decreto sicurezza e immigrazione (decreto 
Salvini) 
decree on immigration and security 
(Salvini Decree)  
Dipartimento per le Libertà Civili e 
l’Immigrazione Unit for Civil Liberties and Immigration  
direttiva rimpatri 2008/115/CE  Return Directive 2008/115/EC 
espulsione  expulsion 
espulsione amministrativa administrative expulsion 
espulsioni giudiziarie  judicial expulsion 
estradizione extradition 
facilitatore della comunicazione  communication facilitator 
foglio notizie  information sheet 
gestione dei flussi migratori migration flows management 
interprete sociale social interpreter 
La Convenzione contro la tortura e altre 
pene o trattamenti crudeli, inumani o 
degradanti  
UN Convention against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) 
maltrattamento  ill-treatment 




mediatore culturale cultural mediator 
mediatore di madre lingua mother-tongue mediator 
mediatore interculturale intercultural mediator 
mediatore linguistico linguistic mediator 
mediatore linguistico- culturale linguistic-cultural mediator 
mediatore sociale social mediator 
migrante irregolare irregular migrant 
minori accompagnati unaccompanied minors 
Nuova Sistema di Accoglienza (SAI) Reception and Integration System 
operatore interculturale intercultural operator 
Ordine di Malta The Sovereign Order of Malta 
Organizzazione Internazionale per le 
Immigrazioni (OIM) 
International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) 
partenza volontaria voluntary departure 
pene degradanti degrading punishment 
pene disumane inhuman punishment 
prima accoglienza first reception 
principio di non-refoulement non-refoulement principle  
procedure semplificate simplified procedures 
Progetto Praesidium Praesidium Project 
protezione sussidiaria subsidiary protection 
protezione umanitaria humanitarian protection  
punti di crisi hotspot 
Questura Provinciale- Ufficio 
Immigrazione 
Provincial Police Headquarters- 
Immigration Office 
respingimento refusal of entry  
respingimento alla frontiera refusal of entry at the border 
respingimento differito deferred refusal of entry 
rilocazione relocation 
rimpatrio return   
rischio di fuga risk of absconding  
roadmap italiana Italian roadmap  
Save the Children Save the Children 
seconda accoglienza second reception 
Sistema Automatizzato di Identificazione 
delle Impronte 
Automated Fingerprint Identification 
System (AFIS) 
Sistema D' Indagine (SDI) Investigation System (SDI) 
Sistema d’informazione Schengen (SIS) Schengen Information System (SIS) 
Sistema di protezione per richiedenti asilo 
e rifugiati (SPRAR) 
System of Protection for Refugees and 
Asylum Seekers 
sottocommissione ad hoc sull'arrivo 
massiccio di migranti in situazione 
Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-




irregolare, di richiedenti asilo e di rifugiati 
sulle rive del sud dell'Europa 
asylum seekers and refugees on Europe's 
southern shores (PACE Ad Hoc Sub-
Committee) 
status di rifugiato refugee status 
strutture temporanee temporary structures 
tecnico della mediazione linguistica per 
immigrati  
technician of linguistic mediation for 
immigrants 
Testo unico sull'Immigrazione  Consolidated Immigration Act  
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